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Introd uction 
ROBERT H. BURGER 
NATIONALINFORMATION POLICY IS beset with antinomies. On the one 
hand, the very thought of a national information policy is anathema to 
one who believes that the first amendment is all the information policy 
we need. The defense of such a position is grounded in the fear that any 
information policy, other than that provided for in the constitution and 
its amendments, is a step toward the demise of democracy and the 
erection of a totalitarian state. The information policy of the Soviet 
Union-i.e., the absolute political control of information-in this per- 
son’s view is seen as the logical outcome of any national information 
policy. 
On the other hand, the continued absence of a national informa- 
tion policy is genuine cause for alarm to one who perceives the potential 
danger of unregulated private and public actions regarding informa- 
tion. The absence of an information policy is detrimental, i t  is argued, 
because government has failed to control actions that can be unjust or 
harmful to individuals, corporations, and the body politic. 
The characteristic of antinomy also pervades disputes over two 
areas of information policy that are currently receiving much attention: 
privacy and secrecy. For example, privacy concerns at the national 
federal level are mainly dealt with in the Privacy Act of 1974 and its 
amendment. The act’s provisions attempt to protect the individual 
citizen from the unwanted and often unwarranted intrusions of govern- 
ment and private institutions. On the other hand, economic health, 
Robert H. Burger is Assistant Slavic Librarian and Associate Professor of Library Admin- 
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crime prevention andcontrol, and national security needs are often cited 
as justifications for these intrusions. As far as secrecy is concerned, it is 
most often discussed in the realm of science and technical information 
policy and national commercial information policy. The government, 
or more precisely, the executive department, is attempting to walk a 
tightrope, balancing national security goals against the requirements of 
technical innovation. The first requires restriction on providing infor- 
mation to foreigners, the latter requires open channels of information 
flow between the United States and foreign scientists. Because of their 
currency, importance, and sharing of certain characteristics-such as 
antinomy-privacy, secrecy, and national information policy were seen 
as an appropriate topic for an issue of Library Trends.  
Generally speaking we do not yet have a volume that attempts to 
deal with this complex subject in any comprehensive way. Answers to 
many questions relating to this broad area still elude us. We really don't 
know, for example, what information policy is, in spite of the large 
amount of literature devoted to the topic.' This quandary has come 
about because of the broad range of policies often subsumed under the 
rubric of information policy, and also because we have not been specific 
about the goals and results of information policy. 
For example, people in communications, computers, commerce, 
and library and information science all use the term in format ion  pol icy  
but apparently mean different things by it. Because there is little inter- 
disciplinary work done in this area or much sharing of perceptions 
among researchers in these various fields, claims about the goals of 
information policy often rest solely on the ideology or narrow discipli- 
nary view of policy analysts and policymakers alone, and not on any 
empirical grounds or long-term experience with a specific type of 
information policy.2 
Along with our ignorance of the nature of information policy, we 
are unsure about what i t  promises or threatens. Will it help to ensure 
progress, justice, and other human ideals? What values does i t  hold 
dear-economic and technical supremacy, democracy, or some other as 
yet unspecified value? Are all these mutually exclusive or mutually 
compatible? Once we pursue a given policy, what will the results be; in 
what way will implementation of a desired policy distort the original 
intent of the policymakers? How will i t  all affect our culture, our 
economy, or moral sensibilities? 
How has technology been related to the urge for the political 
control of information? For that is what information policy is, the 
political control of information. Is i t  a benign or malignant force or 
simply a neutral tool in the hands of unpredictable humans? 
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To begin to answer some of these questions, the authors in this 
number of Library Trends have written the following essays. But the 
reader should not expect a cogent blueprint to emerge here, or, for that 
matter, a philosophical prescription for the years ahead. Description 
and analysis are needed first. Without these two, our subsequent conclu- 
sions would be ill-informed and worthless. On the other hand, we have 
all tried to avoid the sterility of unattainable but often desired objectiv- 
ity. One of the traits common to all the papers is a grappling (and at this 
stage unfortunately that is all that i t  probably can be) for an understand- 
ing of this phenomenon of information policy. Like most of the exist- 
ing information policy literature, these essays are broadly descriptive or 
legally based. But in all of them the issues of privacy and secrecy are 
inextricably intertwined. Russell Shank provides an excellent perspec- 
tive on the privacy issue by examining its manifestations over the last 
century-and-a-half. David Linowes and Colin Bennett give a superb 
analysis of the formation of the Privacy Act of 1974 and in the course of 
their exposition attempt to apply contemporary political science theory 
to the categorization of information policy. Stephen Gould and Harold 
C. Relyea each cogently demonstrate the complexity of the issues sur- 
rounding, respectively, national scientific and technical information 
policy and national commercial information policy and their relation 
to secrecy. 
The next three essays were the most difficult tocompose because, in 
addition to dealing with existing laws and policy phenomena, the 
authors also had to confront the current confusion and abstract nature 
of information policy itself. Fran MacDonald clearly explains the rela- 
tion among technology, privacy, and electronic freedom of speech, an 
area constantly changing because of the fluid nature of technology 
itself. Toni Carbo Bearman, from her vantage point as former executive 
director of NCLIS, gives us a prescient insider’s view of national infor- 
mation policy trends. M.E.L. Jacob and Debbie Rings then comprehen- 
sively explore the labyrinthine area of our national information policy 
and its relation to other (foreign) national information policies and 
international information policy. Finally, Bob Burger provides a frame- 
work for understanding analyses of information policy and for evalua- 
ting their relevancy. 
Here we are dealing with some of the most important issues of our 
time-technology, culture, and human values, and the attempts of 
nation-states to control and influence them. We must face these issues 
without either assuming the virtues of laissez-faire which have at times 
proved to be economically and politically disastrous or of increased 
regulation which some rightly fear may lead to totalitarianism. Rather, 
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we should seek solutions with sober, rational, and compassionate 
minds. The  efforts of the contributors to this symposium would be 
justified if their essays helped to start us on such a path of discovery and 
promise. 
References 
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Privacy: History, Legal, Social, 
and Ethical Aspects 
RUSSELL SHANK 
THEGOVERNANCE OF THE United States is founded on the principle of 
individualism-a recognition of the basic rights of human beings. Prior 
to 1890, however, there was no compelling call for a sector in the law 
that recognized the “right of privacy” as one of these basic rights and the 
need to protect i t  legally. There were, of course, many elements in laws 
governing the United States that dealt with aspects of social behavior 
which might result in the loss or dimunition of an individual’s privacy, 
but they were not contained in the law under the rubric “privacy.” An 
understanding of the development of privacy in tort law may aid in 
thinking about the growing problems of dealing with the right of 
privacy, if it exists, in the new information age. 
The language of discontent seems endemic in American society. It 
led to the Revolution, and in recent years inflamed many individuals 
and groups to engage in civil disobedience, to test laws deemed averse to 
individualism and to demand legal protection in the face of actual or 
potential offensive inroads by government agencies on the individuals’ 
alleged right to be let alone. The language is strident and repeatedly 
reported in the news media. Hence it would seem unusual to think that 
the existence of a right to be let alone should ever be questioned and yet 
it has been. In part the argument is an issue of legal philosophy. In part, 
also, the issue is raised by the conflict between the proponents of the 
utility of the new computer-telecommunications technologies and 
those who fear the potential for these technologies to invade or reduce 
Russell Shank is University Librarian, University of California, Los Angeles. 
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personal privacy. It is difficult to shape new laws to protect that which 
we call “privacy” and not at the same time to unduly impede useful 
innovations in technology. 
Among other things, many people think that the Bill of Rights in 
the U.S. Constitution lays a clear foundation for the right of privacy. 
Yet, in the first ten amendments to the Constitution, the concept of 
privacy is not explicitly stated, and the word @riuate(and any derivative 
of it) is used only once.’ The Bill of Rights does tend to enhance the 
privacy of individuals, but its provisions are directed at outlawing 
specific acts in which a government might engage that are deemed 
anathema to the republic in which we live. Together these acts aim at a 
syndrome of the invasion of privacy, but they provide no relief in law 
based on the argument of the diminution of privacy.’ It was not until 
1965 that the Supreme Court found a way to provide a constitutional 
basis for the existence of privacy as a right to be pr~tec ted .~  And i t  was 
not until 1974 that Congress recognized the right specifically i6a  law. In 
the preamble to the Privacy Act of 1974, Congress stated: 
All people are by nature free and independent, and have certain 
inalienable rights, among which are those of enjoyingand defending 
life and liberty; acquiring, possessing, and protecting property; and 
pursuing and obtaining safety, and happiness, and p r i ~ a c y . ~  
In ancient times privacy must have been maintained by conducting 
one’s affairs secretly. For other than the upper or citizen classes, how- 
ever, even secrecy was unnecessary-people had few rights and less 
property to preserve. To maintain status in ancient societies, one had to 
have a noble character defined according to social norms. Gossip served 
to spread the word about those who might have acted contrary to the 
norms, or who might have actually committed crimes, thus being 
subject to loss of status. There was no law against usinggossip to invade 
privacy in Roman society, nor in those societies based on it. Gossip 
could, though, be dangerous for those who engaged in it, making them 
subject to the wrath of thoseagainst whom it was used. In some societies 
gossips could be punished for being nuisances but not for being invad- 
ers of privacy. 
Secrecy was important to the individual who wished to foment 
revolution or to adopt a nonconformist religion. Again, eavesdroppers 
who reported information that others wanted to keep secret or who 
spread gossip about covert action generally did not violate any privacy 
laws. A person caught eavesdropping could be turned over to the law as 
a trespasser or a common nuisance but not as a thief of privacy. The 
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crime of eavesdropping became part of English law in the fourteenth 
century and was part of the common law of the colonies thereafter.5 
Through the centuries to modern times one can easily recall both 
the movements aimed at improving or preserving the rights of human 
beings and the wars and inquisitions that were waged with individual 
rights at their core. Yet the right to privacy was generally not one of 
them, except as it might be inferred from the manner in which theother 
rights were to be protected. The English Parliament presented a bill of 
rights to King William and Queen Mary in 1689. It stands with the 
Magna Carta as the cornerstone of English liberty. Among other things, 
i t  referred to true, ancient, and indubitable rights and liberties of the 
people. The French have included a declaration of the rights of man and 
citizens in their constitutions since 1789, guaranteeing the freedoms of 
speech, religion, and the press and personal security. The right of 
privacy is implicit in these rights. None of these proclamations pre- 
vented individuals and groups from discriminating against those who 
chose certain religions and political beliefs, but, in the broadest sense, 
these discriminations were not illegal. The fact that they existed gave 
emphasis to the need some felt to keep their personal lives private. 
The concept of privacy as something which could be given value 
for which someone could be compensated if one suffered its invasion, 
violation, or destruction has grown slowly in the United States as a 
consequence of the growth of the institutions and devices of communi-
cations. From message and postal systems that existed before the Revo- 
lution to the computer-telecommunication technology of modern 
times, society’s need for laws protecting the sanctuary of the individual 
has been directly proportional to the complexity of the communication 
systems of the times. 
During the first century of the American Republic, society was not 
so complex that a legal concept of privacy in tort law was deemed 
essential. This is not to say that people were unconcerned about others 
prying into their lives. There was just no compelling interest to seek 
recompense for the intrusion unless, of course, something of property 
value was stolen, or a life endangered, or a home invaded in the process. 
And then the laws of theft, battery, and mayhem could be invoked. 
The potential for eroding privacy by entrusting one’s messages to 
the mails was noted in the earliest days of colonial times in America. 
Governor Bradford of the Pilgrim group in Massachusetts intercepted 
letters of disgruntled settlers and accused the writers of slander and false 
accusations. Benjamin Franklin assumed that his mail was being 
opened even though he forbade the employees of his postal service from 
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opening bags of mail. The first law establishing a postal service con- 
tained language that made it illegal to intercept, read, or destroy mail 
entrusted to it. This prohibition has been repeated in subsequent legis- 
lation concerning the postal service. Most people who use the mail now 
assume that no one intercepts and reads their letters.6 
The census, required by the Constitution in order to determine the 
size of Congress, is another function that many have believed is an 
ominous device by which the government can invade privacy. It was at 
first most notably a political device and was viewed with suspicion in 
the eyes of proponents of states’ rights. As the country grew in all 
dimensions, proposals for adding questions relating to manufactures, 
other elements of economics, and personal characteristics of the people 
have been made. Those in charge of the census have sought to assuage 
the fear of the invasion of privacy. For example, the following language 
appeared in the circular of the census in 1840: 
Objections, it has been suggested, may possibly arise on  the part of 
some persons to give the statistical information required by theact, 
upon the ground of disinclination to expose their private affairs. 
Such, however, is not the intent, nor can be the effect, of answering 
ingenuously, the interrogatories. On  the statistical tables no name 
is inserted-the figures stand opposite no man’s name; and there- 
fore the objection can not apply. It is, moreover, inculcated upon 
the assistant that he consider all communications made to him in 
the performance of his duty, relative to the business of the people, as 
strictly ~onf ident ia l .~  
Still, objections to questions in the census prevail. In the latest 
census i t  was considered an invasion of privacy to count the number of 
bathrooms in residences. It is most appropriate to this current essay to 
note that the intensity of the federal government’s data gathering in the 
census has only increased, partly due to the innovations in tabulations 
that began in the late nineteenth century when Hollerith used his punch 
card innovation to handle the vast array of statistics being gathered.8 
Now that the census data exists in machine-readable form, the census 
has entered the arena of argument about the impact of the computer on 
society. The Federal Office of Management and Budget (OMB) is pro- 
moting the use of commercial agencies to disseminate government data. 
The Census Bureau is thus faced with a conflict. Its data are filed in its 
CENDATA computer database. Two commercial agencies have asked 
for access to the file in order to offer public services. “Given its pledge to 
compile information confidentially, the agency is sensitive to allowing 
end-user access directly to a government computer, and does not want 
even a perception of anyone being able to dial up private in f~ rma t ion . ”~  
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The potential for the invasion of privacy increased with the inven- 
tion of telegraphy. Furthermore, whereas formerly the government was 
the villain people wished to restrain, now private industry was in a 
position to be suspect also. In the Civil War and during the impeach- 
ment deliberations over President Johnson, the government sought and 
received enormous quantities of copies of old telegrams. Moreover, in 
order to examine the questions of irregularities in elections in the 
various states, Congress sought more. Western Union’s own regulations 
forbade its employees from divulging information in telegrams. Its rule 
was: 
All messages whatsoever-including Press Reports, are strictly pri- 
vate and confidential, and must be thus treated by employees of this 
Company. Information must in no case be given to persons not clearly 
entitled to receive it, concerning any message passed or desi ned to6pass over the wires or through the offices of this Company. 
In this manner, a private industry had attempted to extend the restric- 
tions of the government to its own employees. 
Through much of the nineteenth century, the legal philosophers 
paid more attention to the need to administer a system that was based on 
the notion that people were constantly threatened by the government 
while at the same time they tried to sustain the notion that in this nation 
such a threat did not exist. An influential writer of the time, Thomas 
Cooley, said i t  was a matter of principle that “it is better oftentimes that 
crime should go unpunished than that the citizen should be liable to 
have his premises invaded, his trunks broken open, his private books, 
papers, and letters exposed to prying curiosity .... 11 
American society changed rapidly following the Civil War. At the 
same time that people were moving into new territories the cities were 
growing. In the West a person was both more visible because of the 
sparse population and more able to move on to escape a bad reputation. 
In the cities people needed privacy more because of the crowds but 
gained it easier through anonymity. As individuals came to need more 
privacy i t  gained value. 
Slowly an aura of the concept of privacy’s value spread in American 
society. More people learned to read and this led to the impact of another 
“device” on the notion of the value of privacy-that was “yellow jour- 
nalism.” It was fostered by the urge of entrepreneurs to sell newspapers 
to the growing reading public.’2 In earlier days the newspaper was a 
medium for reporting events and political opinion. Now a portion of 
the press turned to sensationalism to increase sales. By the late 1800sthe 
phenomenon of reporting personal items in spicy language attracted 
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essayists of great visibility to urge reform. One writer noted that: “A 
man’s private life is inviolably his own ....None should cross his thresh- 
old. Therein is the sanctum of privacy, the violation of whose rights is 
~acrilege.”’~The President of the University of Wisconsin called for new 
defenses to be set up on behalf of the individual to protect the individual 
from the press because it was “breaking in on many of the amenities of 
social life, and scattering as news things of private interest only and of 
dear personal c~ncern .” ’~  Without new laws an individual could only 
attach social discredit to invasions of privacy on the part of the press.15 
Finally the recognition of a right to privacy, the violation of which 
could be made the subject of suit in court, was argued by two young 
lawyers in Boston-Samuel D. Warren and Louis D. Brandeis. Their 
article in the Hanlard Law Reuiew argued that the individual had a 
right to be let alone.16 That set the course for the passing of privacy laws 
in the states for the next ninety years. 
As it developed, four aspects of damage from the invasion of privacy 
have been recognized: 
-intrusion upon the plaintiff’s seclusion or solitude, or into his pri- 
vate affairs; 
-public disclosure of embarrassing private facts about the plaintiff; 
-publicity which places the plaintiff in a false light in the public eye; 
-appropriation, for the defendant’s advantage, of the plaintiff‘s name 
or 1ikene~s.I~ 
Many have argued that Warren-Brandeis contained false assump- 
tions or exaggerations. The literature of the examination of the right to 
be let alone is extensive with many authors setting forth their own 
reworking of the definitions. Still, by 1982 a right of privacy of some 
dimension was recognized in forty-eight states and the District of 
Columbia.” One influential author, William Prosser, argues away 
most of the torts growing from Warren-Brandeis. Nevertheless, he notes 
that the laws are not wrong: they have resulted from public demand. 
They have grown without plan, however, and i t  may be time to call a 
halt to their pas~age.’~ 
It was not the Warren-Brandeis article alone which impelled the 
public to push for privacy legislation. Innovations in the devices of 
communication increased the fear that government agents could learn 
things about the individual and use them to discomfort or harm people 
even though there might not be actual evidence of such action. The 
American’s penchant for keeping one’s counsel and remaining private 
grew stronger when faced with the possibility of the degradation of these 
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characteristics. Without doubt, this fear, though seemingly irrational, 
has often led lawmakers to err on the side of individualism and privacy 
in advance of damage. Many cases were to be brought to court: space 
here does not allow discussion of their variations. No one was guaran- 
teed complete privacy by the law, but: 
The general policy prevailed that information about a person 
belonged under his control until society could show an overriding 
need for its disclosure. The right to privacy was emphatically a right 
of the individual as it entered the body of American law at the close of 
the nineteenth century.'' 
Legal innovations have not been rapid. With the microphone, 
invented in 1889, government agents and police could engage in eaves- 
dropping without being on the premises of suspected wrongdoers.21 
Wiretapping and bugging of rooms were the tools of thedetective trade. 
And soon the arguments began: if one's premises were not invaded and 
no mail, no telegram, or no message had been stolen, had one lost 
something of value? These questions became more poignant particu- 
larly if one were engaged in criminal activity. In a landmark case in 1928 
the Supreme Court ruled that electronic communications were not 
tangible enough to be seizable unless they were seized on a person's 
property in which case the action would then be subject to the Fourth 
Amendment." One of the dissenters on the Court was Justice Louis 
Brandeis! 
This was an important but not a definitive case. It is the character of 
legal proceedings that each case might present some special circum- 
stances. Hence, while appearing to be similar to a previous case, a new 
case might truly be without precedent. Furthermore, one of the variations 
might consist of the mechanism for the alleged violation of a right of 
privacy. Through the first sixty years of the twentieth century the 
conflict between the issues of the individual's right to know and his or 
her right to be let alone have been exacerbated by continued innovations 
in communcation and the law to deal with them. Old laws have been 
strained to cover new technologies. When telegraphy was added tomail, 
could old regulations about learning something from the content of an 
illegally opened letter be applied to telegrams? Can something learned 
through a phone tap miles from the room in which a word was spoken 
be controlled by laws against stealing letters? Law was strained when 
messages began to be sent over the air by radio and not contained within 
a wire. Government agents are constrained by law from opening a 
traditional letter or eavesdropping on a telephone call. There is no law 
yet against someone reading someone else's electronic mail. 
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In Detroit a federal grand jury, investigating an alleged drug dealer, 
subpoenaed an electronic mail operator for “printouts of any and all 
records, data, documents, or electronic mail about the suspect, his 
associates and their business operation^."'^ The company claimed that 
the information was privileged under the law and refused to give i t  out. 
The court never acted on the company’s claim, however, because an 
indictment was issued without the information. The Rhode Island 
Supreme Court has only recently ruled that information gleaned from 
listening to cordless phone messages could be used to convict a drug 
dealer even though the police had not obtained permission to tap the 
communication. The court reasoned that where there was no wire there 
had been no wiretap, hence no warrant was required. “When Congress 
put limits on eavesdropping, the judges held, it didn’t have the cordless 
phone in mind. ”“Society is faced wi th two extraordinarily complicated 
sets of issues-is there a “right to be let alone,” and when is it violated? 
The dilemma for society lies in determining how i t  should promote the 
innovation of new communications technology while not finding itself 
faced with an unrecognized capability in the technology for breaching 
the legal barriers against the invasion of privacy. 
The Communications Act of 1934 brought together a number of 
laws relating to the telephone and radio and created the Federal Com- 
munications Commission (FCC) to establish regulations that would 
protect the communications industry while preserving the rights of the 
people. The law for radio was thus extended to telegraphy and the 
telephone as the FCC was given jurisdiction over them all including a 
penalty for the unauthorized interception and divulgence of wire 
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messages. 
Now we are faced with a much more sophisticated technological 
environment, that of the computer-communication combination con- 
trolled by the microscopic integrated circuit. The FCC early forbade the 
telephone companies from offering computer services, even though 
computers came to be essential to the operation of the telephone net- 
work in the United States. Furthermore, the phone companies would 
not allow manufacturers of electronic equipment to sell their products 
to the public for unattended attachment to the phone lines. The Carter-
fone decision by the FCC broke the barrier against “foreign” attach- 
ments to the phone system. Then value-added networks and bulk 
resellers of phone lines spawned the forces which have led to the dis- 
memberment of the American Telephone and Telegraph Company 
(AT8cT). The current national mood, also, is instrumental in reducing 
the authority of the FCC in many areas as the forces of the marketplace 
replace government intervention. 
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The specter of the remote agent gaining access to a computer data 
bank containing information about an individual and linking i t  with 
other data banks to create an invisible, virtual, and insidious file on an 
individual began to rise in the 1960s. The government was forced by 
public demand to drop its attempt to create a Federal Data Center 
although the courts did uphold the use of computers to cross-check the 
earnings of recipients of government benefits. 26 
The social environment of consumerism, individualism, and com- 
puters collided in the 1960s. Computers were gaining wide acceptance 
for the storage and manipulation of credit information: individuals 
demanded and got a credit law which gives them access to data about 
themselves and the means for correcting improper records.27 In the same 
year (1968) the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act, however, 
only gave protection to oral communications transmitted by wire.28 
Other potentially troublesome technologies were yet to be introduced 
into the marketplace. It wasn’t until 1974 that the Privacy Act was 
passed regulating the federal government in keeping and providing 
access to records. The explosion of communications technology is now 
rapidly outpacing the law. 
Legislated policy is ambiguous, incomplete or nonexistent with 
regard to a number of technological innovations, among them: dig- 
itally transmitted telephone conversations, calls on cellular or cord-
less phones, data communication between computers, electronic 
mail, database surveillance, pen registers, closed circuit television and 
electronic beepers.29 
Of 142 federal agencies surveyed, 25 percent use or plan to use electronic 
surveillance. The extent of the private sector’s use of electronic surveil- 
lance is unknown.30 
One important part of the Privacy Act was the creation of a Privacy 
Protection Study Commission. It examined individual privacy rights 
and record-keeping practices in many environments, including the 
private sector. The commission’s report made many recommendations 
for federal and state governments for laws and practices to protect the 
privacy of the individual. Perhaps its enduring contribution, however, 
is the conclusion that an effective privacy protection policy must have 
three concurrent objectives: 
-to create a proper balance between what an individual is expected to 
divulge to a record-keeping organization and what he seeks in re- 
turn (tominimize intrusiveness); 
-to open up record-keeping organizations in ways that will mini- 
mize the extent to which recorded information about an individual 
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is itself a source of unfairness in any decision about him made on 
the basis of it ( t o  max imize  fairness); and 
-to create and define obligations with respect to the uses and dis- 
closures that will be made of recorded information about a n  indi- 
vidual t o  create legitimate, enforceable expectations of confiden-t,tiality ). 
Not all students of the problems of legislating privacy in the 
modern world are sanguine about achieving these objectives. Some 
social ideals cannot be translated into intelligible legal theory. “Some 
elude legal resolution because we cannot clearly identify and balance 
the relevant social and moral values; and we refuse to resolve some 
human problems by law because we are unwilling to bear the cost that 
legal solutions would impose.”32 But too much is at stake for both the 
individual and the communication industries: law is required to pre-
vent anarchy, a state in which the individual’s rights would be lost. 
Ithiel de Sola Pool’s closing comments in his last book contain the 
most optimistic view: 
The easy access, low cost, and distributed intelligence of modern 
means of communication are a prime reason for hope. The  demo- 
cratic impulse to regulate evils, as Tccqueville warned, is ironically a 
reason for worry. Lack of technical grasp by policy makers and their 
propensity to solve problems of conflict, privacy, intellectual prop- 
erty, and monopoly by accustomed bureaucratic routines are the main 
reasons for concern. But as long as the First Amendment stands, 
backed by courts which take it seriously, the loss of liberty is not 
foreordained. The  commitment of American culture to pluralism and 
individual rights is reason for optimism, as is the pliancy and profu-
sion of electronic technology. 33 
Americans hold dear both individualism and freedom from govern- 
ment invasion of their private lives. Their laws and court proceedings 
reflect these values and governmental institutions do  change, if slowly, 
as a result of societal pressures. Even if the Constitution does not 
recognize privacy, it embodies a system that can sustain this right. But 
the future is far from clear: 
As the United States becomes moreeconomically, socially, and ppliti- 
cally information-oriented, personal privacy promises to became a 
matter of increasing litigation, legislation, and political concern. 
Indeed, the political ideal of privacy is destined to increase rather than 
lessen in importance within the polity.= 
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Privacy: Its Role in Federal Government 
Informa tion Policy 
DAVID F. LINOWES 
COLIN BENNETT 
Introduction 
THECONTINUOUS TENSION BETWEEN bureaucratic values and democratic 
control has been complicated in recent years by the rapid development 
of information technology and by its application to the agencies of 
government. As sophisticated computer and communications equip- 
ment has been introduced into public agencies, so information has 
become far easier to collect, store, manipulate, and disseminate. On the 
one hand, this has enhanced the management, decision-making, and 
analytical capabilities of governmental organizations. However, the 
advantages that contemporary data-processing techniques have 
brought are offset by certain dangers. In particular, the immense capa- 
bility to control vast quantities of personal information on individual 
citizens has generated a worldwide concern about the potential for 
bureaucratic surveillance and about the consequent erosion of personal 
privacy. 
The gradual realization of these dangers over the last twenty years 
has motivated most Western democracies to provide a policy response in 
the form of “privacy” or “data-protection” laws. Data-protection laws 
are confined to that aspect of privacy protection that arises from the 
collection, use, and disclosure of information on identifiable individu- 
als. Przuacy is used here to encapsulate the broad social value ra ther than 
David F. Linowes is Boeschenstein Professor of Political Economy and Public Policy, 
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign and former Chairman, U.S. Privacy Protec- 
tion Study Commission; andColin Bennett is Assistant Professor, Department of Political 
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the specific policy area. Data protection (the European nomenclature, 
translated from the German Datenschutz)is a more accurate title for this 
group of policies whose main purpose is to regulate the collection, 
storage, use, and transmittal of personal data. Hence the Privacy Act, 
strictly speaking, is a data-protection law similar in purpose to those in 
Europe. Data-protection policy satisfies the right to privacy. But that 
right means more than the protection of information, and is advanced 
through many other statutory, judicial, and constitutional means. 
All national legislation is based on a strikingly similar set of “fair 
information principles” designed to minimize intrusiveness in the col- 
lection of personal information; to maximize fairness in its use; and to 
provide reasonable and enforceable expectations of confidentiality with 
regard to its transmittal. The major data-protection legislation at the 
federal level in the United States, and the main focus of this article, is the 
Privacy Act of 1974.’ 
So far, neither the personal data-protection question in general, 
nor the Privacy Act in particular, have received much attention from 
social scientists. The context of rapid technological change has pro- 
duced a large body of technical, legalistic, and polemical writing that is 
reactive and transient rather than reflective or theoretical. More espe- 
cially, there are few studies of data protection as a policy problem using 
the concepts and approaches of political science. Consequently, policy 
advocacy has progressed without a clear understanding of the tractabil- 
ity of the problem, and of the behavioral and structural variables that 
might impede effective policy implementation. 
The aim of this article is to examine personal data protection as a 
policy problem, employing concepts and approaches from the field of 
political science. This task involves: (1) an analysis of issue emergence 
and problem definition; (2) a study of policy formation; (3) an assess- 
ment of oversight and enforcement; and (4) an identification of the 
various conceptual, structural, and motivational factors that have pre- 
vented data protection from becoming a fully effective component of 
American national information policy. The article concludes by dis- 
cussing the prospects for American data-protection policy given the ten 
years’ experience of implementing the Privacy Act. 
It should be noted, however, that other constitutional, common 
law, and statutory controls play a role in national privacy policy. The 
First, Fourth, and Fifth Amendments all limit government intrusive- 
ness in a variety of ways and thus pertain to the subject of privacy. 
Certain recently enacted statutes include specific safeguards for certain 
types of data: the Fair Credit Reporting Act of 1970 (credit reports); the 
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Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act of 1974 (education records); 
the Tax Reform Act of 1976 (tax information); the Right to Financial 
Privacy Act of 1978 (private financial records); and the Privacy Protec- 
tion Act of 1980 (press offices and files). The Brooks Act of 1965, the 
Paperwork Reduction Act of 1980, and the Federal Managers’ Financial 
Integrity Act of 1982 established federal agency roles for managing 
automated systems. In October 1984, Congress enacted the Counterfeit 
Access Device and Computer Fraud and Abuse Act which imposes 
criminal penalties for certain computer-related crimes. All states also 
now have a variety of privacy laws for both public and private sectors. 
While we do not address state law here, it should be noted that the 
protections afforded at the state level are becoming increasingly 
extensive. 
However, while U.S. privacy law is derived from a variety of 
sources, the centerpiece remains the Privacy Act of 1974. The experience 
of this legislation exposes the major problems of implementing per- 
sonal data-protection policy and of trying to protect personal informa- 
tion in a climate of rapid technological change and competing 
information values. Further, to the American, government (rather than 
the private sector) has always been regarded as the major threat to 
privacy rights. Unlike in most European countries, the private sector 
remains largely unregulated at the federal level. There are some statu- 
tory controls mainly related to credit, banking, and insurance records. 
The Privacy Protection Study Commission recommended the extension 
of controls on a sectoral basis to other record-keeping relationships. 
Overall, however, the private sector in the United States is expected to 
act voluntarily. 
This is not so with the public sector. The fear of information 
technology in the hands of government, as expressed in the Privacy Act, 
reflects a cultural belief that government is the primary potential threat 
and the most likely structure to misuse or abuse the enormous power of 
information technology. In this respect too i t  is fitting to regard the 
Privacy Act as the cornerstone of American privacy policy, the success- 
ful implementation of which is crucial if personal privacy is to play a 
meaningful role in national information policy. 
Problem Definition and Issue Emergence 
There is no generally accepted definition of privacy. A variety of 
cross-cutting values and interests intrude upon its very broadandamor- 
phous range. The classic definition is the “right to be let alone,” 
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originally presented by Judge Cooley and later elaborated in a famous 
article by Warren and Brandeis.’ As the concept developed throughout 
the twentieth century, it became applied to a wide variety of social 
relationships and modes of behavior. In 1960, William Prosser tried to 
clarify the case law and found a complex of four torts: (1)  intrusions 
upon the plaintiff’s seclusion or solitude or into his private affairs; 
(2) public disclosure of embarrassing private facts; ( 3 )  publicity that 
places the plaintiff in a false light; and (4) appropriation for the defen- 
dant’s advantage of the plaintiff’s name or l ikenes~.~ As the concept was 
granted constitutional status in 1965, as existing in the “penumbras” of 
the Constitution, so its span and application widened. 4 
Privacy as a problem of public policy, however, really arose with 
the development and spread of computer technology in the 1960s and 
especially with its application to government. Of particular importance 
was the abortive attempt to establish a “National Data Center” of all 
basic statistical data originating in federal agencies. Although this 
center was intended for aggregate statistical analysis and not for admin-
istrative decision-making about individuals, the proposal floundered 
when subjected to Congressional scrutiny. 
Simultaneously, privacy came to be regarded more as a policy 
problem than something that can be protected in the face of rapid 
technological change by case law. The necessity for a more synoptic 
public-policy solution arose “partly because judicial policies and con- 
stitutional interpretation failed to promote legal recognition of and 
protection for individuals’ claims that their right of privacy entails 
safeguards against abuse of personal information collected, maintained 
and utilized by the g~vernment .”~ Henceforth the right to “information 
privacy” was distinguished from other behavioral aspects of privacy 
(such as physical intrusion and surveillance) and granted its own sepa- 
rate distinction as an issue of public policy. 
Two books, Privacy and Freedom,‘ a study commissioned by the 
Association of the Bar of the City of New York and authored by Alan 
Westin, and Arthur Miller’s The Assault on Privacy’ helped sensitize 
public and elite opinion to the problem and played a critical role in 
defining that problem. For both, information privacy meant givin %individuals “the ability to control the circulation of information” 
relating to them or “to determine for themselves when, how and to what 
extent information about them is communicated to other^."^ Personal 
information emerged from the debates in the late 1960s as ProPerty 
which could not be taken or misused by government without due 
process of law. Later the idea was refined into a set of principlesof “fair 
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information practice” to ensure minimal intrusiveness, maximum fair- 
ness, and legitimate expectations of confidentiality. 
Academic treatments gave way to empirical analyses as concern for 
the issue grew. Westin followed up  his earlier work with a project for the 
National Academy of Sciences entitled Databanks in a Free Society.” In 
addition, a 1973 study entitled Records, Computers and the Rights of 
Citizens” by the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare’s Advi- 
sory Committee on Automated Personal Data Systems called “attention 
to issues of record-keeping practice in the computer age that may have 
profound significance for us all.” As the then Secretary of Health, 
Education and Welfare, Caspar Weinberger, wrote in its forward, i t  
represented “the views of an unusual mixture of experts and lawyers.”’’ 
Kingdon, in Agendas, Alternatives and Public Policies, contends 
that policy is made in America when “the separate streams of problems, 
policies and politics come together at certain critical times. Solutions 
become joined to problems, and both of them are joined to favorable 
political for~es.”’~ In this case, the “solution” of fair information prac- 
tices became linked to the “problem” of information privacy. Both were 
connected to the “favorable political forces” of Watergate. With its 
many and various cases of political bribery, corruption, malpractice, 
intrusiveness, and abuse of persona1 data, this crisis provided the propi- 
tious climate for the construction of a comprehensive data-protection 
policy. 
Kingdon also suggests that this “coupling of the streams” is often 
facilitated by “policy entrepreneurs” defined as “advocates who are 
willing to invest their resources ....to promote a position in return for 
anticipated future gain in the form of material, purposive or solidary 
benefits.”14 In the case of information privacy, the policy entrepreneur 
was Senator Samuel J.  Ervin, Jr. (Democrat, North Carolina), who had 
been a staunch campaigner for protective legislation since the late 
1960s. Ervin’s central role as the chairman of the Senate investigative 
committee which held televised hearings into the Watergate affair, 
enhanced his stature. The passage of the Privacy Act in the final hours of 
the 93rd Congress, therefore, was a solution to a long-standing problem, 
a legislative response to the presidential abuse of power and a personal 
tribute to Ervin in his final term. 
Policy Content 
While privacy invasions in general had been a subject of Congres-
sional interest since the mid-l960s, the idea of legislating a set of fair 
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information principles to protect the right to information privacy was 
motivated principally by the long-term efforts of Senator Samuel J.  
Ervin. In the House, the efforts of then Congressmen Edward I. Koch 
(Democrat, New York) and Barry Goldwater, Jr. (Republican, Califor- 
nia) were instrumental in fostering broad bipartisan agreement on the 
basic content of the law. 
The first principle in the act is that agencies shall not disclose 
personal information contained in a system of records without the 
“prior consent of the individual to whom the record pertain^."'^ There 
are a number of controversial exemptions to this rule. Disclosure is 
permitted without consent to those within the agency who havea “need 
for the record in the performance of their duties”; to other agencies in 
connection with “routine uses,” in other words for purposes “compat- 
ible with the purposes for which it was collected”; and to an agency 
engaged in “civil or criminal law enforcement activity.” Agencies are 
also expected to keep an accurate accounting of all disclosures and 
ensure that corrections made are transmitted “down the line.” 
Second, the Privacy Act requires agencies to allow the individual 
access to “information pertaining to him” which is contained in a 
“system of records.” A very similar right had existed since 1967 in the 
more widely drawn Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). Unlike FOIA, 
however, the Privacy Act grants the individual the concomitant right to 
correct any portion of that record which is not “accurate, relevant, 
timely or 
The third principle concerns collection limitation. Agencies 
should only maintain those records that are “relevant and necessary to 
accomplish the purpose of the agency.”17 Records should be composed 
of information gleaned “to the greatest extent practicable directly from 
the subject individual.” Data subjects should be informed of the author- 
ity for collection, the agencies to which the information may be trans- 
mitted, and the “routine uses” to which the information may be put. 
Fourth, record systems should be public. Agencies are required to 
publish in the Federal Register at least once a year a notice of the 
existence and nature of each system of records containing details of the 
categories of individuals maintained therein, the type of information 
stored, and the practices of the agency regarding storage, retrievability, 
access, retention, and disposal. These systems notices arealso sent to the 
Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and Congress for review. 
The Privacy Act (unlike some of its European equivalents) applies 
to both manual and automated record-keeping systems and provides for 
both civil remedies and criminal penalties in the event of violation. It 
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was hoped that the implementation of these principles would restore 
the correct balance between the citizen and the record-keeping agency. 
To the extent that an American data-protection policy existed, i t  was 
reflected in a general consensus among privacy advocates that the 
dangers of information technology to individual rights could be min- 
imized by the implementation of these principles by the federal agen- 
cies. A balance could be struck between the legitimate information 
needs of government and the constitutionally recognized privacy rights 
of the citizen. 
The major controversy centered not on questions of principle but 
on methods of implementation. From an early stage in the debate, 
privacy advocates agreed that the most effective way to establish fair 
information practice would be through an independent commission. 
Advocates differed, however, over the size of such a body and over 
whether it should be granted the authority to enforce its regulations 
(thus making it in effect a regulatory body). As Regandemonstrates, the 
question of implementation came to dominate the policy discussions 
during which bureaucratic interests in maintaining maximum auto- 
nomy over personal information systems surfaced and eventually pre- 
vailed. This exposes the dilemma of trying to decide implementation 
questions during policy formation: “When implementation questions 
are left unresolved in policy design, bureaucratic concerns will domi- 
nate the implementation stage, but when implementation questions are 
resolved in policy design, bureaucratic concerns will dominate the 
formulation 
Arguments about the need for an independent agency centered on 
the primary Senate bill” introduced by Senator Ervin. Incontrast to the 
House bill:’ Ervin’s bill provided for a Federal Privacy Board with 
oversight and advisory responsibilities. A number of pressing factors 
forced Ervin to abandon this notion in the final days of the 93rd 
Congress: irreconcilable differences between House and Senate under 
severe time pressures; the overwhelming desire to provide some legisla- 
tive response (however imperfect or symbolic) to the Watergate scandal; 
and the fear of a presidential veto if the bill contained provision for an 
independent and permanent privacy commission. 
This backdown resulted in two compromises. First the Federal 
Privacy Board was transformed into a Privacy Protection Study Com-
mission (PPSC) to investigate the issue and make recommendations to 
the president and Congress for action. The commission was given 
subpoena power and the power to swear witnesses. Two members were 
appointed by the president of the Senate, two by the speaker of the 
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House, and three by the president. The commission devoted the next 
two years to examining record-keeping practices in both the public and 
private sectors. 
Second, the oversight function was given to the Office of Manage- 
ment and Budget. Inserted right at the end of the statute is a stipulation 
that: “The Office of Management and Budget shall-1) develop guide- 
lines and regulations for the use of agencies...and 2) provide continuing 
assistance to and oversight of the implementation of the provisions.’’21 
Enforcement and Oversight 
The Privacy Act stipulates that responsibility for implementation 
lies principally with the agencies themselves. But two institutions were 
given specific oversight responsibilities-the OMB and the Subcommit- 
tee on Government Information of the House Government Operations 
Committee. The courts, and of course the individual “data subject,” are 
also critical players in the complex enforcement scheme. We shall 
analyze the response of each of these players under the assumption that 
effective implementation (defined as bureaucratic compliance) requires 
constant monitoring by outside forces. 
Oversight of the Privacy Act by the Office of Management and Budget 
From the start, there was disagreement about the role that Congress 
expected OMB to perform. Congressional intent is obscure, with no 
clarification of the words “develop guidelines and regulations” and 
“provide continuing assistance and oversight.” We shall evaluate 
OMB’s performance according to three criteria: the issuance of guide-
lines; the compilation and presentation of the annual report; and the 
provision of assistance and oversight. 
The first and major effort to issue guidelines took place in the first 
six months of 1975 prior to the promulgation of the Privacy Act Zmple-
mentation Guidelines” in July, ten weeks before the act became effec- 
tive. While this circular contained a comprehensive section by section 
analysis of the act, there was little comment or interpretation. N o  
additional formal guidance of consequence was issued until 1979 when, 
amid controversy surrounding the “Project Match” at the Department 
of Health, Education and Welfare, OMB developed comprehensive 
guidelines on the conduct of computer matching programs. This refers 
to the running of one computer tape against another to selectively 
identify those illegally receiving benefits, draft evaders, or others pre- 
sumed guilty of cheating, tax evasion, or more serious criminal acts. 
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Since its inception, computer matching has been controversial, with 
many questions raised about its constitutionality (primarily under the 
Fourth Amendment), its cost-effectiveness (when so much follow-u 
effort is required), and also about its legality under the Privacy Act. 
An examination of the legislative history of the Privacy Act reveals 
that few people anticipated the possibility of computer matching. Vir- 
tually nobody foresaw the legal difficulties. Controversy centers on 
whether the transferral of tapes of personal data from one agency to 
another for matching purposes is a “routine use” and is therefore 
exempt from the consent requirements of the Privacy Act. The OMB 
guidelines of 1979 do  not sufficiently clarify this issue. The House 
Government Information Subcommittee concluded that the guidelines 
were “largely procedural and intended to finesse some of the difficult 
legal question^."^^ Apart from a 1983 memorandum addressing the 
relationship between the Privacy Act and the newly passed Debt Collec- 
tion no  further guidance has been issued. On the question of 
guidance, it appears that 1975 was the “high water mark of Privacy Act 
activity in O M B . * ~ ~ ~  
Analysis of the second function, the provision of the annual 
reports, is also revealing. That covering calendar year 1975 was 424 
pages long, in two volumes, and included a complete inventory of 
federal personal data system^.'^ The second,% third,” and fourthm 
reports covered the same scope within single volumes. In 1980, the 
inventory of personal-data systems was dropped. Details are still pub- 
lished in the Federal Register but they are no longer compiled in a 
convenient form. The  fifth,31 sixth?’ and seventh33 reports are conse- 
quently a lot slimmer (no more than twenty pages) and concentrate on 
the barest reporting requirements of the law. Some observers have 
considered the latter two deficient in this regard.34 
Finally, the provision of “assistance to” and “oversight of” agency 
implementation has not been interpreted in an aggressive way. OMB 
staff review the information system notices before they go to the Federal 
Register to ensure that they accurately describe: the categories of records 
stored; the “routine uses”; the information management practices of the 
agency; and the extent of the record subject’s rights. They also review the 
fewer and more controversial proposals for exempt systems (mainly 
dealing with security or law enforcement matters). Figures on the 
number of exempt systems per agency are specifically required to be 
published in the annual reports. 
In addition, they regularly answer questions from agencies in 
relation to the interpretation of the Privacy Act. In general, however, the 
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role is reactive rather than aggressive. OMB fulfills the first half of its 
responsibilities under Section 6 (2)-it provides “assistance.” Appar- 
ently i t  does not provide “oversight,” in the sense of actively ensuring 
that agencies comply with the fair information principles. As the 1983 
House hearings revealed: “OMB’s Privacy Act oversight efforts have 
been restricted to responding when issues and problems are presented to 
it. In the absence of a proposed system notice, OMB will not raise a 
question, start an investigation, or otherwise monitor Privacy Act 
compliance.’”’ 
Congressional Oversight of the Privacy Act 
With the realization in 1974 that a separate Privacy Commission 
would not be created, Senator Ervin noted that “it will require aggres- 
sive oversight by the Committee on Government Operations” for the 
Privacy Act to be effective. Ogul draws the distinction between “formal” 
and “latent” oversight, arguing that those who just examine the written 
investigative committee record may be overlooking the more informal 
and routine process of monitoring that goes on away from public and 
media attention.36 We shall make the same distinction in analyzing the 
Congressional response to the Privacy Act. 
From the standpoint of formal oversight, the number of days 
directly devoted to hearings on the Privacy Act alone is low, specifically 
three. In June 1975, before the act had come into force, the Government 
Information and Individual Rights subcommittee conducted a day’s 
hearings to ensure that agencies were preparing to meet their obliga- 
tions. The committee found that, with the exception of the Department 
of Defense (which had decided to set up  a separate operational unit to 
administer the act on account of the large number of record-keeping 
systems in the department), OMB and agency efforts were less than 
enthu~iastic.~’ 
It was another eight years before the next formal investigation by 
the Government Information Subcommittee of the House Government 
Operations Committee. Two days of hearings were held in November 
1983, at which written and oral testimony were received from a number 
of officials, interest group leaders, and “privacy expert^."^^ The hear- 
ings had symbolic significance as well as an investigative purpose: there 
had been no general oversight hearings since enactment; the literary 
significance of “1984” had brought the questions of surveillance by the 
“Big Brother” state to public attention; and the growing volume of 
international data traffic had increasingly exposed the incompatibility 
of the stronger and more comprehensive European laws, causing anx- 
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iety abroad that legal protections in the United States were inadequate 
to protect personal information sent to this country for data processing. 
The result of these hearings was a report entitled W h o  Cares About 
Privacy? Oversight of the Privacy Act of 1974 by the Office ofManage- 
ment and Budget and by the Congress. This report indicated that 
interest in privacy issues had steadily diminished. Simultaneously, 
Congressman Glenn English, the chairman of the Government Infor- 
mation Subcommittee, introduced a bill to establish a permanent Pri- 
vacy Protection Comrnis~ion .~~ Nothing particularly original surfaced 
from this oversight effort, mainly because other investigative bodies had 
already exposed the major shortcomings. For instance, the Privacy 
Protection Study Commission issued an incisive analysis of the Privacy 
Act as an appendix to its 654-page report Personal Privacy in an Znfor- 
mation Society.40 As early as 1977, i t  was apparent that “the difficulty 
with the current law does not appear to arise from the flexibility of 
implementation it allows, but rather from the fact that agencies have 
taken advantage of that flexibility to contravene its spirit.”41 The act 
also received criticism from the General Accounting Office,42 and from 
other congressional committees that had been looking into related 
issues: the privacy of medical records,43 international data and 
computer matching.45 Hence, the 1983 hearings and report on general 
Privacy Act oversight served to put on the official record what most 
observers knew already. 
Ogul further suggests that most members of Congress prefer more 
informal methods of oversight, and that “formal methods are seen as an 
indication of the breakdown of informal efforts.”46 This is probably 
what happened here, although there is some evidence that the continu- 
ous efforts of the staff of the Government Information Subcommittee 
over the years have yielded modest results in some respects. 
Congress is specifically granted two oversight mechanisms in the 
Privacy Act. The first is the annual report which-as already 
demonstrated-has been little used. The second is the requirement that 
agencies give prior notice of the creation or alteration of any system of 
records. To the extent that latent oversight exists, it centers on the 
examination of these system notices by the staff of the subcommittee on 
government information. It is estimated that around 20percent of these 
reports are found to require follow-up enquiry, either by a telephone 
call or, in more serious cases, by a letter from the congressman. Most 
controversy seems to stem from the claiming of new “routine uses” for 
personal inf~rmation.~’ 
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The committee staff over the years has gained considerable exper- 
tise in reviewing these system notices and in detecting irregularities. 
Insofar as these formal descriptions reflect the actual personal informa- 
tion practices of an agency, the staff has a fairly comprehensive view. On 
the other hand, they are aware that a massive activity such as the 
collection, use, and disclosure of billions of personal recordscanonly be 
reflected to a very limited extent in a system notice. 
Enforcement through the Courts 
The case law under the Privacy Act is underdeveloped because of 
the restrictive remedial scheme. The act stipulates that damages can 
only be awarded if i t  can be demonstrated that the plaintiff has suffered 
actual injury from an intentional agency action. This is virtually 
impossible to prove, given the intangible and speculative nature of the 
harm that might result from the unfair collection, use, and transmittal 
of personal information. Injunctive relief is available only to force 
access to and amendment of records. Most litigation relates to the 
interpretation of the exemptions to access and to their relationship with 
those under the related FOIA.48 
Furthermore, the courts have not broadly recognized a right of 
privacy for information held by third parties. In U.S. v. Miller4’ the 
Supreme Court held that an individual has no Fourth or Fifth Amend- 
ment interest to assert when government demands access to the records 
an organization maintains about him (in this case, bank records). An 
individual’s expectation of privacy for records held by any third party is 
neither legitimate, warranted, nor enforceable under the Constitution. 
The Privacy Protection Study Commission described this as a “fateful 
day for personal privacy.”m While it should be noted that subsequently 
Congress enacted the Right of Financial Privacy Act of 1980 to protect 
the confidentiality of bank records, the Miller decision also meant that 
Privacy Act implementation was a matter for legislative and executive 
oversight rather than judicial enforcement. 
The Role of the Individual Data Subject 
The importance of the rights of individual access and correction in 
the overall implementation scheme is also not as great as many 
expected. There is little retrievable under the Privacy Act which cannot 
also be obtained through the FOIA. Consequently, as the PPSC found, 
“the number of Privacy Act access requests (i.e., requests specifically 
citing the Privacy Act) has not been great and most have come from 
agency employees or former employees. ’”’The last time comprehensive 
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figures were compiled (for calendar year 1978) OMB reported nearly 
750,000 access requests to federal agencies for personal records. Of these, 
96 percent were granted in whole or in part. Some 43 percent of requests 
went to the Department of Defense (which has the highest number of 
record systems). Over 90 percent were received by five agencies- 
Defense, Veterans Adminis t ra t ion ,  H E W ,  Justice,  a n d  
Transpor ta tion.52 
These data should be treated with considerable caution as i t  is not 
clear how much of this participation is the direct result of the Privacy 
Act. Most agencies operating public-assistance programs already had 
procedures to allow record subjects access to their files as part of the 
eligibility verification process. And since 1967, access to personal 
records could be gained through the FOIA. Moreover, there are major 
problems of definition and quantification. The majority of requesters 
do not cite the Privacy Act let alone a specific system of records. Some 
cite both the FOIA and the Privacy Act (as the civil liberties groups 
advise). Most just ask to see “their file on . . . . I ’  
Although there are no  pre-1974 figures on access requests, it is 
unlikely that the Privacy Act ushered in a completely new spirit of 
openness. The OMB has concluded that the main result of the access 
right “has been to give the agencies a uniform set of procedures for 
handling requests for record subjects. ..even when the requests do not 
cite a specific Act.”53 
The Barriers to Successful Implementation 
The impact of the Privacy Act is difficult, if not impossible, to 
assess in  any specific way. The policy goals are not defined in terms of 
achieving tangible results (such as distributing or redistributing a pub- 
lic good). The resource to be regulated is an elusive one. Violation of fair 
information practice is only visible in a tiny minority of circumstances. 
Hence, wrongful collection, storage, and dissemination of personal 
information (while i n  violation of the Privacy Act) may not expose 
actual harm to the individual concerned. There are no firmly estab- 
lished or measurable standards of evaluation. Our assessment of impact 
relies more on impressionistic and anecdotal evidence from those with 
the direct experience of implementation. 
The Privacy Act codified a n  important set of principles that have 
had a significant impact on the way agencies think about and treat 
personal information. The  major effort at compliance, which took 
place from 1975 to 1976, succeeded in establishing theextent and nature 
of personal record-keeping practice in the federal government. Privacy 
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Act officers were appointed in each agency. Standard operating proce- 
dures were instituted for the collection, use, and dissemination of per- 
sonal data. Compared to the time prior to 1974, the act appears a major 
force for change. But there remain serious weaknesses and limitations 
which will now be explored in greater detail. 
Explanations of the inadequacy of the Privacy Act offered in the 
past have been predominantly legal. Inherent statutory weaknesses and 
inconsistencies have produced ambiguous guidelines, a weak imple- 
mentation framework, and allowed officials to take advantage of the 
wide latitude and vague prescriptions. While statutory weaknesses are 
important there are other limitations relating to the tractability of the 
problem, the structure of the implementing institutions, and the incen- 
tives of the implementing officials. 
Inherent Statutory Weaknesses 
The inherent weaknesses of the Privacy Act have been well docu- 
mented. Several have been alluded to earlier. Sabatier and Mazmanian, 
presenting their framework for implementation analysis, argue that 
“original policy makers can substantially affect the attainment of legal 
objectives by utilizing the levers of power to coherently structure the 
implementation process. ’I5‘ Several conditions need to be met. 
Most crucially, the statute must contain “clear and consistent 
objectives.” The Privacy Act is deficient in this regard as the language is 
at times vague or contradictory. For instance, “each agency ...shall 
maintain in its records only such information about an individual as is 
relevant and necessary to accomplish a purpose of the agency.”55 The 
words “relevant and necessary” are interpreted by the agencies them- 
selves and normally given an expansive definition. 
In addition, agencies should not disclose personal information 
contained within a system of records without the “prior consent of the 
individual to whom the record contains.”56 This general principle, 
however, is qualified by ten different exemptions. Most controversially, 
disclosure is permitted if for a “routine use,” that is for purposes 
“compatible with the purposes for which i t  was collected.” Agencies 
have found some broad definitions of “compatible,” particularly in 
relation to the process ofcomputer matching to detect waste and fraud. 
For example, in 1980, the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) 
released some of its records to help the Veterans Administration check 
the accreditation of its hospital employees. OPM claimed that the 
disclosure constituted a “routine use” of its data because the agency 
believed “that an integral part of the reason that these records are 
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maintained is to protect the legitimate interests of government and, 
therefore, such a disclosure is compatible with the purposes for main- 
taining these record^."^' 
The notion of information privacy may be incompatible with laws 
and procedures requiring openness and disclosure. The values underly- 
ing the Freedom of Information Act,% for example, may be viewed as 
opposed to those upon which the Privacy Act is based. Many argue that 
in fact they are two sides of the same coin; both attempt to check 
governmental power by placing constraints on an agency’s control of 
information. At the level of statutory language, however, the competing 
values of disclosure andconfidentiality are at times in conflict. Interpre- 
tation of the two laws continues to providedilemmas for both the courts 
and the agency information officers (who are often responsible for both 
statutes). 
As mentioned earlier, the Privacy Act does not provide an effective 
process for the recovery of damages: “The vast number of systems 
involved, the need to establish willful or intentional behavior on the 
part of the agency, and the cost and time involved in brin inga lawsuit, Doften make enforcement by the individual impractical.” In most cases, 
an individual has to show actual injury as a result of unlawful collec- 
tion, use, or disclosure of hidher personal information. Because this is 
virtually impossible to prove, the Privacy Protection Study Commis- 
sion recommended that a suit for punitive damages should be permitted 
in the absence of a demonstration of actual injury to the individual. 
The Tractability of the Problem 
It is clear that some social problems are much easier to deal with 
than others. Some are more technical and some require the alteration of 
behavior by large and diffuse target groups. In this case, the difficulty 
stems more from the extent of behavioral change required by the regu- 
lated body-namely the federal bureaucracy. 
Agencies are expected toalter long-standing practices regarding the 
treatment of personal information. All information is a vital resource 
for the agency’s internal decision-making processes as well as important 
in its relation to the external environment. The capacity to manipulate 
information has increased exponentially with the introduction of infor-
mation technology. As Regan argues: “Information in general is a 
resource that contributes tobureaucratic autonomy in terms of stability, 
predictability and competency over its functions and goals; the value of 
personal information is no different.”60 Federal agencies under the 
Privacy Act are expected to surrender their monopoly of control over a 
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vital resource. They face limitations on the collection, storage, retrieval, 
and transmittal of that resource. Such counterpressures may explain 
why the federal bureaucracy has often taken advantage of the flexibility 
of the Privacy Act to, in effect, contravene its spirit. 
There is a qualitative difference between expectinga publicagency 
to alter its standard operating procedures to distribute or redistribute 
goods and services, or to regulate an outside activity, andexpecting it to 
submit to regulation itself. Privacy policy shares with other attempts to 
“open up” government (such as freedom of information or sunshine 
laws), the somewhat peculiar characteristic that the target group is the 
bureaucracy, and that the “impact” is defined and evaluated in terms of 
reducing bureaucratic power. 
Structural and Resource-Related Factors 
In earlier years the conventional wisdom saw administration as the 
neutral instrument of the Congress and executive branch with effective 
control established through certain simple principles of organization: 
strong managerial leadership, clear lines of authority, meritocratic 
promotion, etc. It was assumed that controlling bureaucracy was an 
objective desired by both Congress and president but which was 
impeded by a wide range of structural and resource-related factors. The  
problem was one of means rather than will. 
Congress appropriated no  additional funds for the act’s implemen- 
tation. The individual agencies and the OMB, therefore, have had to 
comply with a complex and innovative set of statutory expectations 
within the limits of existing resources. Most agencies appointed Privacy 
Act officers, most of whom have other responsibilities (such as for 
FOIA) and who may not be highly placed in the agency hierarchy. They 
often have little ability to voice privacy interests in the face of more 
politically important agency tasks. 
Until 1980,responsibility for Privacy Act oversight at OMB was in 
the hands of one or two persons in the Information Systems Policy 
Division. After that date, with the reorganization pursuant to the pas- 
sage of the Paperwork Reduction Act, responsibility became diffused 
within the newly created Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs 
(OIRA). Each OIRA desk officer is responsible for all the information 
resources management activities of his or her agency. These include: 
forms clearance, checking for onerous regulations, the establishment of 
automatic data processing systems, as well as privacy matters. 
The former administrator of OIRA claimed that “this has meant a 
strengthening and enlargement of the scope of our review. An agency’s 
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Privacy Act activities are examined within the context of other relevant 
information resources management activities.”61 Conversely, the orga- 
nizational reform has meant that no one person in OMB has responsibil- 
ity for Privacy Act oversight. Privacy questions have been subsumed by 
the programmatic goal of reducing federal regulations and paperwork 
under the Paperwork Reduction Act. While this goal is compatible with 
the aim of the Privacy Act to limit information collection to that which 
is “relevant and necessary,” the net effect of this combination of func- 
tional responsibilities has been to make the Privacy Act less effective. 
In this capacity the act has contributed to some reduction in unne- 
cessary information collection, in the elimination of a large amount of 
information from existing systems, and in the consolidation of a 
number of duplicate record-keeping systems. The Privacy Act has been 
described as a “records management statute” rather than a mechanism 
to protect individual rights. The fact that the act provides for adminis- 
trative responsibilities to be added to the already heavy OMB workload 
is no doubt a contributory factor. 
Congress is also faced with considerable structural and resource- 
related obstacles. The PPSC noted that the Subcommittee on Govern- 
ment Information has neither the “staff nor the consolidated expertise 
necessary to evaluate each report submitted. Furthermore there is no 
agreement on how to assess the potential im act of a proposed system 
change along the lines called for in the Act.”6pThe Privacy Act, because 
of its comprehensive application to the entire federal bureaucracy, is 
virtually impossible to monitor by one congressional subcommittee 
whatever the staffing level. The information practices of agencies differ 
widely. Staff cannot hope to become expert in the wide range of public 
policies for which personal information is collected and used. They 
cannot build ties with all the agency personnel responsible for imple- 
menting data-protection policy. The comprehensive scope of the act, 
cutting across all policy sectors, many of which require huge and 
complex information systems, presents the major structural dilemma to 
Congress. 
Motivational and Incentive Explanations 
As our understanding of the behavior of politicians and bureau- 
crats has become more thorough, so structural and resource approaches 
to bureaucratic control have been supplemented, and in some cases 
replaced, by those stressing motivations and incentives. The literature 
reveals a progressive shift away from the conceptualization of static 
institutional relationships toward models which emphasize more 
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dynamic, reciprocal processes of mutual adaptation between policy- 
makers and implementers. This more complex understanding has led 
political scientists to realize that “controlling,” “monitoring,” or 
“overseeing” the bureaucracy can only arise through a thorough under- 
standing of the “realpolitik” of the policy process and of the federal 
agency’s central and political role in that process. More directly, the 
problem becomes not what oversight of the Privacy Act Congress and 
OMB can perform but what they want to perform. 
From the outset, commentators recognized that the location of 
Privacy Act responsibility in OMB would provide few incentives for 
aggressive oversight. OMB’s primary mission as coordinator of the 
president’s budget and fiscal watchdog may be incompatible with many 
of the programmatic goals of data-protection policy. Interviews with 
officials in OMB revealed that the implementation of the Privacy Act 
has been monitored to the extent that it provides statutory support for 
OMB’s emphasis on economy and efficiency in government. Hence the 
stress on limiting the collection of irrelevant material and eliminating 
duplicate information systems. The major provisions of the act (the use 
and disclosure restrictions, and the access and correction principles), 
however, impose direct manpower costs. Accordingly, OMB has moni- 
tored these provisions with less force than it has its primary functions. 
The congressional incentives to monitor bureaucratic compliance 
are correspondingly low in the sense that personal data-protection 
policy requires comprehensive and coordinated control. Fiorina argues 
that “Congress has no electoral incentive to work toward coordinated 
control. Quite the opposite is the case. Congress is making increasing 
use of instruments that keep the bureaucracy more closely tied todecen-
tralized Congressional The splintering and decentralizing 
trends in Congress in recent years have occurred to allow members 
increased influence over segments of the bureaucracy of concern to them 
and their constituents. Control of the parts is achieved at the expense of 
control of the whole. Congress maintains the type of bureaucracy that 
makes it  permeable to legislative influence. By doing so i t  facilitates the 
type of work most beneficial to the individual legislator: securing 
distributive benefits and casework. 
Hence, when a policy like data protection arises, demanding con- 
gressional oversight of the implementation of a policy protecting a 
diffuse value in the entire federal bureaucracy on behalf of the whole 
citizenry, the motivations are going to be low. This is especially so at a 
time when the issues of efficiency and economy in government are 
politically attractive. Given the prevailing climate, it appears that con- 
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gressional interest will remain low until some outrage-maybe the 
Three Mile Island equivalent of privacy-involving a massive abuse of 
personal data, serves as a catalyst for public and legislative attention. 
Conclusion: Prospects for Privacy in the Information Society 
As we have shown, the Privacy Act has some important flaws- 
particularly the expansive and flexible nature of the “routine use” 
exemption and the inadequacy of the remedial scheme. It also suffers 
from the inherent programmatic goals which may require a reduction 
in bureaucratic information control and power. In this regard the 
delegatory pattern of policy-making (where Congress has ordered the 
bureaucracy to keep its own house in order) is likely to fail especially 
given the absence of an outside institutional force with the incentive and 
means to monitor and regulate the public use of personal information. 
Moreover, these institutional failings have occurred in a climate of 
rapid technological development. As the “information revolution” 
continues to produce staggering advances in miniaturization, desktop 
storage capacity, computing speed and instantaneous retrieval, so the 
networking of information systems has been facilitated, and data have 
become far easier to transmit and retrieve. A recent study by the General 
Services Administration of the federal government’s purchase of small 
computers found that agencies bought 37,277 such units in fiscal year 
1984 at a cost of $137 million. The equivalent figures in 1983 were 8000 
units at a cost of $34 million. It is estimated that federal agencies may 
acquire a half-million small computers by 1990.e4 These developments 
could raise the same normative questions about the overintrusive state 
that were debated back in the 1960s and 1970s. The imperative of 
balancing the legitimate needs of government with the personal rights 
of the citizen is as great as ever. 
This context of rapid change, together with the observed inadequa- 
cies of existing institutional mechanisms, has ledobservers to renew the 
call for a permanent and independent privacy commission similar to 
that proposed in the original Senate version of the Privacy Act. Such a 
body should have oversight, advisory, and analytical responsibilities. 
This was an important recommendation of the Privacy Protection 
Study Commission. 
Yet the same factors have also prompted others to argue that such a 
reform would not only be politically impossible but ultimately irrele- 
vant. This school of thought holds thata privacy commission withouta 
privacy constituency could be the reverse of the progressive step 
SUMMER 1986 37 
LINOWES & BENNETT 
intended. Once created, such a body could present the illusion of protec-
tion and at the same time be susceptible to interference by those with 
goals and interests which conflict with privacy. The necessary check on 
bureaucratic power will not arise if a coalition of interests does not 
perceive the value at stake and organize itself to address the important 
issue. So efforts should be directed toward building such a constituency 
while lobbying for a strengthening of the law to allow effective remedies 
through the courts. 
The difficulty for privacy advocates in deciding upon a lobbying 
strategy is that “privacy” is a very complex issue which is not easy to 
frame in general terms. It is closely related to other issues (such as 
confidentiality, secrecy, and computer security). In some respects, such 
as free speech and other First Amendment concerns, it directly chal- 
lenges other interests advanced by the civil liberties lobby. Privacy 
invasions are specific and context-related. The harm to be remedied is 
variable because the value ofpersonal information changes from time to 
time, from person to person, and from organization to organization. 
The issue and the policy problem are perceived and evaluated subjec- 
tively. The statutory protections are only seen to be of value when 
specific harm is demonstrated. For these reasons a “privacy consti- 
tuency” is not likely to emerge. The Privacy Act was passed not because 
of pressure from such a constituency, but because of the enormous and 
transcendant significance of the events surrounding the Watergate 
crisis. 
Hence we reach the dilemma of implementing data-protection 
policy in the federal bureaucracy. Without a supportive privacy consti- 
tuency it is rendered subordinate to other policy interests. The policy 
sits uneasily within the dominant style of American policy-making: a 
fragmented system in which “subgovernments” or “issue networks” 
interact within more or less clearly defined policy sectors to convey 
tangible governmental benefits to subsidized individuals, groups, and 
corporations.65 While a permanent privacy commission would provide 
a more specialized and expert focus for concern, it would have to operate 
without the support of a clientele (other than civil liberties and consum- 
er protection groups) that would derive recognizable benefits from its 
work. 
These dilemmas have persuaded more recent commentators that 
privacy issues cannot continue to be viewed in individualistic terms. 
While opinion polls66 continue to show that a majority of the American 
people are concerned about personal privacy, this concern has not been 
effectively translated into either the use of access and correction rights, 
LIBRARY TRENDS 38 
Privacy in Federal Government Information Policy 
widespread litigation, or political lobbying and protest. It is argued 
that, as privacy is becoming inextricably linked with other information 
policy issues (such as computer crime, data security, and international 
data flow), i t  could be more advantageous to view privacy as just one 
social problem among many which are emerging in the information 
society. If an independent federal body is established, i t  should be given 
the responsibility to address the whole array of national and interna- 
tional issues associated with all types of sophisticated computer and 
communications equipment. 
Each of the three approaches outlined earlier share the same ratio- 
nalistic faith in man’s ability to control the adverse effects of technology. 
The solution does not lie in a Luddite restriction of technological 
progress. The computer is a human creation. There is nothing inherent 
in the technology that cannot be incorporated into our existing system 
of legal and institutional controls. The computer has created a tempo- 
rary imbalance between the individual and the modern complex organi- 
zation. Privacy policy rests on a theoretical assumption that balance can 
be restored by the successful application of these rationally conceived 
principles of fair information practice. The goals of the Privacy Act are 
laudable; the problem so far lies in its full implementation. 
Others see the situation differently, questioning the premise that 
organizations require more and more accurate personal information for 
effective operation in the first place. Taken to its extreme, this argument 
could lead to the conclusion that privacy is immediately lost once a 
record-keeping system is established, and vast quantities of personal 
data are collected and stored. Under these assumptions, personal pri- 
vacy can only be regained by a dismantling of such systems and by 
developing a looser, less discriminating relationship between the indi- 
vidual and the modern complex organization. 
The final prospect stems from the belief that as social change is 
driven by technology, law and public policy can only have at best a 
tangential influence on these inexorable processes. The theory is nor- 
mally called “technological determinism” and is most closely asso- 
ciated with Ellul’s The TechnoZogica1Society.67Theforcebehind social 
change has been the drive for improved “techniques.” This force has 
overwhelmed political and legal controls and has progressively shaped 
social institutions according to the exigencies of the latest technology. 
More specifically, information technology has been regarded as the 
primary force behind the change from industrial to “post-industrial” or 
“technetronic” society-a society “shaped culturally, psychologically, 
socially, and economically by the impact of technology and electronics, 
particularly in the area of computers and communications. ’’m 
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We do not need to embrace this theory wholeheartedly to see that 
the prescription to dismantle information systems is unrealistic. The 
post-industrial society is an information society. The vastly expanded 
capacity to collect, store, manipulate, and transmit data has irrevocably 
changed our lifestyles, workplaces, educational institutions, businesses, 
and political systems. In the post-industrial society, the individual has 
to expect a greater accumulation of information about him/her and the 
circulation of that information throughout society. Some aspects of 
privacy may be an inevitable sacrifice for the other advantages that 
information technology offers. 
While the future of a comprehensive and enforceable personal 
data-protection policy is uncertain, the various scenarios may be becom- 
ing more clear. We can maintain the individualisticgoals of the privacy 
issue and try to reconcile individual rights with the management needs 
of inherently hostile bureaucratic institutions. This may be achieved 
either through a new privacy-protection commission or more tradition- 
ally through case law. We can abandon those goals and treat privacy as 
one social problem among many in the information society. We can 
fight the information revolution to seek a looser, less efficient, and less 
discriminating relationship between the individual and the modern 
record-keeping organization. Or we can be philosophical and recognize 
that in a technologically driven society the advantages of information 
technology will inevitably conflict with our search for individual free- 
doms. What is certain, however, is that whatever direction national 
data-protection policy takes, privacy will still have a powerful emotive 
appeal within our political culture and will remain a central and 
cherished part of the system of individual freedoms in American society. 
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Secrecy and National Commercial 
Information Policy 
HAROLD C. RELYEA 
THEOBJECT OF BUSINESS is sales and profits. And businesses go to great 
lengths to make known or advertise what they have to sell. But they also 
seek control over information concerning their sales and the production 
of what they are selling-goods and services. Secrecy, it has been said, is 
the soul of business. And the penchant for secrecy may be explained in a 
variety of ways: market advantage, investment protection, quality con- 
trol, or production security, to name but a few considerations. Such 
reasons are obvious, unsurprising, and, in many regards, 
understandable. 
However, in modern industrialized democracies-such as the Uni- 
ted States-businesses have not been able to make absolute assertions of 
secrecy. Generally speaking, for the privilege of operating in the mar- 
ketplace, businesses provide certain information to government as the 
regulator of social and economic intercourse. Justice Brandeis made this 
same point over fifty years ago in the following memorable words: 
Whether the corporate privilege shall be granted or withheld is always 
a matter of state policy. If granted, the privilege is conferred in order to 
achieve an end which the State deems desirable.' 
From this situation there arises a condition of continuous tension 
as to the kinds and quantities of business information that are provided 
to government as well as the arrangements under which it  is obtained, 
maintained, and utilized by agencies of the state. 
Harold C. Relyea is a specialist in American National Government, Congressional 
Research Service, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C. 
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Furthermore, government may make general rules for society 
regarding the privileged status of different kinds of business informa- 
tion. The unauthorized disclosure of proprietary knowledge or “trade 
secrets,” for example, might be made punishable through the judicial 
process. Conversely, temporary exclusive use of information about a 
device or machine might be granted to an inventor provided it is 
available for public use after a particular period of time. 
Businesses in the United States devote considerable resources to 
secrecy matters. Billions of dollars are spent each year on “industrial 
security” arrangements to safeguard information. But probably as 
much, if not more, is allocated annually to intelligence endeavors for 
gathering information about competitors. And armies of attorneys, 
lobbyists, and publicists are regularly retained to plead the cause of 
business control of business information, to check potential public- 
policy changes threatening business information protection, and to 
monitor and, if necessary, challenge government institutions attempt- 
ing to disclose business information. 
What is explored here are the contexts in which secrecy is applied to 
business information as a matter of public policy. However, some 
theoretical and conceptual caveats are in order. The overview is, as the 
title suggests, confined to policies and practices of the U.S. federal 
government. Further, lest the title be misunderstood, there is no single, 
unified national commercial information policy. This is a generic 
reference. There are, of course, a variety of federal commercial informa- 
tion policies that are sometimes related. 
Next, a few words about the concept of secrecy. The defining trait or 
characteristic of secrecy, as Sissela Bok notes, is concealment or hiding.2 
An important consideration in this discussion is the extent to which 
concealment can be realized by businesses. Bok also points out that this 
understanding of the term is a neutral one which does not assume “that 
secrets are guilty or threatening, or on the contrary, awesome and 
worthy of re~pect .”~ This perspective has guided the analysis offered 
here, but does not necessarily underlie the policies under examination. 
When Edward Shils defines secrecy as “the compulsory withholding of 
knowledge, reinforced by the prospect of sanctions for disclosure, ’ j4  we 
are reminded that policymakers, indeed, have made judgments that 
certain applications of secrecy to information must be respected or 
punishments shall ensue. 
Then, we come to the object of secrecy-business information. It 
was said at the outset that businesses in the United States seek control 
over information concerning their sales and the production of what they 
are selling. The reference to sales and production information is broadly 
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interpreted here. And the seeking of control over information is des- 
cribed, as a matter of emphasis, as “a condition of continuous tension.” 
Thus, businesses are continuously attempting to make or keep secret 
that information which they determine to merit protection. In law or 
public policy affording some type of secrecy, definitions or characteriza- 
tions of this information may be subject to administrative interpreta- 
tion or susceptible to modification through litigation. Recognizing 
these somewhat unsettled conditions, it has been said that what is 
explored here are the contexts in which secrecy is applied to business 
information as a matter of public policy. In brief, there are, as will be 
seen, various and changing understandings of “business information” 
in federal law and policy. 
Finally, our subject matter certainly lends itself to more analysis 
and exploration than is offered here.5 To reiterate, this discussion is a 
general overview and, as such, it does not purport to be definitive or 
exhaustive. Space considerations alone posed a practical limitation. 
Nonetheless, it is hoped that a useful treatment has resulted. 
The Privacy Threshold 
There can be little doubt that privacy-the autonomous determina- 
tion of when, how, and to what extent information about oneself is 
communicated to others-has become an increasingly important and 
cherished value in American society. And, from time to time, assertions 
are heard that businesses-particularly corporations as personae 
fictae-are entitled to privacy protections equal to those afforded by the 
law as personal privacy rights. However, without detailing theseanalo- 
gous protections, it is sufficient to say that this contention has not 
gained acceptance. As one witty jurist once stated the prevailing view, 
“if you don’t have any privates, you’re not entitled to any privacy.” 
A century ago, the Supreme Court recognized corporations as being 
“persons,” but has not vested them with the privacy rights reserved for 
individuah6 Edward Shils described privacy some years ago as “the 
voluntary withholding of information reinforced by a willing indiffer- 
ence.”’ In this context, perhaps businesses or corporations may lay a 
claim to a privacy interest. However, during the past few decades, the 
voluntary withholding of information has broken down in the face of 
increased regulatory and verification demands, more rigorous surrepti- 
tious collection efforts, and the skillful application of new technology 
in these matters. As a result, both individuals and organizations have 
sought protection in the law. “The lack of privacy for certain core 
secrets,” Alan F. Westin has observed, “can threaten the independence 
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or autonomous life of an organization much as it does that of an 
individual.”* 
Whether privacy is effectively enjoyed by both individuals and 
businesses in the United States may be, to some extent, a matter of 
definition. However, they do not enjoy equal privacy rights. Generally, 
when legal protection has been accorded to the information of busi-
nesses, it has been done for economic reasons and without explanation 
in terms of privacy rights. By contrast, the protection of individuals’ 
personal privacy has been based upon human values and traits with 
specific identification of several privacy rights rooted in the Constitu- 
t i ~ n . ~In sum, there are more appropriate and perhaps more important 
concepts than privacy to be considered when assessing the contexts in 
which secrecy is applied to business information as a matter of public 
policy. 
Trade Secrets 
If there is a jewel in the crown of business information protection it 
is the law of trade secrets. The concept of a trade secret is not well defined 
or, perhaps better stated, its definition is not a commonly agreed upon 
understanding. Flexibility in interpretation is desirable so that new 
technologies and intellectual endeavors may be accommodated by the 
term and its underlying protective status. Probably the most widely 
accepted statement of what constitutes a trade secret is found in the 
Restatement of Torts which, in part, says: “A trade secret may consist of 
any formula, pattern, device or compilation of information which is 
used in one’s business, and which gives him an opportunity toobtain an 
advantage over competitors who do not know or use it.”” 
Given the somewhat loose nature of the trade secret concept, it 
should not be surprising that the law of trade secrets is rather pliable. It 
is largely judge-made, although there are some state and federal statutes 
providing remedies against the disclosure of trade secrets. And it is in the 
common-law tradition, arising from usages and customs of immemori-
al antiquity and from the judgments and decisions of the courts recog- 
nizing, affirming, updating, and enforcing such past practices. 
Historically, the law of trade secrets arose from a concern about 
commercial ethics. In brief, its purpose is largely to enforce standards of 
fair play in business conduct. There are, therefore, certain expectations 
that must be met in order that judicial protection or a statutory remedy 
may apply. First, it must be demonstrated that the information in 
question constitutes a trade secret-that i t  is used in one’s business, 
provides a competitive advantage, and is exclusively held. Second, it 
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must be shown that reasonable precautions were taken to prevent the 
information from becoming known by “proper” means. Third, the 
secrecy breach must be established: the information was obtained by 
“improper” means or in violation of a contractual or fiduciary 
obligation. 
There are several secrecy considerations worth mentioning at this 
juncture. First, depending upon the circumstances, a business may not 
seek recovery for the loss of a trade secret for fear that, in the course of a 
judicial proceeding, more details about the trade secret at issue might 
have to be disclosed or other confidential commercial information 
might have to be revealed. Protective orders, of course, may be a mitiga- 
ting factor. Nevertheless, the situation serves to explain why trade se- 
crets may be closely held by a selective few within a business and also 
why litigation directly addressing loss of trade secrets is not always 
pursued, particularly when some other prosecutorial strategy of less 
commercial risk might be available. 
This brings us to the second and third pertinent secrecy considera- 
tions. Although the law of evidence affords trade secrets a privilege from 
routine disclosure in litigation, i t  is not an absolute protection. In order 
to have a fair trial, judges have ordered the production of documents and 
testimony involving trade secret information. The privilege is, there- 
fore, a qualified one. 
Third, businesses have found contracts and agreements to be a 
useful and effective way to protect trade secrets. Certainly for practical 
reasons, physical safeguards, compartmentalization of knowledge, and 
the close holding of information by a selective few are not always 
sufficient or adequate. A nondisclosure contract not only provides an 
element of flexibility in security arrangements, but also offers an alter- 
native, and perhaps less risky, prosecutorial strategy for punishing trade 
secret losses. In brief, a business may find it  more desirable to pursue a 
breach of contract lawsuit than to litigate directly on expropriation of a 
trade secret. 
Finally, i t  should be apparent from the foregoing paragraphs that 
trade secrets are a peculiar kind of secret. In fact, the term is something of 
a misnomer. Trade secrets are often widely known. As a consequence of 
nondisclosure contracts, a great many employees in a particular busi- 
ness may be exposed to its trade secrets. Through licensing arrange- 
ments, a corporation may reveal trade secrets to another firm. And 
certainly more than one business has become aware that a competitor, 
through independent initiative, possesses and uses a trade secret which 
is not its exclusive knowledge. 
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It isdifficult tosay, withanydegreeofcertainty, what theattractive- 
ness of the trade secrets system is vis-a-vis, for example, the patent 
arrangement. One attribute would appear to be the general flexibility of 
trade secrets law. But, while this consideration attests to the need to 
accommodate new production processes and technology, another 
attraction of trade secrets safeguards may be their propensity for preserv- 
ing the status quo. This occurs partly because trade secrets arise from a 
common-law tradition and partly because of an acceptance of the 
secrecy myth attending this particular type of knowledge. Trade secrets 
are protected as a consequence of custom and past practice, and also 
because they stand sui generis as business information actually used in 
production and providing a competitive advantage. A great deal of the 
character of trade secrets rests with their status of being a veiled secret. 
Patent Protection 
By contrast, information protected under federal patent law has the 
status of being an open secret. The situation is nicely described by a line 
from the third act of M a n  and Superman when Shaw has one of his 
characters say: “We shall never be able to keep the secret unless every- 
body knows what i t  is.” 
A patent is a seventeen-year right of exclusive use given to an 
inventor in exchange for the disclosure of the invention so that it will be 
available for free public use when the patent period expires.”Like trade 
secrets law, patenting grew out of concern for commercial ethics and 
seeks, as well, to provide incentives for innovation. The Republic of 
Venice is credited with enacting the first patent law in 1474. Such a 
statute initially appeared in the United States in 1641 as a consequence 
of legislative action taken in the Massachusetts Bay Colony.” When the 
federal Constitution was ratified in 1788, it specifically empowered 
Congress, in Article I, Section 8, Clause 8, “Topromote the Progress of 
Science and the useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors 
and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and 
Disc~ver ies .”~~The first federal patent law was subsequently enacted in 
1790.14 
As might be anticipated, inventors, lawyers, and judges have found 
interpretation of the patent statute and resolution of patent lawsuits 
inordinately difficult. A few years ago, Justice Byron Whitecommented 
in an opinion “that patent litigation can present issues socomplex that 
legal minds, without appropriate grounding in science and technology, 
may have difficulty in reaching de~is ion .” ’~  
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Under current patent arrangements, all the information in a patent 
application is held in confidence by the Patent andTrademark Office of 
the Department of Commerce until the patent actually issues. Approved 
patent applications may be inspected, but the information may not be 
utilized during the patent period except through licensing with the 
holder. Patent infringement or piracy may be pursued in court. How- 
ever, this kind of litigation, as noted earlier, is highly complex, often 
prolonged, and usually expensive. For several reasons, patenting is less 
desirable than trade secrets protection. Nevertheless, there are certain 
types of inventors who find these arrangements quite suitable for their 
purposes. Universities and small businesses, for example, may not be 
prepared to maintain a trade secret or otherwise may regard patentinga 
better way to realize profit through the licensing or sale of the patented 
information. Also, in an area of rapid development, an inventor may 
consider seventeen-year exclusive use adequate, knowing that by the 
time the protection period lapses, innovation will provide patentable 
enhancements on the original invention or some other improvement 
making it obsolete. 
Regarding the shift away from patenting, Russell Stevenson 
recently wrote that, “while the empirical evidence is scanty, it appears 
that reliance on trade-secret protection is increasing, and in many cases 
even where inventions meet the standards of patentability.”16 Heoffers a 
number of reasons for this phenomenon. First, it is more expensive to 
acquire and defend a patent than to keep a new technological develop- 
ment protected by trade secrets arrangements. Second, in addition to 
cost considerations, the law of trade secrets is thought to be more 
successful in safeguarding proprietary information. Third, because 
approved patent applications are subject to public scrutiny, there is a 
preference for the security afforded by trade secrecy. Finally, there are 
innovations that simply are not patentable. 17 
There is one other aspect of the patent system that some might find 
repugnant and perhaps threatening. This is the possibility that the 
government might seize a patent application, divert it from being the 
basis for an open secret, and impose in its stead an order for absolute 
secrecy. How does this happen? 
Shortly after the United States entered World War I, Congress 
provided authority for the Commissioner of Patents” or the pre~ident’~ 
to withhold certain patents the publication of which might “be detri- 
mental to the public safety or defense, or may assist the enemy or 
endanger the successful prosecution of the war,” in order to keep the 
invention in question secret. Congress broadened the Patent Commis- 
sioner’s powers in this area in 1940 by deleting the requirement that the 
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United States be at war and by allowing the commissioner to so with-
hold the grant of a patent “for such period or periods as in his opinion 
the national interest requires.”20 This general authority lasted until the 
end of World War II.21 However, a permanent statute on this matter was 
subsequently enacted in 1952.22 
The Invention Secrecy Act currently provides that “whenever the 
publication or disclosure of an invention by the granting of a patent, in 
which the Government does not have a property interest, might, in the 
opinion of the [Patent] Commissioner, be detrimental to the national 
security,” he shall make the application available to certain specified 
defense agencies for review. In the event that one of these defense 
agencies determines that “the publication or disclosure of the invention 
by the granting of a patent therefor would be detrimental to the national 
security,...the Commissioner shall order that the invention be kept 
secret and shall withhold the grant of a patent” for not more than one 
year, subject to a possible renewal. 23 These secrecy restrictions may be 
appealed to the Secretary of Commerce24 and a claim for compensation 
for the damage caused by such a secrecy order may be made through the 
proper federal court.25 
Although patent secrecy orders are not applied to a large quantity 
of independently developed innovations, their effect is decisive. An 
inventor subject to such an  order who willfully publishes or discloses 
the information i t  covers not only forfeits his patent right but also can be 
fined $10,000 or imprisoned for two years, or both.26 The affected 
proprietary information is not usable. Compensation is difficult to 
obtain and usually no details are provided regardin the national secur- 
ity detriment prompting the government’s action. f7 
Statutory Protection 
The law of trade secrets and patenting arrangements are two major 
ways in  which secrecy is applied to business information as a matter of 
public policy. As the discussion indicates, neither system affords abso- 
lute protection. They are designed to facilitate fair commercial practice 
in the marketplace. Because i t  is a marketplace subject to government 
scrutiny and regulation, there is a necessity for the government toobtain 
various kinds of business information. In this regard, there arise addi- 
tional contexts in which secrecy is applied to business information as a 
matter of public policy. 
Both Congress and the federal courts have discretionary authority 
for protecting business information. Congressional committees may 
invoke their rules for an executive session and receive business informa- 
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tion in a closed proceeding or as if they were conducting a secret 
meeting. Similarly, a federal judge, as mentioned earlier, may issue a 
protective order limiting the availability of business information intro- 
duced in conjunction with or during a court hearing. 
The federal departments and agencies are subject to various statutes 
governing the protection of business information. There is a criminal 
code provision which prohibits officers and employees of the executive 
branch from publishing, divulging, disclosing, or making known “in 
any manner or to any extent not authorized by law” any information 
received during the course of their employment concerning or relating 
to trade secrets or certain similar specified information.% In addition, 
there is a category of laws requiring absolute protection of proprietary 
information by the departments and agencies, and another group man- 
dating qualified safeguarding. All of these authorities will be examined 
shortly. And there are also the exemptions to the rule of information 
disclosure of the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA).29This statute will 
be considered in a separate, succeeding section. 
The federal criminal law prohibition of agency disclosure “in any 
manner or to any extent not authorized by law” of trade-secret type 
information was enacted in 1948 as one small section of a codification 
statute. The section has come to be known as the Trade Secrets Act. Its 
legislative history indicates that three similar provisions appearing in 
the 1940 edition of the U S .Code-one from an income tax statute:’ one 
from a tariff commission law:1 and one from a commerce department 
authority”-were consolidated to create the new section. According to 
one analyst, the underlying legislative history “nowhere hints that 
Congress sought to alter substantively the reach of the three nondisclo- 
sure statute~.”~’ However, the language of the new section, taken liter- 
ally, sweeps far more broadly than the original three provisions from 
which i t  arose. Further, it appears that the courts “have applied an 
overly broad interpretation of the ~ection.”’~ Thus, the Trade Secrets 
Act has come to be viewed as having effect throughout the executive 
branch. 
It has been said, quite properly, that the language of the section 
“encompasses virtually every category of business information in 
agency file^."'^ And the effect of the act is to punish criminally any 
officer or employee of the United States disclosing such information “in 
any manner or to any extent not authorized by law.” Unfortunately, the 
understanding of the nature of the qualified exception to the section’s 
rule of nondisclosure has been made difficult because Congress did not 
define the phrase “authorized by law” or indicate if disclosure might be 
“authorized” by agency regulations. An even more difficult question 
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concerns the relationship of the Trade Secrets Act to the Freedom of 
Information Act. 
For our purposes, some clarifications in this situation may be 
found in the Supreme Court’s 1979 ruling in the Chrysler case.% Here it 
was affirmed that “properly promulgated, substantive agency regula- 
tions” have the force and effect of law in a variety of contexts, including 
the Trade Secrets According to the Administrative Procedure Act, 
a “substantive” regulation or rule is distinguished from “interpretive 
rules, general statements of policy, or rules of agency organization, 
procedure, or practice.”38 Noting this distinction, the Chrysler opinion 
indicated that a substantive or “legislative-type rule” is one “affecting 
individual rights and obligations,” a characteristic which the Court 
deemed “an important touchstone for distinguishing those rules that 
may be ‘binding’ or have the ‘force of the law.’ J’39 In order to have 
binding effect, substantive regulations, said the Court, must be “issued 
by an agency pursuant to statutory authority” and their promulgation 
“must conform with any procedural requirements imposed by Con- 
gress,’’ such as those found in the Administrative Procedure 
The Court then confined itself to a rather limited treatment of the 
relationship between the Trade Secrets Act and the Freedom of Informa-
tion Act. “Since materials that are exempt from disclosure under the 
FOIA are...outside the ambit of that Act,” said the Chrysler opinion, 
“the Government cannot rely on the FOIA as congressional authoriza- 
tion for disclosure regulations that ermit the release of information b:within the Act’s nine exemptions.” However, because of the condi- 
tions of the case at issue, the Court did not find it necessary to make any 
further determinations regarding the relationship of the two statutes.42 
Thus, there was no judgment regarding the question of whether or not 
the Trade Secrets Act constitutes a nondisclosure law falling within the 
third exemption of the FOIA.43 Indeed, although there was much 
authoritative opinion rejecting the contention that the Trade Secrets 
Act was an exemption 3 statute, the Chrysler decision may have 
rekindled support for the viewpoint.44 The Court also chose to render no 
opinion as to the relationship between the Trade Secrets Act and the 
fourth exemption of the FOIA ertaining to trade secrets and confiden- 
tial commercial information. 4 P  
In view of the Supreme Court’s determination in Chrysler that a 
substantive regulation, in part, must be “issued by an agency pursuant 
to statutory authority” in order to be binding or have the force of law, i t  
is now appropriate to explore the different kinds of statutes providing 
absolute or qualified protection for business information held by fed- 
eral departments and agencies.46 There are various statutory provisions 
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in the U.S.Codeand uncodified laws that impose a general prohibition, 
without exceptions, on the disclosure of proprietary business informa- 
tion obtained during the course of agency operations. For example, in 
conducting an official investigation, the Commodity Futures Trading 
Commission “may publish from time to time, in its discretion, the 
result of such investigation and such statistical information gathered 
therefrom as it may deem of interest to the public, except data and 
information which would separately disclose the business transactions 
of any person and trade secrets or names of customer^."^' The Federal 
Trade Commission is similarly barred from making public “trade 
secrets and names of customer^."^^ 
There are also a number of statutory provisions that impose a 
general prohibition on the disclosure of certain business information, 
but allow an exception to this rule for Congress and/or congressional 
committees. For example, there are several such protective provisions 
which conclude with the following statement or a closely similar 
phrase: “Nothing in this section shall authorize the withholding of 
information by the Secretary or any officer or employee under his 
control from the duly authorized committees of the Congress.”49 
Further, there are various statutory provisions that impose a gen- 
eral prohibition on the disclosure of certain business information, but 
allow a specific exception for disclosure in any relevant administrative 
or judicial proceeding authorized by statute. The language in a perti- 
nent section of the Flammable Fabrics Act is rather common phrasing 
on this point, indicating that “such information may be disclosed to 
other officers or employees concerned with carrying out this chapter or 
when relevant in any proceeding under this ~hapter.”~’ The Hazardous 
Substances Act makes allowance for the revealing of protected business 
information “to the courts, when relevant in any judicial proceeding 
under this ~ h a p t e r . ” ~ ~  And prohibitions on the disclosure of poultry 
inspection5’ or egg products inspection i n f ~ r m a t i o n ~ ~  entitled to protec- 
tion as a trade secret make allowance for revelation “as ordered by a 
court in any judicial proceeding.” 
There are a few statutory provisions that vest discretionary author- 
ity to protect trade secrets in the head(s) of an agency and require the 
supplier of sensitive business information to request its protection as a 
trade secret. The Securities and Exchange Commission, for example, 
exercises such authority regarding certain information filed by public 
utility holding companies. Suppliers of this information may make 
written objection to its disclosure, “stating the grounds for such objec- 
tion, and the Commission is authorized to hear objections in any such 
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case where it finds it a d ~ i s a b l e . ” ~ ~  Similarly, certain exempt organiza- 
tions and certain trusts may request that the Secretary of the Treasury or 
his delegate withhold from public inspection some supporting papers 
to their tax exemption applications. The secretary or his delegate must 
determine if the information at issue “relates to any trade secret, patent, 
process, style of work, or apparatus of the organization” and that 
“public disclosure of such information would adversely affect the 
organization. 955 
There are also a few statutory provisions that allow anagency head 
to disclose confidential information, including business information, if 
necessary, to carry out the purposes of a statute or in the interest of 
public health and safety. Examples of this authority may be found in 
provisions concerning certain weather information, 56 electronic pro- 
duct r ad ia t i~n ;~  and boating safety.% 
Finally, there are some statutory provisions that allow the 
exchange of confidential information, including business information, 
between federal agencies. For example, pesticide, 59 vehicle emission,60 
and noise data61 are governed by such law. And in carryingout certain of 
his duties, the Secretary of Transportation is authorized to request 
pertinent information, including confidential business information, 
from other federal departments and agencies which are “authorized and 
directed to cooperate with the Secretary and furnish such 
information. y16z 
Freedom of Information Act 
In addition to the types of statutory provisions discussed earlier 
which afford varying degrees of protection for business information, 
there is one other law that provides a measure of safekeeping for busi- 
ness records, but does so in the context of presumptive disclosure. 
Originally enacted in 1966, the Freedom of Information Act provides 
the public with legal authority and a procedure to obtain records held in 
agency files.63 Such records, of course, might have been submitted by a 
business or otherwise might contain sensitive proprietary data. Any 
person, including a business, may request these materials pursuant to 
the FOIA. An agency may decline to provide requested records by 
relying upon exemptions to the rule of disclosure specified in the FOIA. 
Two of these, the third and the fourth exemptions, have particular 
pertinence for business i n f ~ r r n a t i o n . ~ ~  
Businesses do use the FOIA to attempt to obtain information about 
competitors. And while no business wants details about its operations 
and products disclosed in this way, there apparently is also a degree of 
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feeling within the business community that such FOIA requests are not 
improper. In a recent oversight hearing, the chairman of a Senate 
subcommittee queried a witness representing the U.S. Chamber of 
Commerce about the propriety of this practice, calling it  “an abuse of 
the intent of the act.” The witness responded, saying: 
I would respectfully disagree with you in that I do not feel that the 
use of the Freedom of Information Act in the manner that you have 
just described is necessarily an abuse of the act. During the Congress 
deliberations over what became the Freedom of Information Act, it 
expressly rejected the notion of a right to know or a need to know in 
order to take advantage of the legislation. So what you have described 
as abuse, in fact represents adaptness and proficiousness in the use of 
the 
In 1984, there were 281,102 reported FOIA requests,66 which was a 
notable increase over the 262,265 request volume of the previous year.67 
Although precise information on the point is not available, probably 50 
to 60percent of these requests are attributable to the business communi- 
ty (i.e., corporations, businesses, legal representatives, or other commer- 
cial representatives). However, this does not mean that these requests 
resulted in the disclosure of any information of entrepreneurial value to 
the requester or, conversely, that valuable proprietary data were lost toa 
competitor. Indeed, it appears that the FOIA is not a very useful tool for 
conducting industrial espionage. Nonetheless, the business community 
continues to have anguish and anxiety about disclosures of its informa- 
tion pursuant to the FOIA. 
Businesses can attempt to prevent an agency from releasing propri- 
etary information that is arguably protectable under one or more of the 
exemptions of the FOIA. In the Chrysler case, the Supreme Court ruled 
that the exemptions of the FOIA are not mandatory and neither that 
statute nor the Trade Secrets Act provides a private right of action to 
prevent agency disclosure of information.68 However, the Court indi- 
cated6’ that judicial review of agency action in these matters is available 
to submitters of business records under the Administrative Procedure 
Also, in the aftermath of the Chrysler decision, many agencies 
established procedures for notifying business submitters when their 
records were being sought pursuant to the FOIA and providing an 
opportunity for them to argue against the release of such material. 
While these procedural arrangements are valuable to the business 
community, serious interpretive problems arise from FOIA exemptions 
three and four. In the case of the third exemption, there is the question of 
appropriate statutory provisions that meet the criteria of the exception 
clause. The situation is somewhat more difficult regarding the fourth 
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exemption covering “trade secrets and commercial or financial infor- 
mation obtained from a person and privileged or confidential.” In a 
1967 interpretive memorandum on the FOIA, the attorney general 
commented: 
The scope of this exemption is particularly difficult to determine. 
The terms used are general and undefined. Moreover, the sentence 
structure makes it susceptible of several readings, none of which is 
entirely sa t i~fac tory .~~ 
Summarizing the dilemma as i t  has subsequently evolved, Russell 
Stevenson notes “there is no generally agreed definition of what consti- 
tutes a ‘trade secret,’” and adds that “the second part of the exemption, 
for ‘commercial or financial information,’ has left more than ample 
latitude for the protection of commercially sensitive information that 
does not relate to the technical details of a manufacturing process.”72 
The difficult question then arises as to when information should be 
considered “privileged and confidential?” Generally accepted judicial 
guidance on this point comes from the National Parks case: informa- 
tion is “confidential” within the terms of the fourth exemption if 
disclosure would either (1) impair the ability of the government to 
obtain similar such information in the future, or (2) “cause substantial 
harm to the competitive position of the person from whom the informa- 
tion was obtained.”73 Although i t  has been somewhat difficult to deter- 
mine what “substantial harm to the competitive position” of a 
submitter means, the courts, notes Stevenson, “have imposed the 
burden of showing some injury on the private party who has supplied 
the information and seeks to prevent its release” and required “more 
than unsupported, conclusory allegations of potential harm.”74 This 
interpretative dilemma in litigation to prevent agency disclosure of 
submitters’ business information has resulted in what Stevenson calls, 
with a bit of understatement, “varying and inconsistent results.”75 And 
while many businesses are probably not pleased with this situation, its 
unsettled status offers hope that a favorable public policy will subse- 
quently result. 
Conclusion 
This brief overview has generally explored the contexts in which 
secrecy is applied to business information as a matter of public policy. 
The situation is a fluid one, with businesses vying with each other for 
information to improve their market standing. It is also a situation 
filled with dynamics, including continuous tension as to the kinds and 
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quantities of business information that are provided to government as 
well as the arrangements under which it is obtained, maintained, and 
utilized by agencies of the state. Businesses are continuously attempting 
to make or keep secret that information that they determine to merit 
protection. They are understandably satisfied when the balance of favor 
in public policy leans toward protection. Conversely, of course, their 
anxieties arise and mount in the face of public policy disposed toward 
disclosure. 
But, to what extent is secrecy-effective concealment or hiding- 
actually being realized in these matters? Indications are that what busi- 
nesses have attained in public policy regarding their proprietary 
information is not secrecy, but control over its disclosure. In their 
separate ways, the law of trade secrets, licensing arrangements, and 
patenting provide this control. And when business information is 
turned over to federal agencies, statutes, in varying degrees, exert this 
control. The Freedom of Information Act poses a threat because the 
business community is presently uncertain about the measure of control 
that may be exercised to check agencies’ decisions to disclose business 
information pursuant to the statute. 
Some might argue with this change in characterization or contend 
that it is a distinction without a difference. However, i t  appears that the 
term secrecy functionally is not an accurate descriptor, but has impor- 
tant symbolic value in these matters. Indeed, if law and public policy 
give recognition to business information as a secret, reinforced by 
sanctions for disclosure, who shall not honor its privileged status? 
Note: The views expressed in this article are those of the author and are not 
attributable to any other source. 
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Secrecy: Its Role in National Scientific and 
Technical Information Policy 
STEPHEN B. GOULD 
Introduction 
TRUEAND CORRECT KNOWLEDGE is the result of a complex process in 
which ideas and information can be checked, tested, and challenged 
continuously and without restraint by all interested parties. Many who 
adhere to this view also believe that scientific discovery and technologi- 
cal innovation become difficult or impossible in the absence of open 
communication within the research community. These assertions are 
widely held to be true among scientists and engineers. In modern 
history, however, military competition between adversaries has fueled 
pragmatic efforts to limit or discourage open communication of ideas 
and information in many fields of research. 
Scientific and technical information is a major product of federally 
sponsored research. National scientific and technical information pol- 
icy, like many broad areas of government concern, is not anywhere 
articulated in a comprehensive form. Agencies that sponsor basic and 
applied research in support of broad mission needs-such as the Depart- 
ments of Defense and Energy and the National Aeronautics and Space 
Administration (NASA)-each have their own policies and practices for 
dissemination and access to information produced. Those seeking to 
understand scientific and technical information policy must derive it 
from numerous statutes, legislative histories, regulations, and executive 
branch directives. Policies for restricting the availability or communica-
tion of scientific and technical information are similarly mandated by a 
Stephen B. Gould is Director, Project on Scientific Communication and National Secur- 
ity, Committee on Scientific Freedom and Responsibility, American Association for the 
Advancement of Science, Washington, D.C. 
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variety of government edicts. One purpose that many of the edicts have 
in common is to restrict or prevent the transfer of militarily useful 
technology to other nations. 
An unclassified report released in September 1985 by Secretary of 
Defense Caspar W. Weinberger states the current case for caution in 
determining the availability of scientific and technological information 
with military applications.’ The report, prepared by the U.S. intelli- 
gence community. argues that Western technology is being systemati- 
cally acquired legally and illegally by “intricately organized, highly 
effective collection programs specifically targeted to improve Soviet 
military weapon systems.” Although the value of these programs for 
Soviet technological development and advancement cannot be mea- 
sured, acquisition of Western equipment and technical documents are 
estimated to benefit all Soviet military research projects. In the view of 
the Department of Defense (DOD), assimilation of Western technology 
by the Soviet Union is so broad that the United States andother Western 
nations are thus subsidizing the Soviet military buildup. 
While undesired technology transfer to the Soviet Union is not the 
only impetus for regulating the flow of scientific and technical informa- 
tion, such transfer is currently the driving force cited by federal officials 
in support of a vigorous technology security campaign. Secrecy (here 
associated with information security classification procedures) is not 
the only tool being used by federal agencies to inhibit acquisition of 
scientific and technical information by U.S.adversaries. Within the past 
few years the government has sought to develop and implement proce- 
dures intended to keep certain categories of unclassified information 
out of the public domain, yet widely accessible by the research commu- 
nity and industry of the United States and its allies. Since mid-1984, the 
government has also sought to clarify what types of scientific and 
technical information will remain available for unrestricted circulation 
within the United States and international research communities. 
This commentary will review and discuss restrictions imposed by 
the federal government on dissemination of scientific and technical 
information. The primary statutory and administrative mechanisms for 
controlling scientific and technical information will be explained. 
Commentary concerning the wisdom of controls on such information 
will be reviewed. Finally, the implications of the current system of 
restrictions will be examined. 
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How Restrictions are Imposed 
The strongest statutory bases for restrictions on scientific and tech- 
nical information are found in the Invention Secrecy Act and the 
Atomic Energy Act. Executive branch discretion and interpretation 
have played a major role in imposing restrictions based on the Export 
Administration Act and the Arms Export Control Act. A series of 
executive orders have established and maintained the security classifica- 
tion program without any statutory basis. 
Before discussing these mechanisms for restricting dissemination 
of scientific and technical information, it is useful to examine National 
Security Decision Directive (NSDD) 189, signed by President Reagan on 
21 September 1985. This directive is intended to set forth current admin- 
istration policy on the dissemination of information resulting from 
basic and applied research sponsored by the federal government. 
According to the directive: 
It is the policy of this Administration that, to the maximum 
extent possible, the products of fundamental research remain 
unrestricted. It is also the policy of this Administration that, 
where the national security requires control, the mechanism 
for control of information generated during federally-funded 
fundamenal research in science, technology and engineering 
at colleges, universities and laboratories is classification. Each 
federal government agency is responsible for: a) determining 
whether classification is appropriate prior to the award of a 
research grant, contract, or cooperative agreement and, if so, 
controlling the research results through standard classifica-
tion. No  restrictions may be placed upon the conduct or report-
ing of federally-funded fundamental research that has not 
received national security classification, except as provided in 
applicable U.S. Statutes.2 
The label fundamental research was not commonly used asa descriptive 
term within the scientific and engineering research community prior to 
release of the directive in draft form in May 1984. According to Depart-
ment of Defense officials, the term was deliberately chosen both to 
convey the nature of research which would likely fall within the scope of 
the policy, and to allow each relevant individual federal agency to 
formulate an operational definition of the term best suited to its particu- 
lar security needs3 NSDD 189 itself provides only a general definition: 
SUMMER 1986 63 
STEPHEN GOU LD 
“Fundamental research” means basic and applied research in science 
and engineering, the results of which ordinarily are published and 
shared broadly within the scientific community, as distinguished 
from proprietary research and from industrial development, design, 
production, and product utilization, the results of which ordinarily 
are restricted for proprietary or national security reason^.^ 
In a memorandum conveying NSDD 189 to the heads of executive 
branch departments and agencies, the White House stressed the policy 
“preserves the ability of the agencies to control unclassified information 
using legislated authority provided expressly for that purpose in appli- 
cable U.S. statutes.” 
Proposed revisions to the Department of Commerce regulations 
which implement the Export Administration Act also employ the con- 
cept of fundamental research and contain the same definition used in 
NSDD 189.5 According to the proposed regulations, information aris- 
ing during or resulting from fundamental research qualifies for unre- 
stricted export to any destination under a General License for Technical 
Data Available to All Destinations (General License GTDA). A General 
License GTDA is roughly equivalent to a regulatory exemption requir- 
ing no prior notification to the Department of Commerce for the export 
of qualifying categories of technical data. Scientific or technical infor- 
mation that is already publicly available or is made public by the 
transaction in question, educational information, and information in 
certain patent applications also qualify for this license. 
The regulations further spell out explicit rules-of-thumb that will 
be used to identify research qualifying as “fundamental research.” 
Research conducted by scientists or engineers working for a university 
will normally be considered fundamental research, unless the university 
or the researchers accept any restrictions on free and immediate publica- 
tion of scientific and technical information resulting from the research 
project.6 Research conducted by scientists or engineers working for a 
federal agency or a federally funded research and development center 
(FFRDC) may be designated as fundamental research under any 
appropriate system devised by the agency or center. Research conducted 
for a business corporation will be considered fundamental research only 
if the researchers are free to make scientific and technical information 
resulting from the research publicly available without restriction or 
delay based on proprietary considerations. 
Almost one year prior to the issuance of NSDD 189, the Department 
of Defense made known its operational criteria for determining whether 
research is fundamental. According to a memorandum issued by the 
under secretary of defense for research and engineering, all unclassified 
LIBRARY TRENDS 64 
Secrecy in National Information Policy 
contract research supported by funds allocated from Department of 
Defense budget category 6.1 is considered to be f~ndamenta l .~  Unclassi-
fied research performed on a university campus and supported by 6.2 
funding is "with rare exceptions" also considered fundamental. Univer- 
sity researchers are to be informed in advance of any Department of 
Defense grant or contract whether the proposed research will be consid- 
ered fundamental, and, if not, what contract controls are proposed by 
the department to restrict dissemination of research data.' Contract 
research projects performed in off-campus university facilities that are 
not supported with 6.1 funds generally are not considered fundamental. 
Some discretion in assigning the fundamental label is allowed for 
research performed for the Department of Defense in federal laborato- 
ries under both budget categories 6.1 and 6.2. 
Department of Defense officials have indicated that research spon- 
sored by the federal government that is not considered fundamental may 
still be free of restriction^.^ However, scientific and technical informa- 
tion that remains unclassified can be considered by the government to be 
restricted under the Export Administration Act or the Arms Export 
Control Act if a researcher is obligated to a contractual agreement with 
the sponsoring agency that restricts dissemination of information aris- 
ing during or resulting from a research project. As indicated earlier, 
neither statute offers a well-defined basis for restricting the flow of 
unclassified information. Since the constitutionality of direct applica- 
tion of the statutes to scientific and technical information has been 
questioned, the government has sought to rely primarily on contractual 
agreements to bring such information under the control of the imple- 
menting export regulations. By deciding what research projects should 
be subject to contractual restrictions, the sponsoring agency essentially 
determines what information will be subject to export controls." The 
Department of Defense in 1983 secured an exemption to the Freedom of 
Information Act that permits the department to withhold from public 
disclosure information i t  determines to be subject to export 
restrictions." 
The Export Administration Act of 1979, as amended by Congress in 
1985, mandates the use of export controls to the extent necessary "to 
restrict the export of goods and technology which wouldmakea signifi- 
cant contribution to the military potential of countries which would 
prove detrimental to the national security of the United States."" The 
act defines technology to mean: 
The information and knowhow (whether in tangible form, such as 
models, prototypes, drawings, sketches, diagrams, blueprints, or 
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manuals, or in intangible form, such as training or technical services) 
that can be used to design, produce, manufacture, utilize, or recon- 
struct goods, includin computer software and technical data, but not %the goods themselves. 
The act requires that a list of militarily critical technologies, to be 
developed by the Department of Defense, be added to the control list of 
goods and technology subject to national security export contr01s.l~ 
While the Department of Defense has developed its list of critical tech- 
nologies, it has not yet been added to the control list. The department’s 
list is widely regarded as a list of all advanced technologies that can be 
applied to the development and manufacture of military systems. 
In the 1985 amendments, the following declaration of policy was 
added to the act: 
I t  is the policy of the United States to sustain vigorous scientific 
enterprise. T o  do so involves sustaining the ability of scientists and 
other scholars freely tocommunicate research findings, in accordance 
with applicable provisions of law, by means of publication, teaching, 
conferences, and other forms of scholarly e~change.’~ 
The House Committee on Foreign Affairs, which originally proposed 
the amendment, has indicated that the phrase “in accordance with 
applicable provisions of law” is intended to encompass constraints 
imposed by executive classification authority and contractual agree- 
ments between researchers and their sponsors based on national securi- 
ty, proprietary or trade secret considerations. The committee added the 
policy statement to the amendments because of concern that an overly 
broad interpretation of the act could seriously limit “the legitimate 
scientific communication process on which scientific productivity in 
the United States depends.” In the view of the committee, existing 
government authority to declare material classified, to control work 
performed under contracts, and to limit the entry to and movement 
within the United States of foreign nationals is adequate to meet U.S. 
security needs.16 
The Arms Export Control Act provides authority for restrictions on 
the export of technical data related to defense arti~1es.l~ The Interna- 
tional Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) in implementing this sta- 
tute define technical data to include: 
Information which is not classified pursuant to U.S. laws and regula- 
tions and which is directly related to the design, engineering, develop- 
ment, production, processing, manufacture, operation, overhaul, 
repair, maintenance, or reconstruction of defense articles. This 
includes blueprints, drawings, photographs, plans, instructions, 
computer software and documentation. This also includes informa- 
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tion which advances the state of the art of articles on the U.S. Muni- 
tions List.’* 
Information in the public domain, and general mathematical andengi- 
neering information only indirectly useful in the defense field are not 
considered to constitute technical data. The ITAR does not yet explic- 
i t ly  employ the concept of fundamental research, and thus the Arms 
Export Control Act could be considered one of the “applicable U.S. 
statutes” available to restrict unclassified technical data arising from 
such research. 
The dissemination controls on federally sponsored research 
imposed by a combination of contractual agreements and the export 
control statutes are generally not restrictive enough to enshroud scien- 
tific and technical information in secrecy. Unclassified documents con- 
taining scientific and technical information developed under the 
sponsorship of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration fall 
into six categories: (1) ITAR documents; (2) Expert Administration 
Regulations (EAR) documents; (3) “For Early Domestic Dissemina- 
tion” documents; (4)“Limited Distribution” documents; ( 5 )documents 
disclosing an invention; or (6) publicly available document^.'^ 
JTAR documents bear a notice stating that the information falls 
under the purview of the US. munitions list and thus should not be 
transferred to foreign nationals in the United States or abroad without 
specific approval. A notice on EAR documents states that thedocument 
“may not be transferred to foreign nationals of proscribed destinations 
without specific approval.” Both types of documents are available to 
U S .  citizens and may be available without an export license to scientists 
and engineers in other countries under the terms of specific 
government-to-government technical coopera tion agreements. 
Documents not otherwise restricted under the provisions of ITAR 
or EAR that contain the results of NASA research anddevelopment that 
have significant potential for domestic, commercial, or governmental 
benefit are designated as restricted distribution documents. “For Early 
Domestic Distribution” documents are those containing technical data 
determined to be applicable to commercial products or processes which 
could be brought to market within a reasonable time period and which 
would contribute to a recipient’s share of the market because the result- 
ing product or process will reach the market sooner or will be superior 
to those of competitors. Such documents bear the following notice: 
Because of its significant early commercial potential, this informa- 
tion, which has been developed under a U.S. Government program, is 
being disseminated within the United States in advance of general 
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publication. This information may be duplicated and used by the 
recipient with the express limitation that it not be published. Release 
of this information to other domestic parties by the recipient shall be 
made subject to these limitations. Foreign release may be made only 
with prior NASA approval and appropriate export licenses.20 
This designation has been used by NASA since 1973. Starting in 1985, 
documents can also be designated by NASA as “Limited Distribution” 
documents. Such documents contain technical data determined to relate 
to a proof-of-concept ora major breakthrough that would allow a major 
technological improvement that could be applied in a commercial or 
governmental aerospace system or subsystem within five years. Copies 
of these documents bear the following notice: “Because of its significant 
technological potential, this information, which has been developed 
under a U.S. Government program, is being given a limiteddistribution 
whereby advanced access is provided for use by domestic interests.”21 
The centerpiece of Department of Defense dissemination policy is 
also a procedure for marking all newly created technical documents 
with distribution statements. The statements are for purposes of defin-
ing availability of technical documents within the defense community 
and indicating how requests for documents from outside the depart- 
ment should be handled. The procedures apply to all technical docu- 
ments generated by research, development, test, and evaluation 
programs funded by the Department of Defense.% 
Seven distribution statements can be used by Department of 
Defense components that generate or are responsible for technical docu- 
ments. Documents with distribution statement A are approved for pub- 
lic release and unlimited distribution. Documents with statements B, C, 
D, or E are automatically available to defined entities. Requests from 
other parties must be specifically approved by the controlling office 
within the Department of Defense. These four statements may be ap- 
plied to classified, declassified, and unclassified documents. 
B documents are available to U.S. government agencies. Justifica- 
tions for assigning this availability include protection in accordance 
with the desires of a foreign government furnishing the information; 
protection of information not owned by the U.S. government that is 
received from a contractor with the understanding that i t  may not be 
transmitted outside the U.S. government; protection of the results of test 
and evaluation of commercial products or military hardware when 
disclosure may cause unfair advantage or disadvantage to the manufac- 
turer; and protection of technical or operational data from automatic 
dissemination under the International Exchange Program. C docu-
ments are available to U.S. government agencies and their contractors, 
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and require protection for information and technical data that advance 
current technology or describe new technology in an area of potentially 
significant military application. D documents are available to the 
Department of Defense and its contractors, and may concern a system or 
hardware in the development or concept stage. E documents are avail- 
able only within the Department of Defense. F documents are available 
only as directed by the controlling office and are generally technical 
documents that are classified. 
For documents marked with distribution statement X,distribution 
is authorized to government agencies and private individuals or enter-
prises eligible to obtain export-controlled technical data. The Depart- 
ment of Defense Authorization Act of 1984 contained a provision 
exempting technical data deemed subject to the export control laws 
from disclosure b the Department of Defense under the Freedom of 
Information Act ‘The Department of Defense has broadly interpreted 
this authority to permit the withholding of subject technical data from 
any type of public disclosure. The implementing regulations set forth 
requirements for eligibility to obtain such data from the Department of 
Defense.24 Private firms and individuals must sign a contractual agree- 
ment which certifies compliance with U.S. export control regulations; 
that recipients of the data are U.S. citizens or persons admitted to the 
United States for permanent residence; that data are needed to bid or 
perform on a contract with the U.S. government or for other approved 
purposes; and that access to the data will not be provided to persons 
other than employees or persons acting on the recipient’s behalf with- 
out the permission of the Department of Defense. The department 
reserves the right to deny requests for subject technical data if the data 
are judged to be unrelated to the purpose for which the requestor is 
certified; if the significance of the data for military purposes is such that 
release for purposes other than direct support of approved activities may 
jeopardize an important technological or operational military advan- 
tage of the United States; or if credible and sufficient information is 
known that the requestor has violated U.S. export control law, violated 
its certification, made a certification in bad faith, or made an omission 
or misstatement of material fact. 
The Atomic Energy Act, first passed by Congress in 1946, requires 
that most information relating to nuclear weapons and nuclear energy 
be designated as Restricted Damz5 Restricted Data is defined in the act as 
“all data concerning (1) design, manufacture, or utilization of atomic 
weapons; (2)the production of special nuclear material; or (3)the use of 
special nuclear material in the production of energy.”= Information 
within this definition is “born classified” as a government secret unless 
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and until i t  has been declassified by the government. A significant 
amount of information falling within the definition of Restricted Data 
has been declassified. Although the designation has generally been 
applied to data generated by government employees or with govern- 
ment sponsorship, the information control provisions of the act have 
been applied to any information falling within the definition of Res-
tricted Data regardless of where the information ~riginated.’~ The law 
requires any person making any invention or discovery generally useful 
in the field of atomic energy to file a report with the Department of 
Energy within six months giving a complete description of it, unless a 
patent application has been filed. 
At the request of the Department of Energy, the Atomic Energy Act 
was amended in 1981 to authorize withholding of unclassified informa- 
tion from release if disclosure could result in a significant adverse effect 
on the health and safety of the public or the common defense. Justifica- 
tion is required that release of the information would significantly 
increase the likelihood of illegal production of nuclear weapons: or 
theft, diversion, or sabotage of nuclear materials, equipment, or 
facili ties.28 
The Invention Secrecy Act permits the government to block the 
granting of a patent and prohibit an inventor from disclosing the 
invention to anyone else when, in the view of a defense agency, publica- 
tion or disclosure of an invention would be detrimental to the national 
security.29 A secrecy order issued by the patent commissioner is effective 
for not more than one year, subject to a possible renewal. Two alterna- 
tives are currently being worked out by the Patent andTrademark Office 
in cooperation with the Department of Defense. The first option would 
allow the issuance of a patent along with an order which limits use or 
disclosure of the invention to classified projects of the government. A 
second option would allow the issuance of an order which limits disclo- 
sure to persons employed by the originating company. Publication of 
such a patent would require an export license, as would the export of a 
product or process making use of the invention. Under both options the 
patent would be withheld until the order was re~cinded.~’ 
Information can be classified for national security purposes pursu- 
ant to a program that is currently defined by Executive Order 12356.31 
Classification at one of three levels-top secret, secret, and 
confidential-can be applied to information if it concerns “scientific, 
technological, or economic matters relating to the national security,” or 
“capabilities of systems, installations, projects, or plans relating to the 
national security.” Basic scientific research information not clearly 
related to the national security cannot be classified. Access to classified 
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information is provided only upon a determination both of an individu- 
al’s trustworthiness, by way of a background investigation, and that 
such access is essential to the accomplishment of authorized govern- 
ment activities. 
Review of Commentary 
Application of all types of restrictions to scientific and technical 
information has long been a controversial matter within government 
and the research community. Discussion and debate on the wisdom of 
imposing controls on information resulting from research supported by 
the federal government has occurred throughout the past four decades. 
In 1948, Vannevar Bush addressed the issue in a manner not antagonis- 
tic to the current multilayered system of controls: 
We can compete in the open with any totalitarian power and give 
them cards and spades as far as fundamental science-the foundation 
on which development rests-is concerned....But in the applications 
which grow through development out of fundamental science, it is a 
different matter. The critical point may well be reached far earlier in 
the process than we are accustomed to think, and ...we must be alert to 
it and ready at once to erect the defenses of protection and security 
which it demands3’ 
Congressional hearings held during the 1950s first brought atten- 
tion to complaints by leading scientists that technological secrecy prac- 
ticed by the federal government was more damaging than beneficial to 
U S .  national security.33 The issues aired then are still being debated 
today-Defense and Commerce Department directives and regulations 
designed to cut down on the flow of technical information, how the flow 
of militarily valuable technological know-how topotential enemies can 
be confined without unduly harming U S .  interests, and whether there 
is too much uncertainty about what information should be classified or 
restricted. 
During the hearings, scientists testified that the United States since 
World War I1 has “steadily lost ground relative to our competitors until 
now there is serious question whether the U.S. actually retains leader- 
ship in certain critically important areas of military technology.” They 
insisted that trying to keep secret broad areas of knowledge was futile. 
Determined foreign data collection activities were seen to be seldom 
blocked while internal information flows were obstructed.% Lloyd 
Berkner delivered the strongest indictment of U.S. secrecy and character- 
ized the then prevailing attitudes as follows: 
SUMMER 1986 71 
STEPHEN GOULD 
As a nation we have become neurotic, so preoccupied by imagined 
aches and pains that we have lost sight of our great strength. We allow 
ourselves to believe that the system of Soviet communism has ele- 
ments of strength superior to our own when we could readily reason 
that a totalitarian socialism can only follow-never lead-our true 
system of free enterprise that exploits diversity. We have been misled 
to adopt some of the Soviet methods with consequent suspicion, 
mistrust, divisiveness and loss of leadership that always follow such 
methods. We see spies under every chair and from the consequent fear, 
prescribe remedies that sap our strength. In rooting them out, let’s 
keep our sense of proportion. Our strength should come from our 
leadershig and unity, a superiority which no espionage can 
mnquer. 
In 1970, a Defense Science Board task force headed by Frederick 
Seitz focused on secrecy in military research and development. In 
addressing specific questions posed by the director of defense research 
and engineering, the task force considered security classification from 
the national long range and short range viewpoints. The task force 
generally concluded that the Department of Defense security classifica- 
tion system required major surgery if it was to function properly in the 
defense, national, and international environment. The information 
most deserving of classification was deemed to be that which industry 
often treats as proprietary. The task force argued that security classifica- 
tion was “most profitably applied in areas close to design and produc- 
tion, having to do with detailed drawings and special techniques of 
manufacture rather than research and most exploratory development.” 
The task force concluded that the amount of scientific and technical 
information which was held to be classified could advantageously be 
decreased as much as 90 percent by limiting the amount of information 
classified and the duration of its classification. The task force recom- 
mended that as a general rule, research and early development should be 
unclassified. Classification was recommended only when development 
of military systems approaches the “blueprint” stage. In particular, the 
“confidential” category was considered to be inappropriate for research 
and development programs, and “special access” limitations were 
judged to be more likely to seriously impede difficult technical pro- 
grams than not.% 
Restrictions on scientific and technical information based on 
export control laws received heightened attention subsequent to a study 
by the Defense Science Board in 1976. A panel chaired by Fred Bucy 
argued that design and manufacturing know-how are the principal 
elements of strategic technology control. Technology contained in ap- 
plied research or development was deemed to be of possible significance 
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in selected areas. The categories of export that were seen as deserving 
primary emphasis were: (1) arrays of design and manufacturing know- 
how; (2) keystone manufacturing, inspection, and test equipment; and 
(3) products accompanied by sophisticated operation, application, or 
maintenance kn~w-how.~’ This premise helped set in motion more 
vigorous efforts to apply export control regulations to transfer and 
dissemination of technical knowledge related to militarily useful 
advanced technology. 
In 1982, a Defense Science Board task force study on university 
responsiveness to national security requirements found that the shift in 
emphasis of export controls from product control to control of 
technology-including products, equipment, and arrays of know- 
how-complicated relations between the Department of Defense and 
the university research community. The task force noted that 
researchers in universities are driven by goals and motivations quite 
different than those found in industry, where proprietary restraints act 
to inhibit the flow of important know-how. Since prestige andrecogni- 
tion are attained in academia by being the first to publish a new idea or 
concept, the task force saw it as crucial that the Department of Defense 
be sensitive to differences between industry and universities in its pur- 
suit of the control of technologies that are critical in a military sense. 
Stating that control of technical information generated by research 
could be a major obstacle to restoring a healthy relationship between 
universities and the Department of Defense, the task force recommended 
that clear guidelines be established for dissemination of technical infor- 
mation in Defense-funded university research. The task force urged that 
the guidelines not be overly restrictive and not inhibit the legitimate 
flow of scientific information. A dialogue between the government and 
the university community since the issuance of this task force report has 
led to the policies on fundamental research articulated in NSDD 189 and 
the general license provisions of the Export Administration 
Regula tions.% 
A study on scientific communication and national security by a 
panel chaired by Dale Corson recommended that no restriction of any 
kind limiting access or communication should be applied to any area of 
university basic or applied research, unless i t  involves a technology 
meeting all of the following criteria: the technology is developing 
rapidly, and the time from basic science to application is short; the 
technology has identifiable direct military applications or is dual-use 
and involves process or production-related techniques; transfer of the 
technology would give the Soviet Union a significant near-term mil- 
itary benefit; and the United States is the only source of information 
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about the technology, or other friendly nations that could also be the 
source have control systems as secure as ours. The panel recommended 
classification for university research meeting these criteria. Noting that 
most universities will not undertake classified work, the panel recom- 
mended as an alternative written agreements no more restrictive than a 
prohibition of direct participation in research projects by nationals of 
designated foreign countries, and a requirement for simultaneous sub- 
mission of manuscripts to a publisher and the contract officer with a 
sixty-day period for the sponsoring federal agency to seek 
m~dif ica t ions .~~ 
Although concluding that the criteria suggested by the Corson 
panel are unworkable, Department of Defense officials have opted for 
use of contractual controls on university research not considered funda- 
mental. The potential use of classification to restrict fundamental 
research is sanctioned by NSDD 189. 
Analyses from a variety of perspectives of the tension between 
controls on the export of technology and the environment required for 
the advancement of science and technology in the United States indicate 
areas of agreement and disagreement as to the widsom of controlling 
unclassified scientific and technical information arising from federally 
sponsored research. Roland Schmitt sees a “Catch-22” dilemma in 
seeking to protect the products of an asset that can be destroyed by the act 
of protection-a system of research and development that is highly 
interactive and largely open. 
Schmitt agrees with what has become a consensus view that all 
areas of fundamental scientific and engineering research should remain 
unfettered by controls including research of military interest. With 
respect to unclassified technical data that is not deemed fundamental, 
Schmitt tacitly accepts some level of control by urging that procedures 
be developed “for screening foreign nationals who come to the United 
States for research training or technical employment so that they can 
have the same freedom of access tounclassified technical information as 
U.S. citizens.”40 Other observers and institutions regard any attempt to 
control technical information as counterproductive for national secur- 
ity. Stephen Unger argues that openness supports national security: 
The free exchange of knowledge among scientists and engineers is a 
key factor in promoting progress. An integral part of the scientific 
process is the publication and wide dissemination of new ideas, 
discoveries, and experimental results. By this means, critics may 
detect errors or faulty reasoning, point out possible improvements, or 
confirm the validity of what was done. Colleagues (often complete 
strangers) may suggest solutions or alternative approaches to prob-
lems raised. They may find applications other than those that the 
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author had in mind-sometimes in entirely different fields. Mention 
in a technical paper of unsuccessful approaches to a problem helps 
others avoid wasting effort in exploring blind alleys. Publication of 
successful solutions to problems makes it unnecessary for others to 
expend time and energy in solving them again, although it is com- 
mon for a solution to inspire others to find better, often simpler, 
solutions to the same problems. They may also eneralize published wsolutions to cover broader classes of problems. 
Resistance to controls on communication of unclassified technical 
information is centered in the scientific and engineering professional 
societies. These societies seek to advance fields of knowledge by promot- 
ing open presentation, discussion, peer review, publication, and dis- 
semination of technical information to all who want it, regardless of 
nationality. Through publication of journals and the sponsorship of 
meetings, societies seek to create a permanent record of knowledge 
generated in scientific and engineering fields. By one self-evaluation: 
From a neo-protectionist perspective the Institute for Electrical and 
Electronics Engineers must rank as a significant threat to Western and 
U.S. national security. As publisher of over fifty state-of-the-art tech- 
nical journals the IEEE provides a direct conduit for critical informa- 
tion transfer across national boundaries, although in view of the 
international authorship this is not ~nidirectional.~' 
In a September 1985 letter to the secretary of defense, the elected 
presidents of twelve scientific and engineering societies emphasized that 
the broad range of unclassified information subject to Department of 
Defense controls places limits on the exchange of scientific and techni- 
cal information that, in turn, are detrimental to the national security 
interests of the nation. In the view of the societies: 
In science and engineering research, the open exchange of informa- 
tion ensures that critical peer review is applied to new advances, 
provides valuable cross-fertilization of ideas and helps avoid duplica- 
tion of effort. One of the principal missions of our organizations is to 
encourage and provide opportunities for such exchange and thereby 
to promote advances in the fields of knowledge which we represent. 
Since such advances are also important to national security, we feel 
impelled to advise you of the counterproductive consequences of the 
current DoD policies and of the limitations in our ability to respond 
to them?3 
Of particular concern to the signatories is a directive, first proposed by 
the Department of Defense earlier in the year, setting policy for the 
presentation of scientific and technical papers based on research spon- 
sored by the d e ~ a r t m e n t . ~ ~  The guidance bars approval of unclassified 
papers judged to contain export-controlled information unless physical 
SUMMER 1986 75 
STEPHEN GOULD 
access to the presentation will be limited to government employees and 
individuals certified by the department as eligible to receive export- 
controlled technical data. Such “unclassified/limited access” presenta- 
tions were first required on an ad hoc basis by the Department of 
Defense during a meeting of the Society for Photo-Optical Instrumenta- 
tion Engineers in April 1985. 
Where are We Headed? 
Dissemination restrictions on a significant body of unclassified 
information arising from government-sponsored research appear now 
to play a substantial role in national scientific and technical informa- 
tion policy. What is unclear is whether the availability and use of 
restrictions on unclassified technical data will lead to a decrease in the 
use of classification authority. According to Sumner Benson, the Rea- 
gan administration considered establishing a fourth category of classifi-
cation, below the existing three categories of confidential, secret, and 
top secret. This approach was rejected as too expensive and cumbersome 
since classification controls require specified physical facilities to house 
the documents, detailed procedures for controlling the documents, and 
costly and time-consuming security clearances for personnel who will 
have access to the documents. As an alternative, the application of 
procedures based in export regulations rather than classification is seen 
by proponents as allowing much greater flexibility in disseminating 
technical information while still inhibiting Soviet access to informa-
tion subject to the controls.45 
In the absence of substantially decreased use of the current classifi- 
cation system, it is clear that export controls will lessen the availability 
of U.S. government-sponsored technical information within the inter- 
national research community. Technical documents arising from many 
categories of unclassified research, which in the past were likely to be 
made publicly available, will now only be accessible to defined sectors 
in the research community. 
Reliance by the government on contractual agreements between 
researchers and their sponsors to bring scientific and technical informa- 
tion within the purview of export control statutes from the start of a 
research project may make the controls legally defensible. No consensus 
has been reached on whether use of contractual agreements to keep 
information out of the public domain makes sense from a public policy 
perspective. Recognizing that export controls are unlikely to com-
pletely halt the undesired transfer of militarily useful knowledge to our 
military adversaries, defense officials argue that making the acquisition 
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activities of our adversaries more difficult and expensive will hinder the 
advance of their military technologies and bolster U.S. national securi- 
ty. Critics question whether the increased transaction costs associated 
with acquisition of export-controlled information by scientists and 
engineers in the United States and friendly nations may similarly hinder 
the advance of Western military and civilian technology. Since a signifi- 
cant portion of the controls on unclassified information now in place 
are new, their impact, both on Soviet and friendly acquisition of export- 
controlled knowledge, cannot yet be measured. 
The “red-tape” burden associated with the new controls could, at 
least in theory, be substantially less than would have been the case if 
such controls had been expanded a decade ago. For example, partial 
automation of the certification, access approval, and document han- 
dling systems associated with implementation by the Department of 
Defense of its policy of selective dissemination of certain categories of 
unclassified technical data could make access by eligible individuals 
and enterprises only marginally different than obtaining publicly avail- 
able documents from the department. Actual experience with access has 
yet to be assessed. 
The physical safeguards expected by the government for export- 
controlled information have not been made clear. Such information 
cannot be kept in publicly accessible library collections, and this alone 
may hinder productive access. Industrial users may experience little 
difficulty in handling controlled documents since existing procedures 
for managing proprietary information may be common and familiar. 
Export-controlled knowledge poses particular problems for many 
academic research institutions. The large population of foreign nation- 
als on most university campuses makes even minimal safeguards awk- 
ward. Faculty may utilize government documents much less extensively 
than in the past if they cannot freely share the information with their 
students regardless of nationality. Over the long term, this may reduce 
the value of academic teaching and research in fields substantially 
supported by government research and development funding. 
Export-controlled knowledge also poses difficult choices for some 
professional societies. Between restrictions that may discriminate 
against members who are citizens of nations with less than complete 
official access to U.S. technology and the difficulties associated with 
access by academic researchers, society effectiveness and the value of 
membership may be reduced whether a society accepts “un-
classifiedlrestricted access” sessions or not. Some societies could be faced 
with a choice of facilitating the sharing of all unclassified ideas among 
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fewer individuals or facilitating the sharing of a smaller body of infor- 
mation among all members. The creation of barriers to participation in 
U.S. professional society meetings by foreign scientists and engineers 
may also contribute to decreased society effectiveness and sharing of 
information. This is a matter of great concern to the scientific and 
engineering societies since leadership in some areas of technology 
resides within other nations. 
Complaints from within the military research establishment point 
to further possible effects of procedures designed to prevent public 
dissemination of unclassified information with military applications. 
It has been argued that such restrictions are making it difficult for the 
national laboratories to recruit and retain the best researchers. One 
laboratory official analyzed the situation as follows: 
How can [researchers] grow professionally if their work cannot be widely 
discussed or presented for peer review? How can they be rewarded without 
the opportunity to publish in the open archival literature? What this 
means is that we have a great deal of difficulty acquiring experienced 
people. We have to grow them ourselves.46 
Conclusions 
It is not difficult to accept the fact that the Soviet Union has a 
vigorous program for legally and illegally obtaining scientific and 
technical information relating to Western technology that is valuable 
for the development of military systems. The legal collection efforts are 
certainly duplicated to a greater or lesser degree by both public and 
private sector entities in most technologically active nations for both 
civilian and military purposes. The use of espionage in conjunction 
with comprehensive monitoring of publicly available information is a 
logical and cost-effective tactic for enhancing the rate of advancement of 
Soviet military technology. The reality of an arms race and multilateral 
technology embargoes make such acquisition efforts a rational course of 
action. Solely within the context of military competition, efforts to 
hinder the Soviet acquisition of Western technology serve an important 
policy role. 
The costs and benefits to national security of restrictions on the 
dissemination of scientific and techincal information with military 
application have clearly not been definitively assessed and may not be 
measurable. Consequently, there is no consensus within the research 
community that is broadly supportive of dissemination restrictions as a 
component of national security policy. On paper, the current array of 
controls on scientific and technical information appears logical from a 
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military perspective. In theory, the restrictions may permit researchers 
to continue to have access to state-of-the-art government-sponsored 
research without significant transaction costs. Yet the history of govern- 
ment is rife with examples of well-intentioned policies that respond to 
particular problems and, when implemented, prove to have unintended 
counterproductive effects. Simply because there has been so little agree- 
ment about the efficacy of dissemination restrictions on scientific and 
technical information, these policies may be at risk of having unfortu- 
nate implications for the advancement of both military and civilian 
research in the United States. 
Much recent attention has been devoted to the unwieldy aspects of 
the classification system-the volume of information that is classified 
by the government, the number of people that consequently must hold 
clearances, and the difficulties of adequately screening and policing 
cleared personnel. The recommendations of the Defense Science Board 
task force on secrecy, in combination with the system now in place to 
control unclassified technical information, offer one alternative that 
could be usefully considered by the government toease the strains on the 
information security system. Declassification of most technical infor- 
mation now currently classified, along with continued control of such 
information using the new procedures for limiting dissemination of 
unclassified information, may yield broad benefits to military and 
civilian research and development. 
Despite general talk of “regulatory impact assessments” to be con- 
ducted prior to new government regulations, the federal government 
does not systematically weigh the broad implications of its controls on 
scientific and technical information. It is the unwantedresponsibility of 
the research community to document the costs of regulation and seek 
relief if serious disruptions in the advancement of science and technol- 
ogy can be proven. The government and the research community have 
struggled with defining the tradeoffs between national security and 
openness in science and technology for much of the post-World War 11 
era. The process of determining an optimal balance between openness 
and secrecy promises to continue. 
References 
1. Technology Transfer Intelligence Committee. Souiet Acquisition of Militarily 
Significant Western Technology. Washington, D.C.: USGPO, 1985. 
2. United States, National Security Decision Directive. “National Policy on the 
Transfer of Scientific, Technical and Engineering Information” (NSDD No. 189). 
Washington, D.C.: White House, 21 Sept. 1985. 
SUMMER 1986 79 
STEPHEN GOULD 
3. Leo Young to the Working Group on Export Controls of the Department of 
Defense/University Forum, informal discussion, 14 Sept. 1984. 
4. United States, National Security Decision Directive. “National Policy on the 
Transfer of Scientific, Technical and Engineering Information” (NSDD No. 189). 
5. See Federal Register 51(16 May 1986):17986-89. 
6. Arrangements providing for a prepublication review by a sponsor of university 
research solely to ensure that the publication would neither compromise patent rights nor 
inadvertently divulge the sponsor’s trade secrets are not considered restrictions under this 
provision. 
7. U S .  Department of Defense. Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for 
Research and Engineering. Memorandum on “Publication of the Results of DoD Spon- 
sored Fundamental Research.” Washington, D.C.: U S .  DOD, 1 Oct. 1984. 
8. Examples of specific contract controls include requirements for prepublication 
review by the government, with or without right to withhold permission for publication; 
restrictions on prepublication dissemination of information to noncitizens or other 
categories of persons; or restrictions on participation of noncitizens or other categories of 
persons in the research. 
9. Leo Young to the Working Group on Export Controls of the Department of 
DefenseAJniversity Forum, informal discussion, 14 Sept. 1984. 
10. U S .  Department of Defense Directive 5230.25, dated 6 Nov. 1984, specifies that 
judgment on whether technical data under consideration discloses critical technology 
with military or space application will be generally guided by the Militarily Critical 
Technologies List. 
11. 10 U.S.C. Section 140c, as added by Public Law 98-94, “Department of Defense 
Authorization Act, 1984,” Section 1217, 24 Sept. 1983. 
12. 50 LJ.S.C. 2402 (2) (A) App. 
13. 50 U.S.C. 2415 App. 
14. 50 U.S.C. 2402 (d) App. 
15. 50 U.S.C. 2402 (12) App. 
16. See Congressional Record 131(16 April 1985):H 2006. 
17. 22 U.S.C. 2751 
18. 22 C.F.R. 125.01. 
19. See NASA Management Instruction 2230.1B. 
20. Ibid., 2230.1D. 
21. Ibid., 2230.1E. 
22. See U S .  Department of Defense Directive 5230.24, “Distribution Statements on 
Technical Documents.” 
23. 10 U.S.C. 140c. 
24. See U.S. Department of Defense Directive 5230.25, “Withholdingof Unclassified 
Technical Data From Public Disclosure.” 
25. 42 U.S.C. 201 1-2296. 
26. 42 U.S.C. 2014(y). 
27. See Cheh, Mary M. “Government Control of Private Ideas.” In Striking a Bal- 
ance: National Security and Scientific Freedom, edited by Harold C. Relyea, p. 8. 
Washington, D.C.: American Association for the Advancement of Science, 1985. 
28. 95 Stat. 1163 at 1170. 
29. 35 U.S.C. 181-88. 
30. See Committee on Scientific Freedom and Responsibility. “Scientific Freedom 
and National Security.” AAS Bulletin 8(Winter 1986):l-2, 7. 
31. See Federal Register 47(25 June 1982):27836-42. 
32. LJ.S. Congress, House, Committee on Government Operations. Availability of  
Information From Federal Departments and Agencies (Part 8). Hearings, 85th Cong., 1st 
sess. Washington, D.C.: USGPO, 1957, pp. 2159-60. 
LIBRARY TRENDS 80 
Secrecy in National Znformation Policy 
33. IJS.Congress, House, Committee on Government Operations. Availability of 
Znforrnation From Federal Executiue Agencies (Part 4). Hearings, 84th Cong., 2d sess. 
Washington, D.C.: USGPO, 1956, p. 725. 
34. Ibid., p. 751. 
35. Ibid., p. 754. 
36. U S .  Department of Defense, Office of the Director of Defense Research and 
Engineering. Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Secrecy. Washington, 
D.C.: DOD, 1 July 1970. 
37. U S .  Department of Defense, Office of the Director of Defense Research and 
Engineering. Report ofthe Defense Science Board Task Force on Export ofU.S.Technol-
ogy. Washington, D.C.: DOD, 4 Feb. 1976. 
38. U.S. Department of Defense, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for 
Research and Engineering. Report of the Defensescience Board Task Force on University 
Responsiveness to National Security Requirements. Washington, D.C.: DOD, 1982. 
39. Panel on  Scientific Communication and National Security, Committee on 
Science, Engineering, and Public Policy, National Academy of Sciences, National 
Academy of Engineering, Institute of Medicine. Scientific Communication and National 
Security. Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press, 1982. 
40. Schmitt, Roland W. “Export Controls: Balancing Technological Innovation and 
National Security.” Issues in Science and Technology l(Fal1 1984): 126. 
41. Unger, Stephen H. “A Proposal to Limit Government Imposed Secrecy.” Tech-
nology and Society Z(Dec. 1983):3-6. 
42. Bogumil, R. J. “Society and Technological Secrets.” Technology and Society 
2(March 1983):Z. 
43. James Y. Oldshue, Gerard Piel, Charles A. Eldon, Paul E. Pritzker, Robert R. 
Wilson, Lewis Larmore, Marvin F. De Vris, Robert R. Shannon, Ellis K. Fields, Richard 
W. Karn, Wilbur L. Meier, Jr.. and T.K. Pethe to Caspar W. Weinberger, joint communi- 
cation, 17 Sept. 1985. 
44. U.S. Department of Defense, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for 
Research and Engineering. “Policy and Guidelines for the Presentation of DoD-
Sponsored Scientific and Technical Papers” (Draft Proposal), 24 Oct. 1985. 
45. Benson, Sumner. (Discussion during a symposium, “Scientific Freedom and 
National Security: Is There a Conflict?” at  the 1985 Annual Meeting of the American 
Association for the Advancement of Science.) In TransactionlSocial Science and Modern 
Society (forthcoming). 
46 Smith, R. Jeffrey. “Scientific Secrecy: An Unhealthy Trend.” Science228( 14 June 
1985):1293 (quote is from Arthur H .  Guenther, chief scientist at  the Air Force Weapons 
Laboratory). 
SUMMER 1986 81 
This Page Intentionally Left Blank 
Technology, Privacy, and Electronic 
Freedom of Speech 
FRANCES M. McDONALD 
Introduction 
DECISIONSBEING MADE NOW have the potential of creating a society in 
which all forms of communications are free or a society in which 
restrictions on access to information are imposed by legislators and 
other government officials. Unfortunately, based on precedents set with 
the regulation of radio and television, technologically uninformed 
government officials are passing laws without adequate attention to 
First Amendment freedoms and civil liberties. 
Electronic technology is conduciveto freedom. The degree of diver-
sity and plenitude ofaccess that mature electronic technology allows 
far exceeds what is enjoyed today. Computerized information net-
works of the twenty-first century need not be any less free for all to use 
without let or hindrance than was the printing press. Only political 
errors might make them s0.l 
While technology has made it possible to access information at a 
rapid pace and in great diversity, current regulations impose a set of 
interlocking restrictions on that access to information. The morass of 
court decisions, Congressional legislation, and Federal Communica- 
tions Commission (FCC) regulations which focus on technology ignore 
the Bill of Rights. First Amendment freedoms have not been applied to 
electronic distribution of information. Whether newspapers and other 
communications transmitted electronically will enjoy traditional press 
freedoms or be regulated as electronic broadcasting is still open to 
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question. In addition to violating the First Amendment, recent techno- 
logical advances have led to violations of the Fourth and Fifth Amend- 
ments. Using information stored in massive databases, the government, 
private industry, and individuals invade privacy with impunity. 
In this article, five major issues related to the impact of technology 
on privacy and access to information will be explored. An overview of 
some of the abuses and the shortcomings of current attempts at regulat- 
ing electronic communications will be provided. 
1. Regulation and licensing of the press. The precedent of regulation of 
the press which began with the Radio Act of 1927 has resulted in 
almost unquestioned acceptance of regulating any forms of elec-
tronic communication today. 
2. Electronic surveillance. Amassing information in huge computer 
databases leads to risks of massive governmental surveillance. 
3. Invasion of privacy. Computers combined with a telecommunica- 
tions link, provide virtually trackless access to any individual or 
organization wishing to peek. 
4. 	Copyright. Copyright law, basedon printed methods of communica-
tion, does not work when applied to the ownership of information 
existing only as electronic impulses. 
5.  	Policy-making and regulation. The inability to anticipate the next 
technological advance leads to a patchwork of laws and regulations 
governing telecommunications and an incoherent national informa- 
tion policy. 
The basis of American communication policy resides in the Consti- 
tution and the Bill of Rights. 
1. Article I, Section 8 [8] gives Congress power to establish post offices 
and post roads. ( C o m m o n  Carrier) 
2. 	Article I, Section 8 [8] gives Congress the power: “To promote the 
Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to 
Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writ- 
ings and Discoveries.” (Copyright) 
3. 	The First Amendment in the Bill of Rights prohibits Congress from 
passing any law abridging freedom of speech or of the press. (Free-
d o m  of the Press) 
Competing with these rights are the protections provided in two 
other amendments in the Bill of Rights. 
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4.The Fourth Amendment provides: “The right of people to be 
secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects, against unreason- 
able searches and seizures.” (Privacy) 
5. The Fifth Amendment entitles all individuals to a range of procedur-
al protections known as due process and stares that “no person shall 
be compelled to be a witness against himself.” (Due Process) 
Regulation and Licensing of the Press 
Eli Oboler’ wrote that “the end of licensing of the Press was, of 
course, the beginning of true intellectual freedom in the United States.” 
However, over the years, three communications models evolved without 
true intellectual freedom for all forms of communication: a print model 
free of regulation, a common carrier model with the government assur- 
ing nondiscriminatory access for all, and a broadcasting model with the 
government licensing owners as publisher^.^ 
Each of the three models developed in a particular industry and for 
different types of communications. The press developed free of regula- 
tion. Based on concepts of monopoly, the common carrier approach 
evolved for telegraph and telephone. Then, based on concepts of spec-
trum scarcity and later on concepts of the public good, the broadcasting 
model evolved resulting in government regulation of radio and televi- 
sion. Since all media are now becoming electronic, “telecommunica- 
tions policy is becoming communications p01icy.”~ Oboler asks in 
relation to the transformation of print media to electronic media: 
Is the cause of intellectual freedom helped or hindered by the late 
twentieth-century developments on many fronts of new ways to send, 
receive, store, and disseminate widely the vast amounts of informa-
tion now available? Will the censor find new methods for censoring 
the vital communications so necessary to p r ~ g r e s s ? ~  
Electronic media have never had the eighteenth- and nineteenth- 
century constitutional protections of no licenses, no special taxes, no 
regulations, no laws, and no prior restraint. Moreover, 
when wires, radio waves, satellites and computers became major 
vehicles of discourse, regulation seemed to be a technical necessity. 
And so, as speech increasingly flows over those electronic media, the 
five-century growth of a n  unabridged right of citizens to speak with- 
out controls may be endangered.6 
The questions are: whether information policy will develop under 
the public interest, good-of-society regulations which now affect broad- 
cast media; whether market conditions and property rights will be 
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allowed to dominate the development of telecommunications policy; 
whether the common carrier concept will be applied; or whether First 
Amendment freedoms will prevail in electronic communications. Cur- 
rently, the government seems to favor diversity as deregulation breaks 
up communications monopolies. But, deregulation leading to a lifting 
of restrictions on press freedom appears unlikely. 
When regulation began, the government viewed the telegraph as a 
business machine (like the computer later) and the issue of free speech 
did not arise. The high cost of sending a few words appeared to preclude 
the use of telegraphy for debate and expression. The courts concluded 
that the government had the authority to regulate telegraphy under 
commerce. Later, as newspapers began to use telegraph lines, the con- 
cept of news service developed. At  first, carriers could choose not to carry 
news service traffic. But by 1893, the Supreme Court said telegraph was 
similar to common carriers requiring access without discrimination. 
Later, the common carrier concept was extended to telephone. While 
this appeared sensible since contact required individuals to be on the 
same line, i t  allowed a monopoly to develop.’ As radio grew, the federal 
government required licenses to be issued in the public convenience, 
reasoning in terms of common carrier law. Today the same type of 
reasoning appears in telecommunications licensing.’ 
In 1920, the first radio station, KDKA Pittsburgh went on the air. 
Issues of scarcity, selective licensing, and free speech dominated the 1924 
to 1927 debate leading to the Radio Act of 1927. Three points of view 
appeared in The Nation. David Sarnoff urged that the “same principles 
that apply to the freedom of the press should be made to apply to 
freedom of the air ....The real danger is in censorship, in over-
reg~la t ion .”~Hudson Maxim wrote against free speech, although with 
some hesitation. “I distrust the wisdom of allowing radio broadcasting 
to be controlled by any private monopoly, but I also distrust the wisdom 
and the ability and the justice of federal control of radio ....Perhaps the 
control of radio should be made quasi-private and quasi-
governmental.”” In the same issue, Grover Whalen argued for govern- 
ment control.” The next year, H.V. Kaltenborn appeared to be favoring 
a common carrier approach when he predicted that since the govern- 
ment would limit the number of stations, government should compel 
those stations to sell air time to “all comers on equal terms.’”’ Ernst, in 
1926, recognized that from the beginning, radio was subject to 
censorship-by the stations, in the selection of what ideas were broad- 
cast; and by the government, in selecting which groups would be 
granted licenses to operate station^.'^ 
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As early as 1925, broadcasters had urged because of scarcity that no 
more licenses be issued and a common carrier approach to radio be 
adopted. “Broadcasting is as much of a public service and convenience 
as the telephone, and ultimately must be subject to the same kind of 
regulation and Over the years, distrust of big business 
entered into decisions about regulation. Fear of AT&T led torejection of 
the alternative of property rights for the new industry and regulation 
through licensing developed. “Both the motive and the effect of the 
Radio Act were to install government controls at the ground floor of the 
new industry before a structure of private rights could de~elop.”’~ 
The debate resulted in regulations promulgated on the basis of 
early use with no awareness of future technological advances. Although 
uses changed and television broadcasting arrived, regulations did not 
adjust. The concept of scarcity prevailed and the concept of equal time 
was introduced. Regulation of content expanded when Red Lion“ 
established the Fairness Doctrine. While proponents favor the apparent 
access the Fairness Doctrine promises, critics point out that in practice, 
access is not enhanced. “The irony of the Fairness Doctrine is that 
broadcasters can fulfill it by tucking away an interview on a contrary 
viewpoint somewhere in the schedule. ””Through licensing, equal 
time provisions, and the Fairness Doctrine, the government administers 
the content of broadcasting. 
Cable T V  and the End of Scarcity 
Even before the advent of cable television, scarcity as an argument 
for continued government regulation had become untenable. Tighter 
channel spacing and the allocation of new frequencies through com- 
pression and multiplexing had increased the number of available chan- 
nels. With the introduction of improved receivers and advanced 
telecommunications technology, spectrum scarcity is no longer a real- 
ity. Enclosed carriers (cable), the potential of fiber optics, and satellite 
transmission further diminish the scarcity argument. In addition, elec- 
tronic memory now allows messages stored on videotape and videodisc 
to be delivered when convenient.” However, regulation continues. 
Regulation of cable television has been divided between local fran- 
chising authorities and the FCC. Until 1965, the FCC declined jurisdic- 
tion creating a favorable environment for the growth of cable, but in 
1965, the FCC put a freeze on new subscribers and banned cable televi- 
sion systems in the 100 largest markets from importing “distant sig- 
nals.” No longer wanting to stop growth, the FCC adopted new rules in 
the early 1970s. These rules which supported cable television were not 
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pro-freedom for cable television. Cable television was regulated in four 
areas-( 1) signal carriage; (2)required or permitted offerings; (3) techni-
cal standards; and (4) division of responsibility between state, federal, 
and local governments. Signal carriage and required or permitted offer- 
ings have First Amendment implication^.'^ 
Local regulations, in the form of franchising agreements, served to 
assure access to those who wanted it. Pool called the resistance of the 
cable industry to requirements for channel leasing “self-serving” and 
described the “temptation for the cable monopoly to stifle uses that do 
not interest it” as good reasons for city governments to require nondis- 
criminatory access as part of franchising agreements. If cable is operated 
like a common carrier system, all who desire access may have access. 
When a cable carrier operates as a publisher, the operator may institute 
restrictions on who uses the system. Separating a carrier from content is 
both economically unwise and wrong on First Amendment grounds.20 
Hints of issues of current concern were raised in 1969 when the FCC 
applied the requirement of equal time to rival candidates if newspaper 
publishers delivered news over cable channels. The FCC said: 
We do not intend to apply these requirements to the distribution of 
printed newspapers to their subscribers by way of cable....We have no 
intention of regulating the print medium when it is distributed in 
facsimile by cable [but] we do hold that the publication of a news-
paper by a party does not put i t  in a different position from other 
persons when it sponsors or arranges for presentation of a CATV 
origin which does not constitute the distribution of a newspaper.’l 
Until recently, cable has been viewed primarily as entertainment. 
Now, cable performs as a two-way delivery system for all types of 
electronic traffic-computer data, electronic mail, videotext, informa- 
tion bases, education, security monitoring, teleconferencing, news ser- 
vices, movies, money, meetings, scientific data, opinion polling, 
manuscripts, petitions, editorials.” Two-way interactive television, 
while appealing in its ability to provide a variety of services, also carries 
with i t  dramatic risks to individual freedom and privacy. Burnham 
identified concerns about personal and collective privacy, uses, and 
regulation. Personal privacy risks exist when records about banking 
transactions, stock purchases, shopping patterns, and even the film- 
viewing habits of individuals are readily available. The  ability to define 
the habits and interests of targeted groups of people through research on 
individual purchases, viewing patterns, and other uses of interactive 
television raises the larger issue of collective privacy. When speech 
recognition becomes possible, the prospect of increased surveillance 
expands.= 
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The 1984 cable television bill, while setting minimal federal restric- 
tions on the cable industry, gives the franchising authority the power to 
censor “obscene” programming and allows the cable operator tocensor 
“nonobscene, sexually-oriented programs” if the franchiser thinks the 
program is in “conflict with community standard^."^^ The legislation 
fails to provide adequate guarantees for freedom of communication for 
cable. Further, the bill “restricts the import of leased access by limiting 
its provisions to video programming, thereby excluding computer lan- 
guages, videotext, and other important and growing areas of cable 
use.”25 “Cable porn” legislation recently introduced into Congress 
could severely restrict, by federal mandate, what cable broadcasters 
would be allowed to transmit.26 
Ignorance of potential technological advances, distrust of big busi- 
ness, and attempts todeter the development of communications monop- 
olies led toregulation of broadcast media. Regulatory policy rather than 
information needs determined telecommunications policy. Owen sug- 
gested two factors to account for the acceptance of regulation of elec-
tronic media. 
First is simple ignorance on the part of courts, commissions, and 
congressional committees of the economics and technology of broad-
casting....The other factor is a certain psychological attitude toward 
the electronic media. Many people regard television as being too 
powerful and influential to be allowed freedom from government 
C O ~ U O I . ~ ~  
Solutions 
Critics of the current method of regulating broadcast media have 
offered a variety of proposals. Owen and Brazelon suggested deregulat- 
ing but charging stations a reasonable spectrum use tax for the right to 
distribute programs over airways. 28 Kelley and Donway recommended 
repeal of the Fairness Doctrine and other content regulation, a transfer 
of current licenses into property rights, and an end to restrictions on 
entry, ownership, and conduct of business.29 Wicklein proposed a 
decentralized common carrier “backbone system” available to everyone 
on a nondiscriminatory basis with no surveillance and no monitoring.30 
Krasnow believes the public trustee approach is constitutionally suspect 
and characterizes the regulation/deregulation scenario as applied to 
broadcasting as “political mane~vering.”~’ Irwin suggests the time has 
come to allow regulation to be done by state governments, not the 
FCC.32 
Attempts by Congress to extend First Amendment freedoms to the 
electronic media have not succeeded because of intensive lobbying by 
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the industry, by the FCC, and by special interest groups. Persons on 
both sides of the debate over broadcast media and the First Amendment 
call themselves real protectors of the First Amendment. In 1978, Van 
Deerlin and Frey introduced legislation to replace the FCC with a 
Communications Regulatory Commission. This met with intense 
opposition from all segments of the industry, the FCC, and special- 
interest groups. After attempting to appease critics by writing and 
rewriting the proposed legislation, the issue faded by 1980.%In the early 
eighties, Senator Packwood tried unsuccessfully to introduce legisla- 
tion leading to First Amendment protections for electronic media.34 
Surveillance/Privacy 
While the discussion of regulation/deregulation of electronic 
forms of communication goes on, the issue of the capability of using 
electronic forms of communication to monitor the activities of citizens 
also demands attention. Alan Westin, an expert in issues of surveillance 
and privacy, pointed out that: “When a powerful (and expensive) new 
technology such as computers and communication systems is deve- 
loped, the questions of who will use this new power, for what ends, and 
under what constraints becomes (once the potential for the new technol- 
ogy is recognized) more a matter of social policy than of technological 
determini~rn.”~~The computer has allowed us to create a “dossier 
society” that invades our privacy and threatens civil rights. Discussion 
of the threats focuses on how to balance privacy and other social inter- 
ests with the content and control of computerized database^.^^ 
Surveillance is “the systematic collection and monitoring of per- 
sonal information for purposes of social control. ’j3’ The National 
Security Administration (NSA) has installed voice-recognition, word- 
spotting devices that look for key phrases on transatlantic phone con- 
versations. Markoff characterized NSA surveillance as an “invisible 
electronic...net over the entire population.” Congressional hearings 
conducted during the mid-1970s revealed that for decades NSA had been 
intercepting international telegrams originating in the United States, 
and later, all radio and telephone conversations linked to this country 
looking for name and address combinations and trigger words.% 
The government does not limit surveillance to private citizens but 
also monitors government employees. Privacy issues occur when the 
government monitors employee telephone calls using computer soft- 
ware which will spot frequently called numbers, long calls, and calls 
placed at unusual times. Civil libertarians warn about the chilling effect 
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such monitoring could have on forms of expression and on government 
whistle blowers. The government considers such surveillance perfectly 
legitimate pointing out that collecting information does not violate 
privacy, only disseminating information to third parties does.39 
Not everyone shares concerns about the uses of government data- 
bases. Society approves the use of databases to identify dangerous drivers 
or to track welfare cheaters. Establishing eligibility for insurance and 
federal programs, defining and documenting details to meet bureau- 
cratic obligations, determining credit and passport eligibility are 
accepted everyday uses of bureaucratic databases. While people protest 
unfair surveillance of themselves, they condone surveillance of others 
for any purposes they support. However, Rule warns that “we can 
conceive of no form of personal information which might not, under 
certain conditions, come to serve the purposes of bureaucracies aiming 
at some form of social control-brutal or humane.”40 
Computerized Criminal Records 
National computerized criminal records are readily available and 
represent one of the most threatening databases. The criteria and stan- 
dards enforced by the various states do not provide uniform information. 
Further, being arrested does not mean having committed a crime. 
Employers use criminal records to screen applicants for federal employ- 
ment, the military, workers for government contractors, federal banks, 
and anywhere licenses and permits are required for a job. In New York, 
the “use of criminal records by law-enforcement agencies has declined 
in recent years, while its use by private employers has gone up.”41 
Florida opens its records to anyone who will pay the search fee. In 
California, criminal history records serve to keep people unemployed. 
In spite of the fact that inaccurate records exist, opening criminal 
records to the public is not likely to result in innocent individuals 
checking records since they would be highly unlikely to expect to find a 
record. Even those who have reason to check are not likely to do so. In 
California, with 3 million records, only three hundred to four hundred 
ask to see records each year, and of these, eighty find incorrect informa- 
tion and only forty are successful in forcing California to correct their 
records. So, one in four who check find discrepancies, and one in ten 
force the state to make a correction. Further, responses to an Office of 
Technology Assessment questionnaire indicated that four of five states 
never conducted audits of the quality of the records.42 
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Privacy Rights  
The basic rights involved in access to database records are those of 
personal privacy, personal access, and public access.* The Privacy 
Protection Study Commission (PPSC) identified five competing soci- 
etal values in formulating public policy to protect personal privacy: 
“(1) First Amendment interest, (2) freedom of information interests, 
(3)the societal interest in law enforcement, (4)cost, and ( 5 ) federal-state 
relations.”44 Three criteria have been developed toprotect privacy: main- 
taining accurate, complete, up-to-date records subject to review; citizens 
knowing uses which can be revoked; and organizations only using data 
on a need-to-know principle to attain their goals.45 
The discussion of privacy and collection of data has “shifted from 
one of debate over privacy protection to one of elimination of abusive 
practice^."^^ Burnham suggested that the right to see and correct our 
own records is viewed as the “miracle cure for many of the abuses of the 
computer age.”47 In fact, most remedies do not address the issue of 
privacy or the threat of massive surveillance finding its way into law. 
Recognizing that “freezing and dismantling” the record collection is 
unlikely, Chaum proposed restructuring major systems that use 
detailed information in a way that requires less information or using 
cryptographic techniques to mask individual records.48 The problem 
lies in attempts to implement privacy laws without identifying people. 
Another suggestion, the use of a unique, reliable, personal identifica- 
tion, has itself the potential of leading to the invasion of individual 
privacy.49 
Computer  Matching 
Computer  matching is a term that has been applied to a variety of 
computerized data processing activities where separate files are run 
through a computer with a program set to detect certain matches. 
Computer matching is currently “being used to detect fraud and abuse 
in government programs by linking together formerly independent 
databases.”50 Westin thinks that banning computer matching is impos- 
sible. He thinks that at this point all we can do is monitor the amount of 
use and build safeguards into matching systems.51 While warning that 
computer matching systems carry the potential for privacy and due pro- 
cess abuses, the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) also suggests 
that it is unrealistic to expect the government or organizations not to use 
computer matching.52 Burnham stated that “increased sharing of infor- 
mation by all agencies of government gradually may be undermining 
the constitutional theory of checks and balances. ’m Particularly alarm- 
ing is the assumption of guilt implied by computer matching. We are 
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“moving from a system relying on voluntary compliance and an assump- 
tion that citizens obey the law, to the assumption that citizens cannot be 
trusted.’”‘ 
The government interprets the use of computer matching for pur- 
poses such as detecting welfare fraud and tracking runaway fathers to 
enforce child support to be legitimate government uses and point out 
that computer matching encourages efficiency. But Burnham asks 
whether the system which is so efficient at tracking fathers might 
actually have headed off other reforms that might have “improved the 
stability of American families.” Once the system is established, what is 
to prevent it from later being used for the surveillance of other groups 
who fall into disfavor? If computer matchingis successfully used for one 
kind of debt relationship, how do we assure it will not be expanded to 
other debt relationships? In a system set up  to track segments of the 
population, inaccuracies present an important hazard.55 Finally, the 
ACLU points out the risk of computer matching becoming computer 
merging resulting in the establishment of a national database?56 
General computer matching violates our guarantees against 
unreasonable search and seizure, due process, and the assumption of 
innocence until proven guilty. To minimize computer matching 
abuses, the ACLU advocates a procedure called “front-end verification” 
in which only applicants for government services or a suspect’s files 
would be checked rather than the government conducting general 
sweeps of databases looking for matches. Additionally, safeguards could 
be built into the system requiring notice that files are subject to match-
ing, requiring verification of all matches, and requiring a hearing 
before benefits are denied or terminated on the basis of a computer 
match. All files created by a match should be destroyed after the match, 
further reducing privacy risks.“ 
Illegal Computer Access 
Once the record collection has been put into place, the question of 
unauthorized access arises. There are three issues of concern. First, 
privacy rights of electronic communications; second, illegal computer 
access; and third, federal regulation of data communications.5s Privacy 
rights have been discussed earlier. 
Well-publicized activities of computer hackers illustrate how lack 
of security has made any database-whether educational, medical, or 
governmental-vulnerable to invasion. Hackers have successfully 
entered computers at Sloan-Kettering, the Department of Defense, the 
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Florida Department of Education, and the Los Alamos National Labor- 
atory in addition to routinely entering corporate databases. A nineteen- 
year-old physics major at UCLA was arrested for entering defense 
department computer^.^' A Newsweek reporter’s credit file was opened 
and credit card records distributed in retaliation for a story about bul- 
letin boards.60 But hackers are not responsible for all illegal computer 
activity. The San Francisco public defender’s office accused police of 
spying on clients’ records kept in a shared computer.61 
Credit records are among the least secure of the giant databases. 
Credit bureaus have a “waiver of the nation’s privacy laws” and have 
information about us we would not allow the government or anyone 
else to keep.62 A large credit firm was sued to force it to tighten security 
against illegal access to credit files which contain lists of credit cards, 
credit limits, amounts owed, social security numbers, and inquiries. 
The credit company charged that the responsibility for allowing illegal 
access belonged to careless user companies whose employees are lax in 
protecting access code numbers and passwords.63 
Although hackers receive the most publicity, much illegal access 
involves persons employed by data processing or electronic information 
companies. A recent survey of members conducted by the Data Process- 
ing Management Association revealed that of the 21 percent who said 
their organizations were victims of computer abuses, only 2 percent 
reported that the abuses were committed by outsiders. A survey of 130 
prosecutors by the National Center for Computer Crime also reported 
that most computer crime was perpetrated by insiders.64 
The term hacker, when used by computer enthusiasts, refers to 
people “involved in a wide range of computer related activities.” When 
used by persons alarmedabout illegal computer access, the term refers to 
a “person who often attempts to gain unauthorized access to large 
systems by using his personal computer equipment.”65 After an arrest 
connected with ,his hacker activities, Bill “Cracker” Landreth provided 
this rationale for unauthorized “exploration” of computers: “We were 
explorers, not spies.” Hackers defend their activities by pointing out 
that most of them abide by a code of ethics, do not erase or damage files, 
do not write ridiculous or obscene messages, do not identify others, do 
not seek publicity, and do not leave tracks. “Tohackers, what is known 
as ‘browsing’ is a (usually) harmless, ‘educational’ pursuit.”66 Sherry 
Turkle described hackers as intelligent students, mostly male, in “a 
culture of loners.” Turkle’s investigations show that from the hacker 
viewpoint, there is nothing wrong with inspecting(with0ut invitation) 
programs and data files and that using others’ programs is not 
tea ling.^' 
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However, the bad image of the hacker and his activities leads to 
legislative action and the fear that FCC regulation will sharply curtail 
activities of computer enthusiasts while at the same time doing nothing 
to deter serious online crime. Publicity about hacker activities led to the 
passage of the nation’s first computer crime law, the Counterfeit Access 
Device and Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of 1984. The law imposes 
penalities for “unauthorized intrusion into computers holding elec- 
tronic funds or national security data” and government-owned comput- 
ers. Although not likely to pass during the fall of 1985, a bill to extend 
protection to private computers has been introduced. Over thirty states 
have computer crime legislation already in place.68 
Computer Networks 
One development of electronic technology which promises to pro- 
vide information and publishing access for a widevariety of individuals 
is the communications network. Ranging from small privately operated 
bulletin boards to giant information databases operated for profit, these 
networks offer a delivery system for all types of communication. Poetry, 
fiction, news commentary, and spiritual messages as well as databases 
are all available through electronic information networks. Bulletin 
boards have become little newspapers providing publishing outlets for 
minority points of view.69 
With the development of communications networks have come 
abuses. Phone numbers and credit card numbers are routinely listed for 
sale on “private boards.” Computer programs appear in listings and 
copies are sold illegally and transmitted electronically. A southern 
California bulletin board operator faces criminal charges because an 
AT&T number was found on his board. Messages related to child 
pornography have been disseminated on computer bulletin boards. 
These activities cause legislators to focus on abuses rather than on 
protecting the First Amendment rights of bulletin board users. A com- 
monly proposed solution is the requirement that bulletin board opera- 
tors monitor messages carried on their systems and delete offensive or 
illegal messages. In California, a bill has been introduced which would 
make the system operator (sysop) “legally responsible for anything left 
on his bulletin board.” This approach puts the bulletin board operator 
in the dual role of police and censor. Further, the bulletin board opera- 
tor risks having the system shut down if illegal activity is found on it. 
Reacting to flaws in current and pending legislation, a California 
lawmaker introduced a bill proposing an amendment to the California 
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Constitution which would insure the privacy of electronic communica- 
tions and provide for electronic freedom of speech.70 
Electronic Mail 
By the year 2000, two-thirds of the nation’s mail will be handled 
electronically. Although the Postal Service insists that its electronic 
mail system, E-Com, is secure, electronic mail poses potentially serious 
problems of security and privacy. Electronic mail offers an attractive 
target to anyone seeking access to individual and corporate informa- 
tion. Intruders can intercept and alter electronic mail. Since electronic 
mail creates a centralized record of who writes what to whom, the 
database developed presents the potential for private and government 
surveillance. Law enforcement officials need a warrant to open standard 
first class mail. The same letter in electronic form must be made avail- 
able to officers with a subpeona or on demand of lawful authority, a 
much weaker re~t r ic t ion .~~ 
Legislation has been proposed to protect the privacy of users of 
electronic mail and “provide legal protection against unauthorized 
government or private interception of new electronic communica- 
tions.” Electronic mail gives government agencies and others the ability 
to compile profiles of a highly personal nature on any individual by 
scanning messages for names, addresses, and topics. Messages are most 
vulnerable to interception when being held for forwarding or recorded 
for backup and audit purposes.72 Because of legal precedents holding 
that citizens have no privacy rights in records held by third parties, 
uncertainty surrounds the legal status of electronic mail databases.73 
During the summer of 1985, the government learned that an indi- 
vidual accused of cocaine trafficking had been exchanging messages 
with potential buyers and sellers using the electronic mail service oper- 
ated by The Source. The Source refused to release its files to law 
enforcement officers on the grounds that messages entrusted to it are not 
“under its legal control.” Since the defendant decided to plead guilty, 
the issue never went to court and the questions of legal control of files 
and Fourth Amendment protections have not been decided. However, 
the U.S.Attorney General’s office suggested that since there was no legal 
precedent in the case, The Source had no grounds for its refusal to reveal 
its files.74 Hints that offensive messages had been deleted by Compu- 
Serve, another electronic service, resulted in a statement by a Compu- 
Serve official that “CompuServe will ‘never’ engage in such E-Mail 
c e n ~ o r s h i p . ” ~ ~  
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At the present time there are both private and public electronic mail 
operations. Bailey suggested that the surveillance problem might be 
more manageable if the private sector rather than the government ran 
automated clearinghouses and facilities for sending mail electronically. 
“In our 10-year effort to get the fair information practice philosophy 
articulated, we have tended tooverlook the extent to which institutional 
pluralism can be an important safeguard for personal privacy in our 
society.”76 The ACLU advocates legislation which “protects the privacy 
of new electronic communication without unintentionally stifling 
technical or social innovation or inhibiting the free flow of 
in forma tion. p77 
Electronic Publishing 
Electronic publishing is an outgrowth of the computer database 
industry. The prospect of publishing on demand, enabling scholars to 
have access to important titles, is only one aspect of the appeal of 
electronic publishing. On-demand publishing also allows the construc- 
tion of individual profiles of readers’ interests for selective dissemina- 
tion of information. The ability of computers to scan electronic 
manuscripts for bibliographic information creates immediate databases 
for researchers. The greatest benefit of electronic publishing is that 
virtually anyone will be able to publish at will. Finally, electronic 
publishing allows for lower production costs, fewer errors, formatting 
standards, speed of production, and submission by electronic 
Pournelle predicts the establishment of an “Electronic Village” 
creating a synergistic effect on the generation of ideas. “When the 
Founding Fathers wrote freedom of the press into the Constitution, they 
intended to protect far more than big city newspapers; they also had in 
mind the smaller-scale activist pamphleteer. Thomas Paine’s Common 
Sense was more in their minds than the London Times.” While pub- 
lishing a newspaper requires considerable money, a computer network 
is available to nearly everyone. Pournelle predicts that the ready avail- 
ability ofnetworks will make suppression of ideas almost impos~ible.~’ 
Unanswered questions about the status of electronic publishing 
exist. Electronic publishing is a mix of long-term and local storage with 
telecommunications links delivering information to the user’s pre- 
mises. If electronic publishing is viewed as publishing, traditional press 
freedoms will apply. But, if electronic distribution of information over 
telephone lines on cable television is viewed as broadcasting, regulation 
could occur. “The cause for fear is that when its (electronic publishing 
or on-demand publishing) technology looks like that of an office the 
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law may see it  as commerce, not publishing and thus subject to regula- 
tion like any business.”80 
As publishing increasingly becomes electronic, the risk of widen-
ing the gap between the information rich and information poor emerges 
as an issue of social concern. Unless individuals have free access to 
information regardless of format, those least likely to have access 
through their own personal computers will have no access at all. Insti- 
tutions providing access to electronic databases now rarely provide the 
service without cost. 
Copyright 
Authority to establish copyright law is embodied in the Constitu- 
tion. If the concept of copyright is accepted as enhancing the free flow of 
ideas by stimulating creative work, one must live with the restrictions 
copyright puts on the use of another’s intellectual property. The “laws 
of copyright are among the most obvious but least condemnedrestraints 
on freedom of expression.”81 Pool concluded that the idea of “the 
objective of copyright is beyond dispute. Intellectual effort needs com- 
pensation.” But “to apply a print scheme of compensation to the fluid 
dialogue of interactive electronic publishing will not succeed.’’82 
Copyright issues arise in the discussion of all forms of electronic 
communication. Computer programs generate abstracts and create da- 
tabases. The programs are copyrightable, but questions exist about who 
owns the generated text. The “idea that a machine is capable of intellec-
tual labor is beyond the scope of copyright statutes. Can a computer 
infringe ~ o p y r i g h t ? ” ~ ~  Participants in computer conferencing sharing 
ideas with strangers risk having their individual ideas taken and used. 
Zientara reports that computer conferencing is largely based on trust 
and that electronic messages are implicitly copyrighted in the name of 
the person who inputs them but, if no notice is included, others can use 
the ideas. If “on-line conferences [are] regarded as databases with their 
own intrinsic value,” who should hold the copyright?M Bibliographic 
control as we know i t  is also likely to change as the concept of uniform 
copies changes. As users modify and expand text, different versions will 
be stored in different locations. In the instance of full text databases, 
does storage on disk memory for later use violate copyright?85 
Piracy of Software 
The area of copyright and technology receiving the most publicity 
is the piracy of computer software. The Software Publishers Association 
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(SPA) has had some success in stopping illegal copying of software 
primarily by personal contact, investigation, and threats of lawsuits. A 
threatened lawsuit against a school district in Ohio resulted in the 
school district’s promise that policy guidelines would be adopted. 
Industry officials intend to continue such pressures to stem the tide of 
illegal copying. Pirate bulletin boards are monitored by the SPA to 
identify copyright violation for potential prosecution.86 
Major corporations nationwide are also caught in the illegal soft- 
ware net. Apple computer officials, after conductingan investigation of 
employees within the company, concluded that employees “regularly 
distribute pirated software among themselves, as well as outside the 
company.” Officials attributed the copying to “Apple’s original ‘hacker 
ethic.’ ” However, an Apple vice-president concluded that Apple’s 
compliance with copyright and the law is 99 per~ent.~’The successof a 
recent lawsuit against a national corporation by the software company 
Micropro is expected to have an impact on corporate piracy of 
software.88 
Licensing 
The software industry has instituted various methods to inhibit 
illegal copying. Copy protection devices and site licensing are two such 
attempts. However, questions have been raised about the legality of 
some of these methods. Licenses include restrictions that go beyond the 
copyright law. A computer law attorney stated that: “Most of the license 
forms I’ve seen fail to distinguish the intellectual property and physical 
pr~perty.”~’Software publishers interpret copyright law to mean that 
only the purchaser of a program has the right to use the program and 
then only in one location and on one machine. Strong consumer and 
legal objections are being heard about the application of copyright to 
microcomputer software. Software industry interpretations which dic- 
tate the users and uses of software and licensing are of special concern.w 
Software producers offer site licensing as the solution for educa- 
tional institutions and corporations which require several individuals 
to use the same program at the same time. Fawcette sees site licensing as 
an “umbrella to cover general dissatisfaction by corporate micro man- 
agers or information center managers with the policies of the software 
industry.” Reflecting the users at large, Fawcette lists the concerns as 
copy protection, customer support, and network licenses which 
obstruct the ability to use software on networks.” 
One of the most controversial of the attempts to limit copying has 
been the shrink-wrap license. Under a shrink-wrap agreement, the 
opening of the wrap is supposed to put a contract into effect. Experts 
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hold differing opinions about the legality of the concept of shrink wrap. 
Of concern to software users is the issue of being held accountable to a 
contract they had no hand in writing and might not be able to read 
clearly and understand. Louisiana passed specific legislation making 
computer software purchasers legally responsible for abiding by the 
shrink-wrap terms on the package. Louisiana’s law is written so that no 
proof needs to be provided that users consented to the shrink-wrap 
agreement.92 A lawsuit designed to test Louisiana’s shrink-wrap law 
was recently dismissed by a district court judge in New or lean^.'^ The 
industry had anticipated that the decision in the Louisiana case would 
help to eliminate some of the confusions about the application of the 
law to microcomputer software. 
Other measures have been proposed. One antipiracy scheme would 
license owners of computers with a unique identification code installed 
in the computer’s hardware. Software writers would have to program 
traps in software to look for special serial numbers. Since both hardware 
and software purchases would be known and recorded for the scheme to 
work, the potential for violation of privacy as well as restraints on 
purchases exists. Another solution being proposed by the software 
industry is the attachment of special devices into the computer.% Not all 
software users find the use of such devices reasonable. The publisher of 
ZnfoWorld called the introduction of the key device “extremist” and 
found it unreasonable to use a special port to hook up a hardware key to 
prevent software ~opying.’~ 
The Office of Technology Assessment recently released a study of 
new information technologies related to intellectual property rights 
and is expected to have a publication identifying problems, issues, and 
gaps in current law. 96 
Conclusion 
Certain principles must be applied to electronic forms of commu-
nications to insure that First Amendment freedoms, privacy, and access 
considerations are protected. The First Amendment must be applied 
fully to all media giving anyone-whether cable operator, major broad- 
cast network, or computer networker-the opportunity to publish with- 
out licensing or scrutiny by the government. Prior restraint regulations 
must not be allowed to dominate electronic publishing. Privacy, due 
process, and protection from self-incrimination must be built into any 
regulatory scheme imposed on electronic communications. Copyright 
enforcement must be adapted to the new technology. “Control of the 
system, restrictions on freedom of expression, intrusions on privacy, 
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and threats to individual liberty” are issues which must be debated and 
policies developed at the national level.” 
Electronic freedom of speech is as essential as print freedoms. 
Today’s corner orator now finds an audience on an electronic bulletin 
board. The patchwork of existing and pending legislation, drafted in 
reaction to abuses of the moment, will not serve to build the coherent 
national policy needed for communication through electronics. At the 
present time, the FCC is experiencing serious problems trying to fit new 
technologies into its current regulatory scheme.98 The “lack of technical 
grasp by policy makers and their propensity to solve problems of con-
flict, privacy, intellectual property, and monopoly by accustomed 
bureaucratic routines are the main reasons for concern.”99 Passing 
further piecemeal legislation and regulations must be halted until a 
coherent national information policy can be adopted. Unless this 
happens, erosion of First Amendment rights and civil liberties will 
continue. 
References 
1. Pool, Ithiel de Sola. Technologies of Freedom. Cambridge: Belknap Press of 
Harvard University Press, 1983, p. 231. 
2. Oboler, Eli M. T o  Free the Mind: Libraries, Technology, and Intellectual Free- 
dom. Littleton, Colo.: Libraries Unlimited, 1983, p. 61. 
3. Pool, Technologies of Freedom, p. 233. 
4. Ibid. 
5. Oboler, T o  Free the Mind, p. 5. 
6. Pool, Technologies of Freedom, p. 1. 
7. Ibid., pp. 91-96. 
8. Ibid., p. 103. 
9. Sarnoff, David. “Freedom of the Air: Uncensored and Uncontrolled.” The 
Nation 119(23 July 1924):90. 
10. Maxin, Hudson. “Freedom of the Air: Radio-The Fulcrum.” The Nation 
119(23 July 1924):91. 
11. Whalen, Grover A. “Freedomof theAir: Radiocontrol.” TheNation 119(23 July 
1924):91. 
12. Kaltenborn, H.V. “On Being ‘On the Air’: Behind the Footlights in a Broadcast- 
ing Studio.” The Independent 114(23 May 1925):583-85. 
13. Ernst, Morris L. “Who Shall Control the Air?” The Nation 122(21 April 
1926):443-44. 
14. Pool, Technologies of Freedom, p. 121. 
15. Kelley, David, and Donway, Roger. Laissez Parler: Freedom in the Electronic 
Media. Bowling Green, Ohio: Bowling Green State University, Social Philosophy and 
Policy Center, 1983, p. 14. 
16. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC 89 S. Ct. 1794 (1969). 
17. Small, William. “Radio and Television Treated Like Distant Cousins.” In The 
First Freedom Today: Critical Issues Relating to Censorship and to Intellectual Freedom, 
edited by Robert B. Downs and Ralph E. McCoy, p. 319. Chicago: ALA, 1984. 
18. Pool, Technologies of Freedom, p. 152. 
SUMMER 1986 101 
FRANCES MCDONALD 
19. Ibid., pp. 157-58; and Carter, T. Barton, et al. The First Amendment and the 
Fourth Estate: TheLaw of Mass Media, 3ded. Mineola, N.Y.: The Foundation Press, 1985, 
pp. 642-57. 
20. Pool, Technologies of Freedom, pp. 239-40. 
21. Ibid., p. 159. 
22. Ibid., pp. 167, 227. 
23. Burnham, David. The Rise of the Computer State: The Threat to OurFreedoms, 
Our Ethics and Our Democratic Process. New York: Random House, 1983, pp. 242-49. 
24. “Cable T V  Bill Passes in Final Hour of 98th Conmess.” Civil Liberties Alert 
8(Jan. 1985):6. 
I 
25. Ameriran Civil Liberties Union. “The ACLU and Cable Television: A Critiaue 
of the  New Federal Leeislation.” Washmeton, D.C.. ACLU, 1984, p. 3 (pamphlet).‘ 
26. Lynn, Barry W. “Testimony Regarding Regulation of ‘Cable Porn’ and ‘Dial-A- 
Porn.’ ” U.S. Senate. Judiciary Subcommittee on Crime, 31 July 1985. Washington, D.C.: 
ACLU, 1985. 
27. Owen, Bruce M., and Bazelon, David L. “Different Media, DifferingTreatment?” 
In Free but Regulated: Conflicting Traditions in Media Law, edited by Daniel L. Brenner 
and William L. Rivers, p. 44. Amas: Iowa State University Press, 1982. 
28. Ibid., p. 63. 
29. Kelley, and Donway, Laisser Parler, pp. 43-44. 
30. Wicklein, John. Electronic Nightmare: The New Communications and Free- 
dom. New York: Viking Press, 1981, pp. 249-53. 
31. Krasnow, Erwin G., et al. Thepolitics of Broadcast Regulation, 3ded. New York: 
St. Martin’s Press, 1982, pp. 21, 27. 
32. Irwin, Manley R. Telecommunications America. Westport, Conn.: Quorum 
Books, 1984, pp. 126-28. 
33. Krasnow, The Politics of Broadcast Regulation, pp. 240-70. 
34. U.S. Senate. Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation. News 
Release, 97th Cong., 2d sess., 28 Sept. 1982. 
35. Westin, Alan F. “TheLong-Term Implications of Computers for Privacy and the 
Protection of Public Order.” In Computers and Privacy in the Next Decade, edited by 
Lance J. Hoffman, p. 168. New York: Academic Press, 1980. 
36. Ibid., pp. 167-81. 
37. Rule, James B., et al. “Preserving Individual Autonomy in an Information 
Oriented Society.” In Computers and Privacy in the Next Decade, p. 68. 
38. Markoff, John, et al. “Federal Court Okays Sweeping Surveillance Privileges.” 
ZnfoWorld 5(4 April 1983):14-15; and . “Electronic Surveillance Menaces 
Personal Privacy.” InfoWorld 5(11 April 1983):16-17. 
39. Tucker, Elizabeth. “Would ‘1985’Have Been a Better Title for ‘1984’?”Washing-
ton Post (National Weekly edition), 25 March 1985, p. 28. 
40. Rule, “Preserving Individual Autonomy,” p. 71. 
41. Burnham, Rise of the Computer State, p. 77. 
42. Ibid., pp. 75-82. 
43. Everest, Gordon C. “Nonuniform Privacy Laws: Implications and Attempts at 
Uniformity.” In Computers and Privacy in the Next Decade, pp. 141-50. 
44. Sitkin, Irwin J. “Comment on ‘Privacy Cost Research: An Agenda.’ ” In Compu-
ters and Privacy in the Next Decade, pp. 61-64. 
45. Rule, “Preserving Individual Autonomy,” p. 74. 
46. Ibid., p. 73. 
47. Burnham, Rise of the Computer State, p. 81. 
48. Swaine, Michael. “Taking a Pseudonym Can Prevent ‘Dossier Society.’ ” Info-
World 5(12 Sept. 1983):19. 
49. Goldstein, Robert C. “Privacy Cost Research: An Agenda.” In Computers and 
Privacy, pp. 51-56. 
50. Berman, Jerry J., and Dame, Lauren. “ACLU Privacy and Technology Project.” 
Washington, D.C.: ACLU, 1985, p. 2 (pamphlet). 
LIBRARY TRENDS 102 
Freedom of Speech 
51. Westin, “LongTerm Implications of Computers,” p. 178. 
52. Berman, and Dame, “ACLU Privacy and Technology Project,” p. 3. 
53. Burnham, Rise of the Computer State, p. 29. 
54. Berman, and Dame, “ACLU Privacy and Technology Project,” p. 13. 
55. Burnham, Rise of the Computer State, pp. 29-33. 
56. Berman, and Dame, “ACLU Privacy and Technology Project,” p. 14. 
57. Ibid., p.  12. 
58. Meeks, Brock N. ”Telelaw vs. Electronic Freedom of Speech.” Linkup  2(Sept. 
1985):22-23. 
59. Hafner, Katherine. “UCLA Student Penetrates DOD Network.” Znfo World 5(21 
Nov. 1983):28 Shea, Tom. ”The FBI Goes After Hackers.” ZnfoWorld 6(26 March 
1984):38-43; and “Student ‘Hacker’ Cracks Code, Enters Education Files.” Education 
Week 5(9 Oct. 1985):3. 
60. Watt, Peggy. “Hack Attack Alarms Hobbyists.” ZnfoWorld 6(31 Dec. 1984):17. 
61. Bannister, Hank. “Police Accused of Computer Spying.” ZnfoWorld 7(18 March 
1985):15-16. 
62. Watt, “Hack Attack Alarms Hobbyists,” p. 17. 
63. . “Credit Bureau Sued on Security.” ZnfoWorld 6(3 Dec. 1984):18. 
64. Ranney, Elizabeth. “Data Security Violated Mostly on the Inside, 2 Studies 
Show.” ZnfoWorld 7(23 Sept. 1985):l. 
65. Landreth, Bill. Out of the Inner Circle: A Hacker’s Guide to Computer Security 
by “The Cracker”: The Teenage Computer Wizard. Bellevue, Wash.: Microsoft Press, 
1985, p. 26. 
66. Ibid., p.  207. 
67. Turkle, Sherry. The Second Self: Computers and the Human Spirit. New York: 
Simon & Schuster, 1984, pp. 196-238. 
68. Mace, Scott. “Computer Bills in Works.” ZnfoWorld 7( 14 Oct. 1985):lO; Markoff, 
John. “Teen-hackers’ Antics Prompt House Hearing.” Znfo World 5(7 Nov. 1983):26 and 
. “New Laws May Penalize Bulletin-Board Hackers.” ZnfoWorld 5(21 Nov. 
1983):27. 
69. “Here Come the Networkers.” Newsweek 126(25 Nov. 1985):lOO. 
70. Meeks, “Telelaw vs. Electronic Freedom,” p. 22. 
71. Rosenfeld, Seth. “Who’s Reading Your Electronic Mail?” ZnfoWorld 5(12 Dec. 
1983):24-26. 
72. Berman, Jerry J. “Testimony on S. 1667 The  Electronic Communication Privacy 
Act of 1985.” U.S. Senate, Senate Judiciary Committee, Subcommittee on Patents, 
Copyrights and Trademarks, 13 Nov. 1985. Washington, D.C.: ACLU, 1985 (pamphlet). 
73. United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976). 
74. Howitt, Doran. “Court Pries Into E-Mail.” ZnfoWorld 7( 15 July 1985):26. 
75. Berstein, Paul, and Casman, Steve. “Who’s Reading the Mail?” (letters section). 
ZnfoWorld 7( 11 March 1985):6. 
76. Bailey, Carole Parsons. “Comment on ‘Privacy in Electronic Funds Transfer, 
Point of Sale, and Electronic Mail Systems in the Next Decade.”’ In Computers and 
Privacy in the Next Decade, pp. 45-50. 
77. Berman, “Testimony on S. 1667,” p. 1. 
78. Haas, Warren J. “Computing in Documentation and Scholarly Research.” 
Science 215(12 Feb. 1982):857-61. 
79. Pournelle, Jerry. “The Real Electronic Village.” Popular Computing 4(0ct. 
1985):45-49. 
80. Pool, Technologies of Freedom, p. 194. 
81. Carter, The First Amendment, p. 178. 
82. Pool, Technologies of Freedom, p. 249. 
83. Ibid., p.  215. 
84. Zientara, Marguerite. “Watch Your Words: Who Owns Information in an Elec- 
aonic Conference?” ZnfoWorld 6(6Aug. 1984):33-34. 
85. Pool, Technologies of Freedom, p. 213. 
SUMMER 1986 103 
FRANCES MCDONALD 
86. “School Districts Singled Out on Piracy Charges.” Classroom Computer Learn- 
ing 6(0ct. 1985): 14. 
87. McGeever, Christine. “Software Piracy Troubles Apple Officials.” ZnfoWorld 7(2 
Sept. 1985):l. 
88. Chin, Kathy. “Conglomerate Sued for Piracy.” ZnfoWorld 7(4 Feb. 1985):17. 
89. . “The Software License Quagmire: The Irony of Unenforceable 
Contracts.” ZnfoWorld 6(25 June 1984):34-35. 
90. Stein, Allan. “License to Own Computers-Projections of a Paranoid?” Znfo-
World 5(3 Oct. 1983):37-38. 
91. Fawcette, James E. “Site Licensing Crucial.” ZnfoWorld 7(22 July 1985):5; Pour- 
nelle, Jerry. “Of Publishers and Pirates.” Popular Computing 4(Dec. 1984):59-62; and 
Becker, Gary. “Software Copyright Looks Fuzzy, But Is It?” Electronic Education 4(0ct. 
1984): 18-19. 
92. “ ‘Shrink-wrap’ Law to Receive Its FirstTest.” TechTrendsSO(Sept.1985):3; and 
Ranney, Elizabeth. “First Test for ‘Shrink-Wrap’ Law.” ZnfoWorld 7(8 July 1985):22. 
93. Ranney, Elizabeth. “State ‘Shrink Wrap’ Piracy Suit is Dismissed by Judge.” 
ZnfoWorld 7(21 Oct. 1985):6. 
94. Mace, Scott. “Devices Allow Backups Yet Inhibit Piracy of Programs.” Znfo-
World 7(16 Sept. 1985):15. 
95. Fawcette, James E. “Fighting Common Sense.” ZnfoWorld 7(4 March 1985):5. 
96. “The New Agenda on Intellectual Property Rights.” TechTrends 3l(May/June 
1986):3. 
97. Wicklein, Electronic Nightmare, p. 242. 
98. Carter, The First Amendment, p. 657. 
99. Pool, Technologies of Freedom, p. 251. 
LIBRARY TRENDS 104 
National Information Policy: An Insider’s View 
TONI CARBO BEARMAN 
Scope of the Paper and Framework 
THISPAPER PRESENTS one individual’s view of national information 
policy in the United States. The paper is not intended as a comprehen- 
sive review of information policy; rather it is intended to provide a 
personal view from someone who has been interested in information 
policy since 1962 and has had the pleasure of playing a small role in 
helping to shape i t  for many of those years. The discussion concentrates 
on U.S. policy activities within the last decade. 
This paper presents a series of trends to set the background and 
content for a discussion of information policy; discusses the 1976 
National Information Policy (NIP) Report; reviews clusters of policy 
issues, including some recent activities of key players; and concludes 
with a discussion of the implications of policy developments for the 
library and information community. 
Information and Society 
In “Information and Society,” Edwin B. Parker contends that there 
are 
three basic factors making u p  our new, largely manmade environ- 
ment, and hence determining the quality of life. The first is matter, 
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the second is energy, and the third is information. The three factors 
are related ....Investment in the production of information (creation of 
new knowledge) and investment in widespread distribution of knowl-
edge (e.g., through education) may be the only way to permit con- 
tinued improvement in the quality of life without large increases in 
consumption of matter and energy.’ 
He argues that all of society’s expenditure on science, technology, 
research, development, and discovery in all fields can be viewed as 
investment in the production of knowledge. He further argues that: 
Similarly, all of society’s expenditures on education, broadly defined, 
can be viewed as investment in the distribution of knowledge ‘....In 
order to identify the information needs of society, both the informa- 
tion needs of individuals and of society as a whole must be included. 
Therefore, when viewed from the perspective of the society as a 
whole, the social need for information may be greater than the aggre- 
gate of the individual needs (or demands) ....Thus, a careful analysisof 
the information needs of the society should also include an examina- 
tion of the importance of investment in both generation anddistribu- 
tion of information as a means to productivity gains in the 17,s. 
economy....Pessimists may argue that the views of the economic 
expansionists and the s tability-seeking conservationists are irrecon- 
cilable. That debate is likely to continue for the rest of this century. 
But, social investment in information resources in thisdecade may be 
the key to eventual rec~nciliation.~ 
All policy work should begin with a careful examination of both 
individual and societal information needs so that policies developed 
take into account the needs and concerns of the citizens and the society 
the policies are meant to govern. Of course there are many different 
needs and these needs are often in conflict with one another. Institutions 
may pull one way and individuals-or other institutions-another, 
resulting, for example, in conflicts between a desire by some to provide 
unrestricted access to most information and a wish by others to restrict 
access to protect national security or proprietary interests. Policy deter- 
mination is best described as a question of balance-balancing among 
concerns and interests. Understanding these concerns, needs, and inter- 
ests is critical in developing sound policies. 
Trends 
Influencing individual and societal information needs are changes 
in U.S. society itself. A brief overview of some of the trends emerging 
over the last decade provides insights into the information issues result- 
ing from these trends. Dramatic changes have taken place in the United 
States since the 1960s and, as a result of these changes, several trends are 
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clear. These trends relate to population shifts, technological develop- 
ments, economic factors, changes in the information profession itself, 
and a renewed emphasis on consumer interests. 
Population Sh ifts 
The U.S. population is becoming older, more ethnically diverse, 
and is shifting geographically. As an article prepared for the U.S. 
National Commission on Libraries and Information Science4 points 
out, by the end of the decade over 31 million people in the United States 
will be aged 65 or older. The 1980census indicates that the four major 
cultural minority groups in the United States are (1) Black, (2) His-
panic, (3) Asian and Pacific Islander, and (4)American Indian, Aleut, 
and Eskimo. By the year 2000 almost one-third of the total U.S. popula- 
tion will be composed of these groups. 
Another population shift has been geographic, from North to 
South and East to West. Of the net population expansion during the 
1970s, 90 percent took place in the Southern and Western states. Most of 
this migration was from metropolitan to nonmetropolitan areas. The 
most rapidly growing counties in the United States are the nonmetro- 
politan areas in the West. The growth of small towns and rural areas is 
expected to continue throughout the 1980s with the majority of this 
growth taking place in the Sun Belt. 
These population changes bring with them new and different 
information needs, such as needs for publications in languages not 
previously included in databases and library collections and require- 
ments for the integration of technologies to deliver information in new 
formats to rurally remote areas. 
Techno logy Developments 
The most dramatic trends relate to technological developments and 
concomitant increases in the ease of violating protection of intellectual 
property or violating privacy. The clichC, “knowledge is power,” has 
taken on new meaning with the increased ability to tap vast databasesof 
information about individuals and organizations. Technology also 
permits the storage of huge amounts of information, increased ease of 
manipulating and managing it, and greatly improved delivery mecha- 
nisms. These developments have improved society’s ability to share 
resources and to link local area networks to larger national and interna- 
tional networks. 
An important related trend is that the perceived center for networks 
is shifting from networking organizations to the individual’s work 
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station; this shift has important economic implications such as the 
widening gap between information haves and have-nots. 
Economic Factors 
Economic trends include increasing budget deficits, international 
trade imbalances, and a growing awareness of the importance of infor-
mation resources in the economy. With the financial difficulties facing 
the country coupled with the large portion of the gross national product 
(GNP) derived from information-related activities, more attention is 
being paid to information as a valuable resource. The trade imbalances 
and increased concerns about the need toprotect technological informa- 
tion for the nation’s defense have led to moves toward protectionism and 
restrictions on the dissemination of information. In recent years, policy- 
makers within the U.S. government have disagreed over what informa- 
tion should be restricted and what should be disseminated. 
Related to this is disagreement over the appropriate role of the 
government in gathering, managing, and disseminating information. 
A recent trend has been toward an increasing privatization of informa- 
tion activities previously considered to be inherently governmental. In a 
recent article, Reinhardt Krause notes: 
Balancing the traditional role of government as the collector, orga- 
nizer, and disseminator of information with the functions of a $13 
billion private industry growing20 percent annually is getting harder 
these days ....One of the things clear, though is that government is 
getting out of the publications business. What analogies are appro- 
priate between cooperative agreements instituted with depository 
libraries with printed material, and what might be necessary now 
with “on-line” information in a different age needs to be e ~ a m i n e d . ~  
The current trend in Washington is to increase reliance on the private 
sector through contracting out of services or by turning activities com- 
pletely over to the private sector. 
The Information Profession 
These economic developments are having an impact on the infor- 
mation profession itself. The information profession is changing as the 
discipline-currently in a period of transition-breaks down into new 
specialties and combines with other disciplines. In addition, both the 
public perception of the role of the information professional and the 
added demands of the job are putting new pressure on educators, 
employers, and all information professionals to change curricula, 
improve continuing education, and develop new recruitment pro- 
grams. With these changes has come an increased awareness of the 
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importance of the information profession and the need for heightened 
attention to ethical issues such as the protection of privacy. 
These trends are expected to lead to a stronger role for those infor- 
mation professionals and graduate schools who can survive-and hope-
fully thrive-under the increased demands placed upon them. We can 
expect to see continued attention paid to discussion and perhaps the 
development of a code of ethics for the information profession. 
A related trend is the reshaping of the education system for the 
information profession. Some graduate library and information science 
programs have shut down; others have dramatically changed their 
curricula and faculty. Graduate programs in business, computer 
science, and other disciplines have moved into the information field. A 
reexamination of the accreditation process is underway. Links are being 
made with related professions such as records management, archives, 
business, and data processing. Continuing education programs are 
becoming more varied and, in some cases, highly competitive with one 
another. Studies have recently been completed on the competencies 
needed by information professionals in the years ahead. All of these 
factors point to dramatic changes in the education of information 
professionals in the future. 
Consumers’ Interests 
All of these trends relate back to the information needs of individu- 
als and of society as a whole. Emerging from them is a renewed empha- 
sis on the protection of the consumers’ interests. Recent suits, such as the 
Dalkon shield case and the possible relation between aspirin andReye’s 
syndrome, emphasize the importance of information in health. Infor- 
mation products and services play a critical role in providing informa- 
tion that consumers need to make decisions and in insuring that the 
effects of products on individuals and society are known and dissemi- 
nated. We can expect continued demand for information to help indi- 
viduals make decisions, govern society effectively, and enchance the 
quality of life. 
These trends-population shifts, rapid technological develop- 
ments, economic factors, changes in the information profession, and a 
continued emphasis on protecting consumers’ interests-have raised a 
number of issues and have increased the need for information policies. 
The National Information Policy Report of 1976 
In reviewing the literature since the 1960s, it becomes clear that 
many, if not most, of the questions and issues raised in the late 1960s and 
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early 1970s are still facing us today. Also, most of the questions remain 
unanswered. 
First, of course, is the frequently asked question, “Do we need A 
NATIONAL INFORMATION POLICY, a national information pol- 
icy, policies for the dissemination of federal information, or none of the 
above?” The answers are as diverse as the questions. The Rockefeller 
report on National Information Policy published in 1976 by the U.S. 
National Commission on Libraries and Information Science, pointedly 
declares: 
To debate whether there should be a national information policy is 
pointless. There will be such a policy....It will exist whether or not 
these questions [raised in the report] are arrived at consciously or 
unconsciously, by commission or omission, carefully or haphazardly, 
in a comprehensive or in a piecemeal fashion. 6 
We already do have some policies, such as the First and Fourth 
Amendments to the U.S. Constitution, the Office of Management and 
Budget (OMB) Circular A-76 which stresses the need for government 
agencies to contract with and to rely upon the private sector as much as 
possible, and the Paperwork Reduction Act (Public Law 96-51 1) which 
has had a major impact on the gathering, production, and dissemina- 
tion of government information. Also, the recent OMB Circular A-130 
on the management of information resources provides another major 
set of policies. National and international information policies have 
been developed and continue to be developed in a piecemeal fashion, 
some by legislation, others through executive orders, and yet others 
through circulars, regulations, and guidelines established by individual 
agencies. 
Information policy has a wide range of connotations to different 
people. As the NIP Report notes: 
All of them, however, have one thing in common-they deal with the 
policies which govern the way information affects our society. To the 
Federal Communications Commission information policy may mean 
policy dealing with the regulation of information messages over 
common carrier facilities; to the Justice Department i t  may mean 
policy with respect to the implementation of the Freedom of Informa-
tion Act; to the National Science Foundation it may mean policy 
concerning the communication of research results to the scientific 
and technical community in the public and private sector; to the 
library community it may mean policy with respect to postal rates for 
the distribution of books throughout thecountry; and to the business- 
man i t  may mean policy affecting the information reporting require- 
ments imposed by federal and state governments. 
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Although the term injormatzon policy can have different connota- 
tions, the various perspectives which are brought to i t  are all part of a 
common family of interdependent and intersecting interests. It is this 
larger context and the expectation that information policy issues will 
become more pressing in the future which compel a national infor- 
mation policy. The interrelationships which exist between and 
among information communications, information technology, 
information economics, information privacy, information systems, 
information confidentiality, information science, information net- 
works, and information management have signalled the need for a 
broader, more comprehensive approach to the p r ~ b l e m . ~  
The NIP Report reviews five clusters of issues: (1) government 
information collection, transfer, and dissemination; (2) information in 
commerce: a resource for public good and private gain; (3) the interac- 
tion between technology and government; (4)international implica- 
tions of information policies and developments; and ( 5 ) preparing for 
the information age. A decade later, most of these issues are still unre- 
solved. The report also recommended the establishment of an Office of 
Information Policy in the Executive Office of the President, but this 
recommendation was never implemented. 
Although no single agency or office exists to develop and imple- 
ment a single national information policy, over the last decade consider- 
able attention has been paid in the development of policies. 
An Overview of the Issues and the Players 
A review of some of the major issues makes i t  clear that the issues are 
complex, diverse, and strongly interrelated. The issues can be divided, 
somewhat arbitrarily, into four areas: technological, economic, socio- 
cultural, and political.’ 
Technological Issues 
Technological issues involve those related to the hardware itself or 
to issues brought about by the hardware. For example, international 
negotiations about geostationary “parking orbits” for communications 
satellites or the allocation of spectrum frequencies relate directly to the 
hardware. The development of international standards to use the tech- 
nologies raises important related issues such as whether some standards 
favor certain nations or restrict competition. 
Technology has made it  much easier to gather and disseminate 
information, but it has also created new problems in protecting privacy 
and proprietary or national defense information. Because television 
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signals and data are easily beamed via satellite, methods are also needed 
to protect these signals from piracy and to encrypt data. 
In the United States, billions of dollars are being spent to develop 
encryption techniques and protect data and to develop the technologies 
needed both to disseminate and to protect information. Questions have 
arisen concerning whether companies previously forbidden from cer- 
tain types of discussions under antitrust laws should be permitted to col-
laborate to build new generation computers. Some recent policy deci- 
sions have been in the affirmative. The impact of the major policy shift 
resulting in the divestiture of A T & T  continues to be significant result- 
ing in new competition, increases in telecommunication costs for li- 
brary and information networks, and changes in the U.S. telecommuni- 
cations system. We can expect technological developments to continue 
to raise information policy issues in the years ahead. 
Economic Issues 
All information policy issues have economic implications because 
of the value of information and because of the importance of informa-
tion management and technology for increases in productivity and in 
improving the quality of life. The fundamental question is “Who 
pays?” Increasingly large portions of the U.S. gross national product 
(many estimate nearly half) are derived from information-related activi- 
ties. The  higher the proportion of a country’s information that is stored 
and managed outside its borders, the greater the loss to the country of 
jobs and revenue generated from the information-related activities. 
Although we have no  adequate statistics on the world and U.S. markets 
for information industries, trends from available data indicate that: 
(1) the sector has grown enormously and has tremendous potential for 
continued growth; and (2) competition for U.S. and world markets 
continues to be fierce. 
The United States is losing the trade balance with its competitors. 
For example, in 1983 exports of communications equipment and elec- 
tronics components from the United States were $1 1.8 billion, and 
imports were $19.1 billion. In 1984 the consumer electronics industry 
represented $40 billion and 1.5. million jobs in the United States. 
Estimates of the size of the total U.S. information industry in 1985 range 
from $200 to $300 billion. Clearly this is a sizable industry with great 
implications for the world’s economy. 
The  economic dimensions are significant and raise a number of 
issues such as those concerning the need to protect intellectual property, 
whether trade restrictions are needed, and determining the appropriate 
roles of the government and the private sector (both for-profit and 
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not-for-profit) in the life cycle of information. Discussions of the 
appropriate roles of the various sectors have taken place for several 
decades in the United States. NCLIS issued a major study on this topic 
in 1982.’ 
In December 1985, the Office of Management and Budget issued 
Circular A-130 on the management of information resources. This 
circular, which includes a number of basic assumption statements, seeks 
to establish broad policies for the entire life cycle of information from 
gathering or creation to dissemination. Many consider it to be the single 
most important information policy document since the Paperwork 
Reduction Act. Comments on an earlier draft came from more than 350 
individuals and agencies with more than half from librarians and 
several from members of Congress. 
The circular seeks to strike a balance between protecting the citi- 
zen’s right to access and a desire to provide information in the most 
cost-effective manner. The Government Printing Office (GPO) also has 
responsibility to insure that government information is disseminated. 
At the time this article was written, staff at GPO and the U.S.Congress’ 
Joint Committee on Printing were drafting guidelines for executive 
branch agencies on the depositing of publications in depository librar- 
ies. Differences of opinion between the executive and legislative 
branches over the definition of a publication and possible disagreement 
over roles and responsibilities will have to be resolved. It is clear that 
increased attention will be paid to determining the government’s 
responsibility for the entire life cycle of information. 
Increased attention is also expected to be paid to questions of 
foreign competition. Decisions by countries to restrict trade and to 
support research and development aimed at focusing efforts and leap 
frogging technology to dominate the market have resulted in regulatory 
controls on telecommunications and information activities, protection- 
ist trade barriers, and government funding in cooperation with industry 
for research and development (R&D). These activities are being watched 
closely within the United States. The 1985 decision by the Department 
of State to establish a Bureau of International Communications and 
Information Policy within the department reflects the increased atten- 
tion paid by the administration to these concerns. Among possible U.S. 
efforts in this area, we can expect to see attempts to work with individual 
nations and international groups to remove trade barriers and improve 
reciprocal trade and efforts to enhance the competitiveness of export 
firms perhaps through tax credits for research and development, export 
tax credits, or increased federal support for R&D in high-risk areas. 
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Economic issues are expected to receive even <greater attention in the 
months ahead. 
Sociocultural Issues 
Although many of theses issues are international, they must also be 
dealt with as national issues. When a country’s data reside outside its 
boundaries, national regulatory efforts cannot reach the data and the 
absence of bilateral or multilateral agreements prevent control by the 
country over its own data and may limit its return on demand. Such a 
situation could threaten national sovereignty or even national security. 
In many countries information products and services have been strongly 
nationally oriented; the diversity of languages, alphabets, classification 
schemes, and approaches to organizing information are usually consid- 
ered assets. Efforts toward uniformity of data storage or the perceived 
dominance by some countries may be viewed as threatening to national 
cultural identification and self-images. For example, a proliferation of 
television programs and advertising from one country may be seen as a 
threat to another country’s culture. 
tinrestricted data flows and the location of a nation’s data outside 
its borders lead many nations to fear that they may not have access to 
their own data when the nation needs them and that the country’s 
cultural heritage may be in jeopardy. Related to these concerns are 
questions of the preservation of intellectual property rights, privacy 
issues, and concerns with assistance programs by developed countries 
for the less-developed nations and their “terms of modernization.” The 
protection of intellectual property and privacy rights has become 
increasingly difficult because of the power to violate these rights offered 
by technology. Several ethical issues have been raised concerning the 
responsibilities of the information profession and are being discussed at 
conferences of professional societies such as the American Society for 
Information Science (ASIS). 
Determining the kinds of programs for aid needed by less developed 
countries is equally difficult. Many advanced technologies are unsuit- 
able to meet the needs of developing countries, and databases often have 
a national cultural bias. Also, shortages of trained experts to implement 
new programs, the requirement of high capital investments, and coun- 
tries’ concerns about being “locked in” to another country’s technology 
and support requirements all exacerbate the problem of identifying and 
implementing aid programs. 
A final sociocultural issue area relates to the education of informa- 
tion professionals. Determining what our future colleagues need to 
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may disagree with those from the Departments of Commerceor State, or 
with the academic community on determining what information 
should be disseminated. 
Related to this issue are the problems of encryption for secure 
networking including the availability of encryption and decryption 
programs and the setting of related standards. Some data must be 
protected to insure privacy, protect proprietary interests, or safeguard 
national security. Determining what should be protected, from whom, 
and how are important issues to be resolved in the years ahead. This 
overview highlights some of the major information policy issues con- 
fronting us in the future. 0ther articles in this volume deal with some of 
them in greater detail. 
Implications for the Future 
Some of the implications of these issues have been discussed earlier, 
in particular the need to examineand resolve these issues, the changes in 
the information profession itself, the dramatic developments in educa- 
tion, and the need for a code of ethics. Information professionals will be 
called upon to take the lead in these areas and in developing policies. 
Although many policies have been developed, other policies and per- 
haps changes in current policies, are needed. In this author’s personal 
opinion, a single National Information Policy is not desirable. Policies 
for all phases in the life cycle of government information are needed. 
Determination of these policies must begin with a clear definition 
of what kind of information is covered by the policy. The NCLIS Public 
Sector/Private Sector Task Force developed the somewhat awkward but 
correct phrase governmentally distributable informat ion to mean: 
Information brought together for governmental purposes from infor- 
mation in the public domain or within the scope of “fair use,” or 
owned by the government itself, o r  that the government has obtained 
rights to distribute, or that is distributable under the Freedom of 
Information Act, subject only to the statutory limitations (such as 
national security, personal privacy, etc.).” 
This distinction is critical to insure that information to which access 
must be restricted-such as personal information about an individual- 
is treated differently from that which can and should be made widely 
available. 
In describing the possible content of information policies, the NIP 
Report offered a series of principles as a starting point for debate: 
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-Encourage access to information and information systems by all seg- 
ments of society to meet the basic needs of people, to improve the 
quality of life, and to enable the responsibilities of citizenship to be 
met. 
-Safeguard the use of personal information about individuals and pro- 
tect their right to personal privacy. 
-Encourage systems that foster the creation and dissemination of 
knowledge. 
-Maintain adequate control over the power information provides to 
government either through checks and balances, through diffusion of 
control, through decentralization, through federal/state consor-
tiums, or by other means. 
-Encourage efficient resource allocation in the development of intro-
duction systems and efficiency in their use through consistency in 
standards, practices, and procedures, and through encouraging 
quality and accuracy. 
-Maintain pluralism in information systems and strengthen the pri- 
vate sector so that, through competition, innovation can be encour- 
aged. 
-Adopt rules which will have some permanence and general applic- 
ability so that the private sector will be encouraged to invest in new 
systems and methods. 
Given a clear definition of what information is included, these princi- 
ples could still serve today as a good starting point for debate. Many will 
question the need to strengthen the private sector. The question of the 
appropriate roles and responsibilities of the private sector (both for- 
profit and not-for-profit) and the government, at all levels-federal, 
state, regional, and local-deserves much greater attention and debate. 
In addition, many other principles should be added to this list. 
Conclusion 
What should information professionals do about information pol- 
icy? First, become familiar with the issues; read about them; and discuss 
them, especially with people from different viewpoints. Second, infor- 
mation professionals should make their views known to policymakers, 
members of Congress, industry leaders, and others who are developing 
policies. Third, information professionals should work on the actual 
development of policies. Expert advice from information professionals 
is needed; and policies will be developed with or without the participa- 
tion of information professionals. T o  have effective, realistic policies 
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requires the active participation of knowledgeable information profes- 
sionals from all sectors. 
Note: The comments reflect the author’s o w n  views and do not  necessarily 
represent those of the U.S. National Commission o n  Libraries a n d  Information 
Science (NCLIS) or the U.S. Government.  
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INFORNATION to all living organisms. How we use that IS INTEGRAL 
information determines how we live and function and how our societies 
evolve. Information is essential to the operation and survival of national 
governments. Each nation has information policies that are supported 
by a web of laws, administrative regulations, customs, and beliefs. 
Within the past quarter century, many nations have developed increas- 
ingly explicit and restrictive information policies that are implemented 
in order to maintain their own political, cultural, and economic status. 
To understand the reasons for the formation and implementation of a 
specific nation’s information policy we must, among other things, 
acquire a broad view of that nation’s history and traditions. In short, we 
must know the context out of which specific policies arise. 
But this knowledge alone will not be sufficient. Nations do not 
make information policies based solely on their own history and values. 
A nation’s information policy is also made in response to and in 
anticipation of other nations’ information policy; prevailing eco- 
nomic, social, and political conditions; and the current state of technol- 
ogy. In this overview we will explore the broader context from which 
information policies emerge by describing the important factors affect- 
ing information policy-making. First we will review the evolution and 
application of copyright law and the regulations affecting media and 
M.E.L. Jacob is Vice-president, Library Planning, OCLC Online Computer Library 
Center, Dublin, Ohio; and D.L. Rings is Information Analyst, OCLC Online Computer 
Library Center, Dublin, Ohio. 
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telecommunications. Next we will consider culture and language as 
they relate to information policy. Third, recent technological develop- 
ments will be scrutinized, including the politicization of technology. 
Fourth, we will discuss economic aspects and privacy legislation. 
Finally, we will indicate the implication of these contexts for informa- 
tion professionals. 
We tend to think of information policy as a recent phenomenon. 
We forget the history of previous attempts to restrict or promote the flow 
of information. In the West, elaborate systems of government regulation 
of information did not appear until the 1500s after the spread of print-
ing technology.' For example, by 1559, when printing became suffi- 
ciently widespread to pose a potential threat togovernment policies and 
was centralized enough to present a target for control, thelndex Expur- 
gatorius, a list of books that gave titles of works forbidden by the church 
authority to Roman Catholics pending revision or deletion of some 
sections, was issued. This index was included in the Index Librorum 
Prohibitorum from 1571 until 1966. 
More recently some U.S. library boards or local authorities have 
sought to have certain titles removed from library collections because of 
sexual, political, or philosophic views deemed offensive to those 
groups. The  continuing discussion of the inclusion and exclusion of 
creationism in school texts is another aspect.' 
In the late 1500s the British passed licensing acts which required 
licenses for printers to publish, imposed taxes on newsprint, advertise- 
ments, and on newspapers themselves, and prosecuted government 
critics. The rise of printing and increased literacy also led to changes in 
science, philosophy, and religion. The  Reformation was fueled in part 
by the ability to mass produce books. 
While the United States has enshrined freedom of speech in the Bill 
of Rights, the limits of this freedom have undergone continual tests and 
redefinition. The right to a free press, developed early in U.S.history, is 
a jealously guarded right. However, court rulings, while maintaining 
the basic right, have also drawn limits to publishers' and reporters' 
rights. 
Copyright 
Property rights were firmly rooted in Western tradition and formed 
the basis for most wealth. Intellectual property rights were gradually 
seen as equally valuable as land and other tangible property. Copyright 
to protect such ownership rights was rooted in printing technology. 
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The  printing press was a single point where copies could be examined 
and controlled. Authorities monitored the presses both to censor sacri- 
lege or sedition and to protect the author’s intellectual property. Copy- 
right did not apply to verbal communication. The  United States, for 
example, denied copyright protection to piano rolls because they were 
not “writings” in a tangible form readable by a human being. This  
concept of copyright originally excluded from protection many new 
communication technologies although more recently copyright has 
also been applied to computer software including software encoded on  
microchips. The  international inconsistency in this area is illustrated in 
table 1 which provides an overview of the legal protection that different 
countries offer for computer programs. 
The  United States has exhibited a great deal of hypocrisy on copy- 
right. During the nineteenth century, American publishers 
unabashedly pirated many British and European publications, particu- 
larly the works of popular authors such as Charles Dickens. The  United 
States did not sign the Universal Copyright Convention until 1952 and 
still is not a participant in the Berne Convention endorsed by the World 
Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO). T h e  Berne Convention is 
observed by most U.S. allies. An advisory committee is presently review- 
ing the major issues of the Berne Convention and the significance of 
U.S. participation in it. The  lack of U.S. participation and the resulting 
incornpatabilities of U.S. copyright law remain a sore point with other 
countries. Presently, 1J.S.publishers obtain protection under the Berne 
Convention by simultaneous publishing in the United States and in 
Berne countries. 
Media and Telecommunication Regulations 
Media and telecommunication facilities have become essential to 
the information society. Radios appear even in primitive villages, and 
developing countries such as India have used satellite broadcasts to 
reach remote areas. Appendix A indicates the availability of these types 
of services for many countries. Regulation of these facilities has raised 
major concerns. T h e  reasons are partly explained by the history of their 
development. 
The  tele<graph was the first application of electrical telecommuni- 
cations and Samuel F.B. Morse’s invention coincided with and aided the 
rapid economic growth and expansion of the United States. During the 
1800s the westward expansion of the railroads was paralleled by the 
telegraph’s expansion west. T h e  transcontinental telegraph was com- 
pleted in 1861. Operating problems included poor insulation, wires that 
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TABLE 1 (cont.) 
Trade Secret / 
Unfair 
Nation Copyright Competition Trademark Patent 
USSR Unclear 
Venezuela No Limited 
Yugoslavia No 
* Special legislation passed + LJpdate per Donald M. Lamberton, Queensland, Australia 
Legislation pending 
Special legislation proposed 
Perhaps, if included in process 
Sources: BigeIow, Robert P. “Legal Protection of Computer Software.” In International 
Information Economy Handbook, edited by G. Russell Pipe and Chris Brown. Spring- 
field, Va.: Transnational Data Reporting Service, 1985, pp, 46-48 (chart is excerpted and 
updated from entire text). Update sources include: Authors’ files; “International Software 
Protection,” Fenwitk, Davis, and West, 29 March 1985; Greguras, “International Software 
Protection,” Practising Law Institute, June 1985; Borking, Third Party Protection of 
Software and Firmware, North Holland, 1985; Hanneman, T h e  Patentability of Compu- 
ter Software, Kluwer, 1985; Bernacchi and Deffense, “How to Protect Software in Venezu- 
ela,’’ T e n  Selected Countries, International Intellectual Property Alliance, Aug. 1985; 
Keplinger, Copyright Aspects of the Protection of Computer Software, WIPO, Dec. 1984; 
papers by D.S. Johnston, J.A. Connors, T.H.  Lee, K.Y. Park, and S. Guo at the IBA 
Section on Business Law Conference, Singapore, Oct. 1985. 
broke easily, and nonstandard equipment that made message exchange 
difficult between different telegraph companies. 
Many of the present national telecommunications policies have 
their roots in historical events. The first significant military use of the 
telegraph occurred during the Crimean War of 1853-1856. News of the 
battles reached the public before hand-carried military dispatches 
reached government leaders-a situation that aided spies and jeopar- 
dized national security. This led directly to the government ownership 
of the national telegraph systems in all European countries by the end of 
the ~ e n t u r y . ~  
Development of the telephone stemmed in part from efforts to 
multiplex telegraph signals-i.e., to transmit different signals (and 
different messages) on the same wire. As more and more signals were 
multiplexed, some realized that voice tones could be approximated over 
a wire. Alexander Graham Bell applied for a patent on his telephone 
design in 1876. Two years later he drafted a prospectus to found the Bell 
Company. The Bell Company became a regulated monopoly in 1879, a 
status which continued unchallenged until the 1950s. In January 1982, 
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the Bell Company signed a consent agreement that made the divestiture 
of this company effective January 1984. 
Among the more sensitive areas of information policy are media 
and telecommunications regulations. Trade barriers and other protec- 
tionist policies once reserved for traditional, labor-intensive, “smoke- 
stack” industries,  a re  now becoming preva len t  i n  the  
telecommunications and information i n d ~ s t r i e s . ~Such practices 
include: denying or restricting access by U.S. firms to foreign telecom- 
munications and information equipment and services markets; devis- 
ing technical interface and equipment standards that needlessly 
preclude or hamper use of foreign-owned equipment in connection 
with domestic public telecommunications networks; subsidizing export 
financing for domestic firms; imposing local equipment purchase 
incentives, direct subsidies, or low-cost loans for research and develop- 
ment to local firms; restricting government procurements to domestic 
firms; and imposing higher rates for private-line services to exclude or 
hinder U.S. competition. 
There is also a trend of increased politicization of telecommunica-
tions issues in international forums. The ITU (International Telecom- 
munications Union) has become a focus for Third World efforts to gain 
assistance in the telecommunications field and to further other, often 
unrelated, political ends (e.g., the expulsion of Portugal and South 
Africa from the Torremolinos Plenipotentiary Conference). Other 
international organizations that have placed international information 
and telecommunications issues at the forefront of their agendas are the: 
Council of Europe (CoE), United Nations Center on Transnational 
Corporations (UNCTC), Intergovernmental Bureau for Informatics 
(IBI), United Nations Educational Scientific and Cultural Organiza- 
tion (Unesco), Organization for Economic Cooperation and Develop- 
ment (OECD), International Standards Organization (ISO), 
International Communications Satellite Organization (INTELSAT), 
and Communications Satellite Corporation (Comsat). Many of the 
present attitudes and concerns were first articulated in a Unesco report. 
After a review of this activity, the roles of the other international 
agencies will be discussed briefly. 
In 1976, Unesco requested an independent commission to consider 
the problems of communication and its ramifications. The report, 
popularly known as the MacBride Report, describes many important 
aspects of the problems and includes value judgments related to cultural 
imperialism by the West but ineffectively tries to please everyone. The 
report provides a starting point for the long-term development of the 
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world communication system, but it does not provide a strategy on how 
to proceed. 
Reaction to the MacBride Report  has been mixed. The  U.S.’s 
response, particularly by the journalistic community, has been negative 
and was a contributing factor that led to U.S.’s withdrawal from 
Unesco. A year later, 31 December 1985,Great Britain alsoconfirmed its 
withdrawal. Other Western European countries have stated that they are 
reconsidering their memberships, and Canada and Japan said they are 
not satisfied with Unesco’s r e f ~ r m . ~  In any event, the MacBrzde Report 
served notice to the Western world that developing countries had con- 
cerns that were not being addressed by existing mechanisms. 
The  report is the first international document to provide a global 
view of the world’s communications problems and emphasizes the need 
to give communications issues high priority on the national and inter- 
national levels. The  commission itself states: 
The  recommendations and suggestions contained in our Report do 
not presume to cover all topics and issues calling for reflection and 
action. Nevertheless, they indicate the importance and scale of the 
tasks which face every country in the field of information and com- 
munication, as well as their international dimensions which pose a 
formidable challenge to the community of nations....Our study indi- 
cates clearly the direction in which the world must move to attain a 
new information and communication order-essentially a series of 
new relationships arising from the advances promised by new com- 
munication technologies which should enable all peoples to bene- 
fit....The objective should be to ensure that men and women are 
enabled to lead richer and more satisfying lives.6 
If nothing else, the report raised expectations regarding informa- 
tion services and facilities in developing nations and notified the devel- 
oped countries that the status quo was unacceptable. More countries 
wanted a share of the media and telecommunications resources. Newer 
forms of communication provide new facilities and have also raised 
governmental concerns over the problems of regulation and control and 
involve a number of agencies including intergovernmental organiza- 
tions as well as national organizations. 
The ITU coordinates communication, satellite orbital allotments, 
and communication frequency allocations to countries in order to avoid 
harmful interference toanother country’s radio communications. With- 
out cooperation and agreements, frequency spectrum allocations are 
meaningless. Such allocations and their strict adherence are essential for 
communication facilities to operate and fulfill their function. Two 
groups trying to use the same frequency slot will result in garbled 
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messages. The ITU encourages countries to conform to internationally 
approved standards and works toward the adoption of one multilateral 
agreement, which avoids the complex negotiations that would result if 
each nation had to enter into bilateral agreements with every other 
nation. Compliance, however, is voluntary. 
The ITU has numerous administrative bodies working to imple-
ment guidelines and recommendations such as: IFRB (International 
Frequency Registration Board), CCIR (Consultative Committee on 
Radio-Communication), and CCITT (Consultative Committee on Tele- 
graph and Telephone). The CCITT deals with information services, 
teletext, and integrated services. It also is designing the intelligent 
global network-the Integrated Service Digital Network (ISDN). The  
ISDN will integrate most telecommunication and information systems 
into a global network. It can provide rapid, more cost-effective com- 
munication systems. 
The  OECD also negotiates voluntary international agreements and 
has developed guidelines on protection of personal data and invest- 
ment. OECD studies include those of private industry perspectives on 
trade, transborder data flow, and economic issues such as unemploy- 
ment resulting from the widespread use of electronic technologies. It 
encourages member nations to develop coordinated policies for infor- 
mation, media, and telecommunications regulations. 
INTELSAT is a global satellite system used for international trans- 
mission of communications services. It was established to provide high 
quality, reliable telecommunications services and domestic services for 
nondiscriminatory international public use. INTELSAT is owned by 
the various signatories of the INTELSAT Operating Agreement. The  
amount owned depends on actual use. Earth stations, however, are 
owned by the individual administrations. A great deal of international 
technical cooperation is necessary. Member nations are concerned with 
U.S. policies on deregulation which, in their view, may threaten the 
economic viability of INTELSAT because of competition from com- 
mercial ownership and control of satellites. 
Terminal equipment regulation was affected by satellite, comput- 
er, and facsimile communication improvements which began in the 
1960s. The  first of these-satellite communication-became an issue 
when AT&T wanted a monopoly in U.S. satellite communication. 
Instead, Congress passed a law in 1962 creating the Communications 
Satellite Corporation (Comsat). Comsat is 50 percent owned by the 
common carriers and 50 percent by the public. It had a governed 
monopoly on U.S. international satellite communications, but could 
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only sell bulk circuits to common carriers for resale. One of Comsat’s 
accomplishments was the successful operation of a geostationary satel- 
lite which demonstrated the superiority of this type of satellite to low- 
altitude ones. Unfortunately, Comsat did not pursue research and 
development activities, but instead left these to NASA (National Aero- 
nautics and Space Administration). 
T o  interconnect networks requires common standards. Standards- 
making bodies include the CCITT, ISO, the American National Stand- 
ards Institute (ANSI)-particularly Subcommittee X3-and the 
National Information Standards Organization 239 (NISO). IS0 is 
working toward compatible international technical standards for a 
wide range of equipment including computer and telecommunications 
equipment. ANSI is the U.S. representative to ISO. ANSI Subcommittee 
X3 is responsible for most U.S. standards related tocomputinganddata 
processing while NISO is a private, not-for-profit organization in the 
United States and develops standards related to libraries, publishers, 
and information services. Both standards developed by Subcommittee 
X3 and NISO are issued by ANSI. NISO is currently the secretariat for 
ISO’s TC46/Subcommittee 4 which is responsible for standards in the 
area of library automation. 
Other Telecommunications Issues 
Two major concerns of other nations are remote sensing data and 
the economic base of services. Developing nations have been sensitive to 
the economic advantages others could gain by access to remote 
sensing-i.e., data gathered by satellite identifying their natural 
resources-and have demanded access to their own data and sought to 
restrict its use by others. The economic base of telecommunications for 
many Eurpoean countries has rested on telex services. This reliance has 
made them reluctant to change their services andresistant to someof the 
new technologies. The recent positive experience in France, which 
provided broad services to telephone subscribers, may diminish this 
concern. 
With the availability of hundred-channel cable systems, video- 
cassettes, videodiscs, and network links to thousands of online informa- 
tion services, there is potential for a diversity of voices. In the United 
States and Great Britain, telephone monopolies are being broken up. 
Before computers, phone administrations refused connection of any 
“foreign attachment” to their networks. Today, in the United States, 
Japan, Great Britain, and elsewhere, customers may buy approved 
terminals and phone equipment and attach them to existing systems.’ 
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How governmental policies will deal with such interconnections is still 
evolving and will be influenced by political, cultural, and economic 
conditions. 
Cultural Environmental Conditions 
Environmental conditions that influence information policies 
include national security and ambitions, social and cultural perspec- 
tives, linguistics, legal and regulatory aspects, and technological 
development. 
Edward T.Hall, in The Dance o f l i f e , discusses time and the way it 
affects cultural perspectives. Complex societies organize time in differ- 
ent ways: (1) sequentially-i.e., events scheduled as separate items, one 
thing at a time, as in Northern Europe and America; (2) simulta-
neously-i.e., several things at once, following the Mediterranean and 
Latin American model of involvement; or (3)holistically-i.e., the view 
of time as an ocean, not a stream, as envisioned by some American 
Indian tribes. These systems are logically and empirically quite distinct. 
Like oil and water, they do not mix and they influence how each culture 
views information.8 
In Western society, our view of time is so thoroughly woven into the 
fabric of existence that we are hardly aware of the degree to which i t  
permeates everything including how we interact with others and how 
we make decisions and view information. Most of our activities are 
governed by the clock. By scheduling, we compartmentalize, making i t  
possible to concentrate on one thing at a time, but also reducing our 
understanding of context and the possibility of several apparently 
separate factors interacting or having some dependence on one another. 
Scheduling, by its nature, selects what area or issues we will recognize 
and attempts to reduce, and limits, the number of events within a given 
period. Scheduling is a system for setting priorities; important things 
are taken upon first and allotted the most time; unimportant things are 
left to be done last or omitted if time runs out. This is both a strength 
and a weakness since it allows us to create manageable tasks but can 
cause us to ignore or miss the interactions of several apparently unre- 
lated factors. This fragmented approach has been criticized by Repre- 
sentative Browng as i t  applies to the U.S. attitude toward national 
solutions for and coordination of U.S. information policy. 
In Latin America, the intelligentsia and the academicians fre- 
quently participate in several fields at once-fields that the average 
North American academician, business, or professional person thinks 
of as antithetical. Business, philosophy, medicine, and poetry, for 
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example, are common, well-respected combinations. Several Latin 
American countries, most notably Brazil, have also devised coordinated 
national information policies, as noted in appendix B. 
Similarly, the Arabs and Turks operate in people-intensive envi- 
ronments, are almost never alone-even in the home-and use different 
“screening processes” than Europeans. They interact with several peo- 
ple at once and are continually involved with each other. Tight schedul- 
ing is difficult if not impossible. Their approaches and concerns for 
information systems are different, particularly regarding privacy issues. 
The Japanese are highly context-dependent. While many West- 
erners focus on ensuring the rights of individuals, the Japanese and 
other Oriental cultures are more concerned with group rights and with 
societal values. However, the goals of Japan and Hong Kong to become 
the data-processing and data-handling centers of the world have raised 
concerns regarding privacy and personal data. These concerns have 
been heightened in Hong Kong with the approach of the 1997 turnover 
of Hong Kong to mainland China. Security for computer processing 
has also added impetus to developing data-protection laws in both 
countries. 
Language 
Another aspect of cultural differences is language and how it affects 
information availability and use. J. Michel, director, Centre de Docu- 
mentation du CNRS, discusses the linguistic barriers to the free flow of 
information and indicates that the number of people who are fully 
bilingual or multilingual is low. In scientific and technical literature, 
only five languages play a significant role: English, Russian, German, 
French, and Japanese (see table 2). 
English is most often used for primary publications in the basic 
disciplines: physics, chemistry, biology. But in applied sciences-such 
as earth sciences, engineering, and medicine-the authors generally use 
their mother tongue. Michel indicates that this trend is accentuated in 
technical information such as reports, patents, standards, technical 
journals and newsletters, and state-of-the-art reviews. Therefore, in 
many areas the main losers of information through written communi- 
cation are English-speaking people because only 12 percent are able to 
read French documents and 4 percent German, whereas 97 percent of all 
French and German scientists are able to read English. 
In oral communication, however, the linguistic barrier becomes a 
tremendous obstacle for non-English-speaking people. They are the 
losers when attending a meeting or conference because they do not 
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TABLE 2 
DISTRIBUTION FAMILIES 1975-4 BILLIONPEOPLEOF LANGUAGE I N  
Languages M1llaons Percen1age 
Indo-European languages 
Indo-Aryan (Hindi, Bengali, etc.) 590 15 
Germanic (English, German, Scandinavian, Dutch) 490 12 
Romance (French, Spanish, Italian, 
Portuguese, Romanian) 490 12 
Slavic (Russian, Polish, etc.) 300 8 
0ther 80 2 
TOTAL 1950 49 
Sino-Tibetan languages 
Chinese 800 20 

Other 200 5 

TOTAL 1000 25 

Japanese 120 3 

Others 930 23 

Source: Michel, J. “Linguistic and Political Barriers in the International Transfer of 
Information in Science and Technology.” Journal of Information Science 5( 1982): 13 1. 
understand half of what is said and are unable to participate in any 
discussions or cannot seek clarification of ambiguous points. 
This situation is clearly reflected in the citation behavior of scien-
tists. It takes five times longer for an article written in any language 
other than English to have an impact equivalent to that of an English 
article. Measuring outside-of-country citations, the United States is 
most highly cited by the outside world. The next five countries cited in 
order are the United Kingdom, West Germany, Japan, France, and the 
USSR. The USSR receives the fewest citations by far from the outside 
world. This may relate not only to lack of knowledge of Russian but also 
to the use of a non-Roman alphabet which requires transliteration or 
translation. In addition, the nature and content of the literature cannot 
be ignored. It is likely that, in spite of character set and language, 
increasing access will be provided to Japanese literature as the Japanese 
continue their development of fifth-generation computer systems. 
According to Michel, the Science Citation Index is introducing a 
significant distortion in depicting science and in measuring the impact 
of scientific work because the selection criteria used for this database are 
strengthening the linguistic barrier. It is a vicious circle. The best 
publications are the most-cited articles; the most-cited publications are 
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articles that are the most read; English is the most common language in 
the scientific community; so to be cited, i t  is better to publish in English 
and publications in English are probably the best ones and will receive 
top priority in selection. 
This position is very dangerous and is progressively creating a kindof 
English speaking community ghetto, in which many people deter- 
mined to get the most valuable information are very reluctant to take 
into account any non-English written documents. We are far from 
scientific objectivity." 
Michel indicates "the first step in solving the problem of the 
linguistic barrier is to recognize its existence."" In addition, terminol- 
ogy should be addressed; multilingualism of Journals and abstracting 
and indexing services should be encouraged; more people should learn 
several languages; and translation activities, both man-made and 
computer-aided translation, should be promoted. 
Technology 
Technology has strongly influenced information policies and con- 
tinues to raise concerns. The early influence of printing and telecom- 
munication technology was discussed earlier. This section will identify 
recent trends and their effects. The rapid advances and convergence of 
computer, communication, and media technologies allow us to 
acquire, store, manipulate, and transmit information with incredible 
speed. 
Ithiel de Sola Pool has described the trends we are facing in com- 
munications technology. The public networks are moving toward dig- 
ital and broadband capabilities that will allow every household and 
workplace two-way transmission of high-definition pictures and text in 
bulk, along with voice, videotext, andother low-speed services. l2 Digital 
transmission- the translation of information into coded pulses of ones 
and zeros-allows rapid transmission and reduces error rates. Broad- 
band capabilities, as opposed to narrowband transmission that is nor- 
mally used for most voice signals, are required for image transmission. 
Digital broadband transmission of pictures requires many more combi- 
nations of ones and zeros than do voice signals. 
Millions of offices and homes will have computers needing broad 
bandwidth for a variety of tasks. Individuals at home or work using 
high-definition moving pictures; two-way video for teleconferencing, 
teleshopping, or browsing in libraries will create the demand for end-to- 
end broadband networks. The business community will be the driving 
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force in such networks. Some private networks already exist and 
AT&T’s strategy for building telecommunication systems is focusing 
on these private networks. 
The trend is toward increasingly sophisticated equipment on the 
user’s own premises. While the costs of computer logic, memory, and 
long-distance communication are falling, the uses for these are expand- 
ing. Not long ago it would have taken a million-dollar computer to do 
what a $2000 microcomputer can do today. American industry is antici- 
pating that the percentage of disposable income spent on information 
activities will grow and major U.S. firms are seeking companies and 
services in that industry. American Express and Westinghouse are 
investing in cablecasting; Boeing is selling time-sharing services as 
General Electric has for years; and retailers like Sears Roebuck are 
experimenting with videodisc catalogs. Investors see the biggest dollar 
growth not in transmission or its hardware but in software and the 
equipment located on the customer’s premises. This conclusion led 
AT&T to accept divestiture of its local phone companies in exchange for 
the freedom to sell information services and equipment to end users.13 
Big customers will benefit and decentralization will become easier 
from the development of more elaborate terminal equipment. Compa- 
nies with information service and carrier billings in the millions will 
invest in their own networks, leased circuits, compression devices, and 
other technology designed to help them operate efficiently or cut costs. 
Depending on the structure of the vendors’ and carriers’ tariffs, different 
alternatives will provide greater benefits. One trade-off will be between 
buying communications capacity to improve management control, and 
buying local processing power to cut communication costs. Switching 
between such centralizing and decentralizing choices may alternate as 
technological and tariff changes affect relative prices, but the costs of 
computing equipment used to store data locally, to compress it,  and to 
process it will probably fall farther and faster than thecosts of transmis- 
sion. The development of CD ROM (Compact Disc Read-only 
Memory) and optical storage units will also influence these trade-offs. 
Potentials of Networks 
As Pool indicates, the communications network of the future does 
not have to be provided by a single large organization with central 
contr01.l~ Having a hierarchical structure governed by central control is 
only one way to organize complex systems. For a decentralized system to 
function, there must be mutually agreed upon ways of interconnecting 
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the parts other than by central command; the interconnections may be 
managed by conventions, habits, or formal standards. As he notes, 
property rights are enforced by laws while language is enforced by 
custom and usage. In the technical areas one partner may dominate 
(such as IBM) establishing de facto standards, or a more formal process 
may be used coordinated by IS0  and ANSI. 
A decentralized set of communications systems can function as a 
single system only if traffic on each network can move from one network 
to another. There are three critical requirements: (1) the right to inter- 
connect, (2)conformity to technical standards defining interfacing, and 
(3) a directory system. 
There will be many networks offering many services, some public, 
some private, some specialized, some general-purpose. Most of them 
will interconnect with each other. Some of these networks will have 
their own central directory or controls, others will not. Video, voice, and 
text, information and entertainment-public and personal-will be 
mixed but may each have special requirements and even differently 
designed networks, but most will be interconnected. 
Digital technology promotes the trend toward distributed process- 
ing throughout the system and reduces or eliminates the need for central 
control. It is easier to convert one system of zero-one pulses into another 
such digital system than i t  is to interface the analog memoryless com- 
munications systems of the past. Using intelligent digital devices that 
scan associate data structures at nanosecond speeds and communicate at 
light speed, a directory search without a universal list, can makedistrib- 
uted systems work effectively. 
Future communications will be radically different from those of the 
past because of artificial intelligence. Computer-composed messages 
sent from computer to computer may never be seen by a person at all. In 
an electronic funds transfer, only a few bits are needed to debit an 
account by $102.60. Most traffic involves checking and rechecking to 
validate the signature, determine if sufficient funds are available, and 
the remaining balance. 
Heuristically programmed computers will give particular readers 
information based on what they chose last time. Computer-aided 
instructional programs will assess students’ past performance before 
providing the instruction they need. Dialogue will be with machines as 
well as with people. The ability to capture and store the decision base of 
experts will broaden access to experts and even extend their influence 
beyond their own life spans. All of these will affect what and how we 
communicate. As a result, telecommunication facilities will become 
increasingly important. 
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Telecommunications and information sectors are seen as the future 
for economic well-being. Everyone wants a piece of the pie. Competing 
national interests are distorting-and in some instances reducing-the 
effectiveness of international organizations. 
Telecommunication technology is shrinking the effect of geo-
graphic distances. Most costs are incurred in the local loops and 
switches-for setting up the call and for billing-and only a small 
amount for the long-distance portion. The variable cost of extra micro- 
wave links is a minor item and, with satellite transmission, distance 
becomes unimportant. The ability to communicate at will and at low 
cost will change the patterns of communication and interaction. This 
will foster a trend toward pluralistic and competitive communication 
sys terns. 15 
Electronic technology can promote freedom, encourage diversity, 
and provide broader access. Computerized information networks of the 
twenty-first century can provide the same freedom as the printing press, 
but just as the printing press offered a central point for censorship, so 
can centrally-controlled communication systems provide for central 
control. The recent attempts by the National Security Agency (NSA) to 
ensure all networks use NSA encryption programs could provide such 
contro1.l6 
International Politics and Technology 
Although national borders have lines on maps, signals don’t stop at 
national borders. The lack of respect for national border policies in 
telecommunications has prompted international meetings dominated 
by questions about the freedom of information flow. Various points of 
view have surfaced. The Socialist countries are concerned that their 
governments might be subverted by ideas not compatible with their own 
ideology. The Western world has been concerned about government 
domination of the information flow. Third World countries feel re- 
stricted in developing an approach of their own, seeing themselves 
dominated by the overwhelming forces of the Socialist and Western 
countries. 
Sarah Goddard Power, former U.S. deputy assistant secretary of 
state of human rights and social affairs, recognizes that no country 
wants to be manipulated by, or to be dependent upon, another nation 
for its development and future survival. 
Either we design, produce, market and distribute the most 
advanced products and services spun off by the communications 
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revolution-and, in so doing, reinforce our economic as well as 
political, social and cultural advantage-or we will increasingly find 
ourselves in the position of consumer and debtor to those who 
do....The question of how the world adapts to the communications 
revolution has been steadily moving up the list of international 
concerns over the last decade, and it has now emerged as a major point 
of contention in East-West and North-South relationship^.'^ 
In the developing countries, information policies need to be made 
according to the priorities each country sets for the internal develop- 
ment of its own information technology. In the developed world, eco- 
nomic factors and industry trends-as well as changing user 
capabilities-will have an effect on a country’s policy-making 
decisions. 
The growing number of international organizations involved with 
these issues increases the likelihood that any international “rules of the 
game” developed governing the activities of nations and private entities 
may directly, and possibly adversely, affect U.S. interests. 
The U.S. government has not given the telecommunications and 
information issues adequate high level attention. Jurisdictional dis- 
putes are responsible for a lack of coordination among departments and 
agencies involved in these areas. Political leaders such as Representative 
George Brown remain pessimistic about our ability to ensure that the 
United States is not excluded from partnership in developing interna- 
tional policies. Some changes are evident including the appointment in 
April 1983 of Diana Dougan, assistant secretary of state andcoordinator 
for international communications and information policy, with the 
rank of ambassador. The United States must recognize that the present 
fears of other nations are rooted in national and economic survival 
issues and, as a consequence, elicit highly emotional responses towhat, 
from the U.S. perspective, are reasonable recommendations or demands. 
Economic Aspects 
Nations are passing data-protection laws, increasing tariffs, and 
creating various nontariff barriers to regulate the flow of information 
processed by machines. They argue that these steps are necessary to 
protect individual privacy, to promote data security, and to preserve 
national sovereignty. They say they need time to develop their own 
strategies for information and communications development. They 
believe multinational corporations (MNCs) from the United States 
impede development. European countries fear the loss of domestic 
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revenues and jobs for the local work force when information is transmit- 
ted by, processed and stored in, foreign telecommunications and com- 
puter centers.” Ironically, many of the recent takeovers of U.S. 
information companies have raised similar fears in the United States. 
C. Jansen van Rosendaal, in his paper “European Information 
Policy Situation,” defines the information market as “the market for 
value-added information services.” He also states: 
Information is one of the few non-scarce raw materials for the econ- 
omy of Western Europe, with the information industry one of its few 
sunrise sectors. The  timely and inexpensive availability of informa-
tion makes it a motor for innovation and therefore a driving force for 
economic and social deve l~pment . ’~  
He describes the barriers that are preventing greater European 
involvement in the new electronic information services as: the respective 
roles of the public and private sectors in information supply and dis- 
semination, the physical infrastructure, differing national rules and 
regulations, and the impact of technology. Awareness of the economic 
value of information is growing, but there is insufficient agreement on 
whether the true value and price of information will be recognized 
under market conditions and what role the public sector should play. 
He urges clarification of rules of the game and a measure of agreement 
on those rules throughout the (European economic) community as 
essential to encourage private-sector investment in new information 
services. 
Most countries regard telecommunications as a “natural monop- 
oly.” Developments in computing and telecommunications technology 
are causing monopolies to be questioned. The developments in Britain 
with the sale of telecommunications facilities to the private sector are 
one example. Appendix A gives an overview of a number of communi-
cations and media in different countries. It also compares the number of 
information services in use with the size of each country’s population. 
Present regulations are being reviewed in areas such as: (1) access 
rules for the private information providers, (2) level and structure of 
tariffs, (3)consistency oftariffs throughout Europe, and (4) standardized 
interface equipment. Differing national rules and regulations also act as 
indirect barriers to information flows within the European Commun- 
ity. There are differing privacy protection regulations, copyright laws, 
taxation practices, and rules on establishment of services. Technologi- 
cal developments are decreasing the distinction between the different 
types of services and potentially increasing the competition between 
them. The different practices in the European Economic Community 
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also lead to different solutions to the same problems. The Organization 
for Economic Cooperation and Development, and Council of Europe 
are trying to bring about more uniformity and consistency. 
Economies of scale for the European market require a balanced 
development of the market in all member states. The more widely 
accessible services are, the greater their economies of scale and financial 
viability, although new technology can change these. Different sched- 
ules for introducing new services can create inequities and restrict 
growth. DIANE (Direct Information Access Network for Europe) was to 
provide a means for European information providers to develop services 
and markets. It has been a mixed success. It is not yet clear whether such 
services can compete in the broader world market without subsidies or 
protective policies. 
SWIFT (Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommu- 
nication) is an example of a successful, largely unsubsidized electronic 
system. It is a successful network used for international banking com- 
munications. SWIFT is a cooperative nonprofit society owned by its 
member banks and o erating in Europe, North America, South Amer- 
ica, and the Far East.'SWIFT was conceived in the late 1960s by a small 
group of European banks seeking to rationalize international banking 
operations. 
The primary objective of SWIFT is to provide a standardized, 
available, auditable, secure, and private system for its member banks to 
complete international financial transactions between themselves. The 
SWIFT message text-standards allow banks throughout the world to 
communicate directly using a common language. To SWIFT security 
means safety, accuracy, privacy, reliability, and timeliness. Security is 
inherent throughout SWIFT from its physical aspects to software fea- 
tures. The principle of dual responsibility is essential to access, opera- 
tion, and authorization policies and procedures. Operating centers and 
regional processor centers are limited-access areas where strict entry 
procedures are enforced. 
All transmissions over international lines are encrypted. Encryp- 
tion keys at the ends of each line are changed at random intervals. If no 
live traffic is on the line, pseudo-traffic is generated to prevent anybody 
from establishing traffic patterns. Banks can, if they wish and if the 
PTTs (Post, Telegraph and Telephone Administration) permit, use 
cryptographic equipment on their national lines. Messages held for 
retrieval at the operating centers are also stored in encrypted form. 
SWIFT accepts financial liability for direct loss or interest losses 
arising out of delayed transactions incurred by a user as a result of 
SUMMER 1986 137 
JACOB & RINGS 
negligence, error, omission, or fraud within the limits of its responsibil- 
ity. IJnlike DIANE, SWIFT is truly international in scope rather than 
regional. It is offering essential financial services to support interna- 
tional trade and provides strong incentives for participation by interna- 
tional banking agencies. 
Transborder Data Flows 
The OECD issued a press release stating the member countries 
adopted the “Declaration on Transborder Data Flows” on 11 April 
1985.” This declaration is the first international effort to address eco- 
nomic and social issues and the benefits resulting from access to a 
variety of sources of information and effective information services. It 
also recognizes that each member country has its own national policies 
and goals which may affect the flow of information across borders. 
The members who have signed this declaration believe that all can 
work for international development of the information industry and 
reduce the economic dependence on developed nations by developing 
nations, accelerate the development of the economies of developing 
countries, and establish control over domestic resources. No one net- 
work of information goods and services will dominate many nations’ 
economies and international trade. The developing nations will 
develop their information technologies depending upon their own 
cultural, economic, and political needs and abilities. 
There is an increasing awareness that the U.S. principal informa- 
tion policy goals include assuring free flow of information and free 
markets. The free flow of information worldwide, subject only to the 
most compelling national security and personal privacy limitations, 
remains a cornerstone for American policy but has been tempered lately 
in regard to high technology and supporting areas. Promotion of U.S. 
interests is seen as essential to our leadership role in the world. 
Information flow to developing nations should contribute to the 
elimination of hunger, poverty, disease, and ignorance and assist devel- 
oping nations’ sound economic development. We continue to believe in 
and strive for a free and competitive marketplace for telecommunica- 
tions and information services, equipment, and facilities. Nonpolitical 
international organizations can efficiently develop, manage, expand, 
and provide nondiscriminatory access to international telecommunica- 
tions facilities and networks. Human well-being and understanding 
can grow and be promoted through international telecommunications 
services.22 
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Some of the problems in applying these goals and policies are 
resistance to free-market operation and different definitions of free flow. 
Many foreign economies are focused toward centralized or government 
planning rather than the U.S. free market concept. There seems to be 
almost a deliberate misunderstanding of the word free by foreign 
nationals. They are quick to point out that U.S. firms barter, trade, and 
charge for access to information and soquestion the use of the wordfree. 
The United States and United Kingdom use this word as meaning 
“without unnecessary restrictions. 
Most objections arise in relation to telecommunications where 
control of the media is seen as a powerful force for promoting govern- 
mental views. Developing countries oppose the allocation of radio 
spectrum frequencies and orbital positions on the basis of economic 
efficiency. They claim that the United States, Western, and Soviet 
countries, with access to technology, are usurping what should be a 
common resource. 
Economic and industrial policies of some foreign governments 
focus on industry-targeting policies, including use of subsidized 
export financing and the erection of protectionist nontariff trade barri- 
ers that prevent and distort international trade. United Nations (UN) 
organizations have drafted proposed codes of conduct in support of 
more restrictive policies for mass media and information policy than are 
acceptable to the United States and U.S. citizens. Greater government 
control of transborder data flows of both commercial and personal 
information among computers located in different countries is now a 
fact. Numerous examples are shown in appendix B including those of 
Canada and Sweden. 
The United States has urged that services, including information 
services, be discussed in the next round of General Agreements on 
Tariffs and Trade (GATT). Some developing nations are adverse to this 
because they do not feel they have sufficient data or knowledge to 
negotiate agreements on services. This is a two-part problem involving 
the definition of services and the identification of which arenas or 
organizations are the most appropriate in dealing with agreements, 
guidelines, treaties, or regulations on information services. 
Information is seen in different ways. Some see it as an intangible 
commodity with market-determined value with intermediate resources 
applied at various stages in the process of producing other goods and 
services. The United States espouses fundamental beliefs in basic ideas 
to which economic value cannot be objectively assigned and, if sub-
jected to regulation, to achieveeconomic goals, may clash with the basic 
rights of free thought and expression. The United States has urged the 
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least possible control of information by governments for any reason. 
Others believe that no information is free of bias or is fully objective and 
thus must be regulated, modified, suppressed, or have information 
added to provide a more balanced perspective. 
A conference on transborder data flows policies was held 23-27 June 
1980 by the Intergovernmental Bureau for Informatics. A major 
issue before this conference was the prospect of increasing international 
in terdepencence without sacrificing national independence and sover- 
eignty. Interdependence suggests to many a potential for vulnerability 
and national subordination. However, Computer and Business Equip- 
ment Manufacturers’ Association (CBEMA) argues the opposite should 
be true.24 
According to CBEMA this perception of vulnerability is tied to the 
notion of information or informatics as a “national resource” akin to 
food, water, energy, minerals, and environment. Total national inde- 
pendence of supply, desirable in theory, is rarely possible in reality. 
When possible, indigenous sources of supply are developed to lessen 
international dependence for certain resources. Yet no nation can be 
totally independent; all remain vulnerable and interdependent in vary- 
ing degrees. 
CBEMA acknowledges that while information has value and limits 
in the free world, its limitations are different from those of other re- 
sources or commodities and should not be treated by the rules or 
regulations for commodities. Its principal limitation is the variable 
perishability over time. Sometimes perishability is desirable-at other 
times information must be preserved. Information doesn’t disappear 
with consumption; i t  may instead be enhanced in the act of consump-
tion. It is, however, susceptible toaccidental and deliberate debasement, 
distortion, and destr~ction.’~ 
Innovation and Information Flow 
Some see technological leadership as essential to a successful 
information-based economy. Representative Ed Zschau26 indicates that 
the technological leadership in the United States has eroded in recent 
years through neglect. He states that in the 1950s, the United States was 
credited with 80 percent of the major inventions made, but in the 1970s 
the U.S. share of major inventions dropped to 60 percent. Over the past 
twenty years, research and development expenditures have declined in 
the United States while its two most aggressive trading partners, Japan 
and West Germany, have increased their research and development 
expenditures during the same period. 
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While i t  is reassuring that high technology is finally getting proper 
attention, all this new-found enthusiasm may be a mixed blessing. 
Many of those who have jumped on the high technology bandwagon 
have been exaggerating its capabilities for restoring our economic 
growth. They suggest, for example, that high technology can create 
enough jobs to replace all those that are being lost in our so-called 
“smokestack” industries ...g overnment should play a positive role in 
promoting high technology. But the Republican TaskForce on High 
Technology Initiatives, which I chair, believes that rather than “tar- 
geting” specific technologies for industries, the proper role for 
government is to target the process by which they are developed-the 
process of innovation. That is, our government should focus on 
creating an environment in which high technology, innovation, new 
ideas, and new companies are likely to flourish. Making sure that 
such an environment exists is the best way to help America maintain 
its technological leader~hip.’~ 
Zschau has identified four essential conditions to promote techno- 
logical innovation: ( 1 )  a strong commitment to basic research; (2)incen-
tives for investors, entrepreneurs, and innovators; (3) a strong 
educational capability; and (4) expanding market opportunities. 
A proper high technology industrial policy is one that focuses on 
these prerequisites for innovation. It consists of specific legislative 
and regulatory initiatives that foster these conditions and avoids 
government actions that would weaken them.” 
Recent attempts by some U S .  agencies to restrict the distribution of 
high technology information and products to Soviet Bloc countries 
have raised a threat to the U.S. position on “free” flow of inf~rmation.~’ 
Another view is proposed by Alan I. Rapoport who argues: 
The United States is not the only industrial country with a large 
research and development infrastructure generating scientific and 
technological discoveries which may ultimately be exploited for com- 
mercial purposes. Those presuming that U.S. international competi- 
tiveness is harmed by outflows of scientific and technological 
information often fail to take intoconsideration that competitiveness 
of other countries generating scientific and technological discoveries 
should then be equally adversely affected by the outflow of such 
inf~rmation.~’ 
Rapoport discusses many channels through which scientific and 
technical information may be dispersed: journals, education and train- 
ing, exchanges of personnel, normal cooperative research and technical 
assistance programs, direct foreign investment by a multinational par- 
ent firm to its foreign subsidiaries, licensing agreements, and the sale of 
turnkey plants. It can also be embodied in final or intermediate products 
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which are exported, and it can be acquired through industrial espio- 
nage. He has found that it has become difficult to determine the origin 
of a particular piece of Scientific and technological information or the 
location(s) of its use because of the number of joint ventures between 
firms or subsidiaries based in different countries, and because many 
individuals study and teach in universities and work in laboratories 
outside their own country. These mechanisms have been exploited, 
particularly by the Japanese and the Koreans. 
The transfer of scientific and technical information is difficult to 
track and nearly impossible to regulate without eroding the free market 
concept of the United States. Rapoport explains that “no country 
presently appears to have enough scientific and technological power to 
unilaterally restrict its transfer of scientific and technological informa- 
tion without some kind of effective retaliation from other c o u n t r i e ~ . ” ~ ~  
Rapoport emphasizes that if U.S. firms develop technology, 
transfer it abroad, and maintain their research and development to 
continue to improve and develop technology, they can commercialize 
their efforts and never lose their edge. Firms might lose their edge 
because they fail to realize the commercial potential of their efforts or 
they neglect to continue their research and development work. Bobby 
Inman, director of the MCC (Microelectronics Computer Technology 
Corporation), has repeatedly reiterated this problem of American firms 
in commercializing and bringing rapidly to market new products. 
Rapoport concludes: 
I t  is difficult to find any real evidence to substantiate the claims that 

the unrestricted flow of scientific and technological information is 

detrimental to U.S. international competitiveness. Simple logiccom- 

bined with available evidence strongly suggest that the free flow of 

scientific and technological information is not a significant factor in 

any loss of U.S. competitiveness, but in fact may serve to advance 

rather than hinder such competiti~eness.~~ 

Since information grows primarily through cooperative research, 
analysis, combination, and synthesis, free flow is the strongest means of 
ensuring new indigenous information sources. No one would seriously 
suggest that a nation could actually supply 100 percent of its own 
information. There is, however, a corollary that has been pursued 
through history-that a national government controlling 100 percent of 
incoming and outgoing information may actually retard development. 
Technology control has led to retarding advances, the Chinese self- 
imposed isolation and the resulting technology gap confirms the 
negative effects of such controls. 
LIBRARY TRENDS 142 
National & International Information Policies 
CBEMA believes that all national and international efforts should 
be aimed at reducing direct and indirect government control of informa-
tion content and flow. Control should be limited only to those isolated 
instances affecting national security. 
For information science and technology the application of the 
“national resource” concept can be misleading and destructive. It can 
lead to an undue concentration on the technology, development, and 
production of equipment and the measuring of a nation’s information 
processing strength by its production of microelectronics and its asso- 
ciated hardware. This emphasizes the importance of only one compo- 
nent of information processing, encouraging a false reliance on vertical 
integration and may use scarce capital unwisely. Information process- 
ing is a people-intensive activity depending on the availability of skills 
and the “soft” sciences-i.e., systems analysis, database management, 
application analysis and development, and programming. 
Information generation, handling and processing, analytical data 
gathering, and program development methodologies are largely equip- 
ment independent and more easily transferable than direct hardware 
technology. This “soft” technology is the real determinant of informa-
tion processing progress. The medical, agricultural, financial, manu- 
facturing, or educational expert skilled in the use of fundamental 
information-processing techniques will be the true keystone to the 
growth of national information process success. 
CBEMA believes the growth of these skills requires a free and open 
interchange of information data and technology, and there is an inter- 
national interdependence in which all the partners grow mutually. 
Information skills thrive in the information exchange process, and the 
depth and breadth of the skills acquired is directly related to the richness 
of the exchange. 
Technological application rests on a relative rather than an abso- 
lute scale. There are only a few advanced and strategic applications 
which are entirely dependent for their existence on state-of-the-art tech- 
nology. There are broader sets of applications that are enhanced and 
made more cost effective by the newest technology but which may still 
be developed on older devices that often become obsolete, not because of 
their inability to perform the desired tasks but because of the increasing 
cost of maintenance, lack of spare parts, and lackof knowledgeable staff 
to apply them. 
The computer industry is one of the rare industries where the costs 
have decreased over the last decade and the equipment’s capacity, effi- 
ciency, and ease of use has increased. In an economic sense, the comput- 
er industry is a classic example of elasticity of demand. With the advent 
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of new technology, the cost has decreased thereby making i t  attractive to 
a larger marketplace. Computing technology availability is becoming 
increasingly international and diverse. The growth of the Japanese and 
Korean computing sectors are ample evidence of new participants. 
CBEMA believes the dramatic scenario of one nation or group of 
nations bringing others to their knees through information technology 
deprivation is illusory. 
Information policy should be viewed broadly in its support role to 
the fundamental programs for international cooperation. 
We, the member companies of CBEMA, encourage each nation to 
consider information in the perspective of its needs, its social prob- 
lems, its goals and priorities. Clearly, these will not be the same in all 
cases. Just as each tree in a forest has a unique requirement for 
nourishment and environment, each society has different needs for 
infusion of investment, technology and conventions of control. To 
erect a structure to govern the use of information technology that is 
common toall, at this point in histor might beequally asirresponsi- 
ble as to ignore the matter entirely. Jd 
This view does not appear to be shared by many foreign governments as 
evidenced by the growth of privacy legislation and telecommunications 
regulations. 
Privacy 
Foreign data-protection laws are increasingly prevalent as auto- 
matic data processing technologies develop. The telecommunications 
industry is subject to new protectionist policies and anticompetitive 
practices by countries trying to maximize their role in the dissemination 
and supply of information. The same basic issues recur as new technolo- 
gies and market developments occur in the information industry. Table 
3 shows a summary of the major players and the current status of 
data-protection laws.35 Appendix B contains an inventory of the legisla- 
tive actions that many countries have enacted or are proposing for data 
protection. 
Privacy has become an international problem and the international 
dimension has revealed some of those issues behind privacy and data 
protection. Rules and regulations for transborder data flows were 
implemented with data-protection agencies to monitor them. The 
examples in table 3 show how regulations differ in strictness and 
content in different countries.36 
In some countries, transborder data flow has to be licensed, in 
others organizations register with their government, and in others there 
LIBRARY TRENDS 144 
National & International Information Policies 
TABLE 3 
COUNTRIES I N  DEVELOPING LAWSINVOLVED DATA-PROTECTION 
Znformatzon 
Country Policy Legislation Areas 
Australia Proposed 
Austria Implicit Yes Privacy 
Belgium Proposed 
Brazil Explicit Yes Technology 
Canada Explicit Yes Privacy, broadcasting, 
banking 
Denmark Explicit Yes Privacy 
Federal Rep. 
of Germany 
Implicit Yes Privacy, 
telecommunications 
Finland Proposed 
France Implicit Yes Privacy 
Iceland Proposed 
Israel Explicit Yes Privacy 
Italy Proposed 
Luxembourg Implicit Yes Privacy 
Netherlands Proposed 
New Zealand Implicit Yes Privacy 
Norway Implicit Yes Privacy 
Portugal Explicit Yes Privacy 
Spain Explicit Yes Privacy 
Sweden Explicit Yes Privacy 
Switzerland Proposed 
United Kingdom Explicit Yes Privacy 
United States 
of America 




are only regulations to be observed. In all instances the general criterion 
seems to be that transborder data flow is permitted if the recipient 
country provides data protection that is equivalent to that of the sender. 
National legislation in these countries has created an indirect but strong 
demand for legislation in other sovereign countries generating a grow- 
ing concern in the international business community and in interna- 
tional organizations of increased restrictions, complexity, and 
administrative overhead in dealing with a variety of legislation in 
different countries. 
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Agencies of data protection may become more than just internal 
implementation agencies for data protection. They can become an 
integral part of state information policy by influencing, preparing, and 
to some extent, executing these policies. Experience and knowledge 
accumulated within these institutions provide an ideal opportunity for 
influencing government policies. Private institutions must consider 
and consult officials of these agencies when establishing new informa- 
tion systems. Influence of the data-protection administrations extends 
beyond actual data-protection issues, to microprocessing and its effect 
on employment, and to new media and their effects on society. 
Privacy and confidentiality are not the only considerations related 
to data protection. The distribution of political and economic power is 
equally important. The rights and limitations to develop and apply 
information technology; to collect, process, and distribute the informa- 
tion; and to develop and apply decision-making algorithms are of 
increasing concern to all nations. 
Developing countries have to be prepared for the broader issues 
arising with data protection-even if privacy has a different meaning in 
their cultural environment-or they may inadvertently restrict their 
country’s growth. Hall, as discussed earlier, has some interesting obser- 
vations on different cultural perspectives and the resulting concerns 
with and view of privacy. Each developing country must develop its 
own policy for the implementation and the priority assigned informa- 
tion technologies. There are many issues raised by such needs and views. 
In 1977 at the OECD conference in Vienna, P. Walckiers presented 
a project to process and control customs information. Such a system 
could help to reduce importation and allocation time, cut down on 
warehouse space, and facilitate trade; and i t  could also provide govern- 
ments with exact information on internal and external trade and infor- 
mation needed to develop and monitor economic policies. At the same 
time such a system evokes questions of confidentiality, the use of eco- 
nomic power, and national sovereignty. 
The data-protection laws and their administration, like copyright 
and early British licensing laws related to print technology, have created 
an atmosphere suited to information control. Information has eco- 
nomic value and can be used for or against the individual citizen or for 
or against government positions. Concerned government officials 
believe that it can no longer be left to a free market of conflicting 
interests but requires various checks and balances managed by the state. 
These agencies accumulate knowledge and expertise important for 
national and international information systems. Developing nations 
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want to share in this knowledge and become participants in the infor- 
mation economy. 
While not strictly related to privacy legislation, the United States 
has also acted to restrict information flow. Mostly this has been related 
to efforts to reduce the flow of high technology to the Soviet Union. 
More recently, information flow has also been raised in relation to our 
competitive position. U.S. officials have acted to restrict export licenses 
on some goods such as magnetic tapes that contained bibliographic 
information. Both Chemical Abstracts Service and the Institute for 
Scientific Information were affected, but such restrictions were 
removed. During the hostage crisis in Iran, the export of MEDLARS 
tapes to that country was briefly halted. Questions have also been raised 
about the access of foreign nationals to supercomputing facilities 
funded by the federal government. 
These incidents, while of concern to U.S. citizens and to foreign 
governments, are not really indicative of government policy. Rather 
they represent the efforts of various individuals or agencies and while 
annoying and disruptive, do not represent a change in U.S. information 
policy. They do give credence to concerns of foreign nationals that the 
United States will use its considerable powers to restrict information 
access from those countries who do not support U.S. policies. Unless we 
remain vigilant, such restrictive acts could become official policy. 
Because modern society is becoming more dependent on the new 
information systems, attempts to regulate or modify information flow 
through any means, including privacy legislation, must be scrutinized 
carefully and avoided when possible. This dependency can be seen in 
the reliance on the safety and reliability of the air traffic control system; 
the reliability, security, and controllability of military command and 
control systems; the security of large-scale electronic funds-transfer 
systems; and the reliability, accuracy, and responsiveness of the social 
security information system.37 Society has a vested interest in the reliable 
technical operation of each of these systems and the cost of failure is 
high. It requires the cooperation of international agencies, national 
governments, and private organizations to see that information 
required by these systems continue to flow freely. 
PublidPrivate Sectors 
The public and private-including commercial-sectors some-
times conflict in their view of the value of information. The private 
sector is concerned with personal privacy either because individuals and 
organizations want to be left alone, or they feel information about 
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themselves could be exploited to cause personal harm or intrusion if 
disclosed without their permission. The public sector in the United 
States views information as essential to the public’s well-being and the 
support of democratic institutions and has consequently supported the 
free flow of information except in technical information. This can be 
seen in the support of schools, public libraries, museums, and First 
Amendment guarantees, although support of the 1974 Privacy Act has 
been weak. The commercial sector recognizes that information is a 
valuable commodity to be used, manipulated, repackaged and sold in 
newspapers, books, computerized mailing lists, in broadcasting, in 
databases, or as consulting services. 
The differences in value systems between the sectors raises a variety 
of policy issues. Computer-based information systems increase the 
quantity of information collected, the ease of collection and dissemina- 
tion, its usefulness, and its ease of storage which can affect the behavior 
of government, individuals, and organizations and the very nature of 
some traditional differences which are discussed later. Automated infor- 
mation systems may affect, both directly and indirectly, policy problems 
that, while exacerbated by technology, were longstanding and not 
caused by technology. Because much more can be obtained, handled, 
processed, and distributed so much faster, old problems are made worse 
and new ones are created. 
The increased scale and efficiency of computerized criminal justice 
record keeping heightens the conflict between the needs of law enforce- 
ment agents and the individual rights of citizens. Similarly, the ten- 
dency of the technology to support centralized record systems creates 
jurisdictional problems in federal-state relationships and state-local 
relationships. Some experts believe this centralization trend could 
reverse through the use of smaller computers with distributed databases. 
Who is responsible for the data in such systems and who has access to it? 
The NCLIS Task Force report, Public SectorlPrivate Sector Inter- 
action in Providing Information Services,% and the Library of Congress 
Network Planning Paper, PubliclPrivate Sector Interactions, The 
Implications for N e t ~ o r k i n g , ~ ’consider other aspects of public and 
private roles. More recently the move by the Reagan administration to 
privatize information services has been the source of increasing debate 
and concern in the library and information science community. There 
are fears that depository programs could be restricted or curtailed, that 
archival or preservation responsibilities may be ignored, and that access 
to information may become too expensive for many citizens. 
ALA (American Library Association) created the ALA Commission 
on Freedom and Equality of Access to Information to: 
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Define and find synthesis in issues (social, economic, political, and 
technological) arising from the ability of modern technologies to 
enhance and extend the production and dissemination of informa-
tion; (2) identify those particular issues in which near-term decisions 
as to public or private sector policy may be needed to assure the level of 
access to information required for economic growth, for effective 
citizen participation in public affairs, and for individual self-
fulfillment; and (3)consider the roleof libraries in relation to freedom 
and equality of access to information, evaluate the challenges to the 
American ideal of individual freedom and equality of opportunity, 
and recommend courses of action.40 
This report has become known as the Lacy Report after Dan Lacy, the 
chairman of this committee. At recent ALA hearings on the Lacy 
Report, Jeanne Isacco commented on chapter four of the report. 
These pages suggest that the private sector should be the primary 
information vehicle and that government information in electronic 
format should be disseminated by the private sector unless it doesn’t 
want to. This philosophy is best manifested by the Commission 
identifying the critical question concerning access as: “What govern- 
ment publishing activities, by preempting or limiting private pub- 
lishing activities, may actually limit the kinds of access and the 
freedom of independent access to information.” That is a backward 
question. The  question I wish they had asked concerning access is: 
How can we assure the unimpeded flow of information which is the 
lifeblood of research and development progress and a free democratic 
society?41 
She also wondered why the commission failed to ask: “Can private 
sector dissemination be priced and transacted in such a way as to serve 
the public interest?” She said if the broadest range of public usage could 
not be served by the private sector, “then reliance on the private sector 
must be limited, reduced or waived in favor of a more broad dissemina- 
tion through the non-profit sector, the g o ~ e r n m e n t . ’ ’ ~ ~  
These issues will continue to be debated as will the lobbyingefforts 
to influence congressional and administration officials. The citizens’ 
right to information and who pays the cost of providing access are 
among key concerns. 
This overview has considered many areas and identified a variety of 
problems and concerns. There are no easy solutions. We are moving, 
and will continue to move further, toward an information based econ- 
omy. The United States faces major challenges on the underlying 
technological base-i.e., semiconductor technology and computer 
systems-from others, particularly the Japanese and now the Koreans. 
Telecommunication spectrum allocation and privacy legislation will 
continue to be international issues with the real focus on national 
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sovereignty. Inevitably the United States will have to become more 
flexible and find ways to become more effective-e.g., to make better use 
of telecommunication frequencies it is able to retain. The  future lies in 
improving both research and the ability to bring products to market 
more quickly. 
All nations are going to have to recognize and live with their 
interdependencies and seek niches each can exploit effectively. We 
cannot sell services and goods unless the nations wanting these have 
something of value to trade. All countries will become more, not less, 
dependent on others. The  United States will probably have to moderate 
its free market concepts and recognize that individual rights will have to 
give way in certain instances to the greater good. Our  challenge is how 
to preserve the best of our societal values while continuing to provide an 
economy where all can prosper. 
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Distribution of Media Services 
Country Telephones Daily Newspaper 
per 100 circulation, 
population copies per 1000 1000 
1981 (a) population 1979 (b) 
Algeria 3.3 22 
Argentina 9.8 (NA) 
Australia 48.9 (e) 336 
Bangladesh .1 5 
Belgium 38.7 228 
Bolivia (NA) 39 
Brazil 7.2 44 (9) 
Bulgaria 17.0 234 
Burma -1  (h) 10 
Canada 69.3 24 1 
Chile 5.2 87 
China 
Main 1 and .4 (NA) 
Taiwan 23.6 (NA) 
Columbia 6.5 48 ( j )  
Costa Rica 10.9 70 
Austria 42.1 35 1 
Cuba 4.2 91 
Cyprus 20.2 108 
Czechoslovakia 21.0 304 
Denmark 67.4 367 
Ecuador 3.3 49 
E q p t  1.2 (NA) 
El Salvador 2.2 (NA) 
Ethiopia 2.8 (e) 2 
52.2 480 Finland 
France 49.8 205 ( i )  
German Dem. Rep. 19.4 517 




































































































































































































































per per 1000 
population 
(c) 1981 (d) 
234 585 
170 (f) 143 (f) 
248 2 95 






387 (f) 847 






41 1 963 
63 1 21 10 
125 564 
126 405 
195 ( f )  209 (f) 
10 33 
(NA) (NA) 







Appendix A (cont.) 
Telephones Daily Newspaper 
per 100 circulation, 
population copies per 1000 1000 
1981 (a) population 1979 (b) 
puerto Kico 22.0 139 
Romania (NA) 181 
Saudi Arabia 19.2 (NA) 
Sin gapore 31.7 249 
south Africa 11.8 66  (i) 
Soviet Union 9.3 (1) 396 (i) 
Spain 32.9 128 (i) 
Sri Canka .7 (NA) 
Sudan .4 1 
Sweden 82.8 526 
Switzerland 75.1 395 
Syria 4.6 12 
Thailand 1.1 (NA) 
Trinidad and Tobago (NA) 171 
Tunisia 3.0 44 
Turkey 4.7 (NA) 
United Kingdom 49.7 (NA) 
United States 78.9 282 
Uruguay 10.1 (NA) 
Venezuela 5.8 (h) 176 
Yugoelavia 10.2 103 
Zimbabwe 2.9 16 




















(StAtiEtiCal Abstract Of the United State0 1985. United 
Departrent of Cotmerce, Buremu of the Canam, 105th 
pago 849, Washington, D.C.) 
Not AVAilabh 
Comprises public and privets telephone# installed which 
connected to a central exchange. 
Publicationa containing general nova and apparing at 
times a week# m y  rang. in site from s aingle eheet to 
more page.. Circulation data refer to average 
issue or number of printed copies per issue and include 
sold outside ths country. 
Estimated number of nets in we, except as noted. 
D a t ~  cover estirated number of receiver# in u e ,  except 
and apply to a11 types of receivere for radio broadcasts 
public, including receivers connected to a radio 





Refera to circulation of 33 out of 38 dailies only. 
Include. San mrino 
Excludea telephone systemm of the military forcea. 














Government report in preparation. 
Creates a right to data protection
for individuals, associatione, b 
corporations w i t h  respect to data 
maintained by both the public b 
private sectors. 11/28/78. 
Proposed legislation in Parliamnt. 
Noonmtive Act 22/82. For Registration
of All Conputer Software. 12/7/82. 
Canada Canadian Human Rights Act 1977 
Banks & Banking Law Revision 1980 
(Bank Act) 1980 
Tax Law Amendwnt 1976 (C-58) 






Public Authorities a Private 
in Data-processing, January 1979. 
(Enterprises) Acts 1978 
Act on the Misuse of Personal Data 
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Applies t o  data on A u s t r i a n s  whether l iving i n  Austria o r  abroad 6 
whether data is held by the p lb l i c  or private sector. Data Protec- 
t ion Council is a po l i t i ca l  observer. Data Protection Conmission 
enforces the A c t  i n  the public sector, acts as administrative a r t ,  
investigates data-processing transactions, 6 approves transborder 
data flow fo r  public 6 private sector records. 
Creates three categories of collputer program: 1) Program developed 
i n  B r a z i l  by Brazilian persona or corporations physically resident h 
domiciled i n  Brazil: 2) Program developed outside of Brazil with no 
national alternatives,  6 of relevant economic in t e re s t  t o  the coun- 
t r y  whose program technology 6 e c o n d c  exploitation righta have 
been effect ively transferred to a national conpany epecializing i n  h 
capable of developing new program 6 services: 3) A l l  program not 
i n  categories 1 h 2. Requires government agencies, state enterprise8 
6 foundations supported by the government t o  use category 1program
whenever possible. Bars conpanies wing  unregistered program from 
Belling services to government 6 from taking advantage of lowered 
income taxes. 
Enumerates private information r ights  of individuals with respect 
t o  Federal Government records, including the r ight  to know: w h a t  
records the government maintainrr, how the information is being used# 
6 the r ight  t o  challenge the correctness, relevance, 6 currency of 
the  information. 
Requires a l l  processing bank data which m y  be required by banking
authori t ies  t o  be carried out i n  Canada. D a t a  may be transmitted out 
of Canada, but the Inspector General of Banks nust be notified. Pro-
hibi ta  banks from se l l i ng  time-sharing services which are unrelated 
t o  t h e i r  am o r  c l i en t s '  banking a c t i v i t i e s  6 applies t o  a l l  banks 
operating i n  Canada, whether Canadian or foreign-ckmed. 
Denies Canadian advertisers business deductions for  broadcaet time 
purchased on U.S. television stations i f  advertising is directed 
primarily a t  Canadian audiences. 
Policies: 1)Expand programing choices: 2) Strengthen Canadian pro- 
graming; 3) D i r e c t  Canadian Radio 6 Television Commission (a%)on 





Private Sector A c t  concerns data i n  mual 6 electronic record 
systems 6 both perm1 data 6 financial  data about corporations. 
Protects personal data i n  public files 6 f i l e s  of physical or legal  
perms nraintained for  their aun purposes or  fo r  transacting bus-
iness w i t h  others. Covers manual 6 autonated f i l e s  with s l igh t ly
different  provisions. 
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17th Order for Amending the Tele- 
mummications Regulations. With 
regard to introduction of usage- 
baaed tariffs for fixed connection 
6 a system surcharge for PBX's. 
Finland 
France 
Government report in preparation. 
Data Processing, Data Files, & 




Proposed legislation drafted. 





Government report in preparation. 
Government report in preparation. 
Law Regulating the Use of Personal 
Data in Data-proceming. 3/79. 
Netherlands 
New Zealand 
Proposal currently in Parliament. 
H u n  Rights CoPmission Act 1977. 
Norway %reoral Registers Act 
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Changes tariffs for fixed connections based exclusively on distance 
to usage-based tariffs. Brings tariff basis for fixed connections in 
line with existing policy for switched connections. Prevents reali- 
zation of special interests of specific ~ e e rgroups at the coet of 
the majority of customers of the Deutsche Bundepoet. Harmonization 
of tariffs is oriented taward anticipated new regulations for 
digital C facilities & their analogue connections. 
Regulates the collection, registration, addition to, storage, & 
destruction of personal data in both the public & private sectors. 
Covers the use of autanated databases & files, & the interconnection 
referral, & comrmnication of personal data. Certain provisions apply 
additionally to non-autanated pere0~1 information. Excludes legal 
per80118 from the scope of the Act. Gives CNIL power to regulate Or 
prohibit transborder data f l w  of name-linked data. CNIL has the 
pawer to ensure conpliance by making spot checks of data facilities, 
6 by refusing to authorize data-processing or transfer which it 
feels would violate the law. 
Requires the Minister of Justice to m e  regulations to inplement 
the law, including establishing conditions of keeping C safeguarding
infonmtion in electronic databases, rules of conduct h ethics for 
persons in possession of enployee databases, & conditions of trans- 
mitting OK restricting transmission of database information outside 
of the state. Data protected by the law includes data on personal
status, personality, intimate affairs, state of health, economic 
mition, vocational qualifications, opinions, & beliefs. 
Provisions include: obligation to obtain authorization for all data- 
bases containing personal data: creation of a national directory of 
databases; rights of data subject regarding access to the database & 
correction of incorrect data: regulation of data collection: sur-
veillance of databases; h rights & duties of data-processing 
specialists. 
Incorporates the United Nations International Covenants on Human 
Rights. Gives the Hurnan Rights Carmission several privacy functions 
which are not defined OK delineated with respect to data-protection 
as such, except for a reference to the privacy of records in the 
Wanganui Law Enforcement Computer Center which maintains a coaputer 
based information system to aid the Departments of Police h Justice 
& Ministry of Transport in carrying out their duties. 
covers the systematic collection of p e r ~ 0 ~ 1  
information by the pub- 
lic & private sectors. Establishes general rules for collection, use 
h dissemination of personal & corporate information together with a 
licensing system for certain registers. The Data Inspectorate has 
jurisdiction over all computerized files & manual records, which 
include sensitive infonmtion as defined by the Act. 





















Appendix B (cont.) 
Constitution of the Portugeee 

Republicr Article 351-3. 





Data Act (1973:289) amended July 11 
1979 h March 1980. 
Government report in preparation. 

D a t a  Protection Act of 1984 
public Law 97-138, International 





Public Law 97-241 Department of 

State Authorization A c t r  Fiscal 
Years 1982 h 1983. 8/24/82. 
Public Law 97-2591 CORDRJniCatiOnS 

Amendments Act of 1982. 9/13/82. 

Public Act 97-341 Economic R m v e V  

Tax Act of 1981. 8/13/81. 
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The right of honor, personal h family privacy, & identity is guaran- 
teed. The secrecy of comications particularly postal, telegraphic 
& telephone comnurications, is guaranteed, except by judicial order. 
Applies to personal information maintained in both public & private
sectors. Limits the formation & use of “personal registry” system 
to data that: 1) contain personal information that identifies the 
individuals concerned; h 2) are made by automated data processing. 
Provides that all data processing rmet be authorized & licensed by 
the Data Inspection Board, that personal information cannot be Bent 
abroad without special prior licensing, h that citizens have right 
of access to files concerning them. The March 1988 amendments 
include measures to tighten up on tax evasion h to restrict infor- 
mation on government activity available to individuals. 
Concerned only with conputer-baaed information systems. Creates a 
Registrar of Data Protection appointed by the Cram, who is respon- 
sible for the creation & maintenance of a registrar of data U-KS & 
may encourage trade associations OK other bodies representing data 
Users to prepare & disseminate to their membersr codes of practice 
for guidance in couplying with the data protection principles. A 
person holding data is defined as a data user if: 1) data is a part 
of a collection of data processed, or intended to be processed by or 
for the person, on equiplnent operating automatically: 2) person con-
trols the contents & use of the data: 3) data must be in the form in 
which they will be, or have been processed. 
Amended section 222 of the Cummications Act of 1934 to repeal the 

limitation upon Western Union which prevented it from providing 

international comications services in couptition with the inter-

national record carriers. 

Prohibits using appropriated fun& to pay the U.S. contributions to 
UNEsCo if UNEsCo iaplements a policy to: 1) licenee journalists OK 
their publications: 2) restrict the free flaw of information; OK 3)
iupoee mandatory journalistic codes. Exeapts private sector repre- 
sentatives from conflict+f-interest requirement when aerving on 
US. delegations to international telecommunications meetings. Thia 
provision applies to meetings of the ITU h its consultative coamit- 
tees, 88 well as any other international telecomaunicatione meetings 
or conferences designated by the Secretary of State. 
Authorizes appropriations for the National Telecomnunications 6 

Information Administration EY ‘83& ‘84. Directs the Administration 
to conduct a study of the long-range telecomnuricatione h informa-
tion goals, policies, 6 strategies of the US. Directs the Adminis-
tration to review the manner by which the US. develops its 
telecoamurications h information policy. 
Title VII - Requires that tax returns h return information be made 
available to officers h eupl~yees of the General Accounting Office 
(-1 for the purpose of any audit authorized by law with respect to 
any program or activity carried out under the Social Security Act. 
Prohibits the disclosure of m e t h e  for the selection of tax returns 
for audits. 
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Public Law 97-98, Department of 
Energy National Security & Military
Applications of Nuclear Energy 
Authorization Act of 1982. 12/4/81. 
public Law 97-145, Export Admin-
istration Am?n&renta Act of 1981. 
12/29/81 
Public Law 97-364, National Driver 

Registration Act of 1982. 18/25/62. 

public Law 97-326, Consolidated 
Federal Funds Report Act of 1982 
18/25/62. 
Public Law 97-369, Department of 
Ransportation & Related Agencies 
Appropriations Act, 1983. 
12/18/82. 
Public Law 97-33, A bill to amend 
the International Investment Survey
Act of 1976. 8/7/81. 
Public Law 97-35, Cnmibus Reconcilia- 
tion Act of 1981. 8/13/81. 
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Amends the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 to direct the Secretary of 
Energy to prescribe regulations prohibiting the dis-mination of 
apecific unclassified information concerning a t d c  energy defense 
program which could have significant adverse affects on the health, 
safety, 6 security of the public. Directs the Secretary to prepare a 
quarterly report detailing the application of such guidelines. 
Requires all information regarding export controls to be made avail-
able upon request to the appropriate CongressioMl Cormittee & to 
the W.Prohibits such camittee h the GAO from disclosing, except 
under specified circumstances, any such information that was 
submitted confidentially. 
Title I1 - Eliminates the register in the Department of Connerce 
that lists the names of persons who had their motor vehicle opera- 
tor's licenses revoked. Directs the Secretary of Transportation to 
establish and maintain a National Driver Register to assist chief 
driver licensing officials of participating states in exchanging 
info-tion regarding the M)tOK vehicle driver record6 Of individ-
uals. Prohibits Secretary from keeping information in Register for 
more than seven years. 
Amenda the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1970 to direct Coup-
troller General of the US. to proaulgate standards for the collec- 
tion h reporting by all Federal agencies of information on the 
geographic distribution of Federal funds h to review agency coapli- 
ance with standards. Directs the President to designate a Federal 
agency to: 1) receive & review agency reports of Federal funds, 2)
establish & maintain an information system on the geographic distri- 
bution of funds, & 3) generate reports for U-KS of such systems. 
Requires hresident to designate a Federal agency to create 6 operate
five regional data analysis centers which shall provide public 
policy analyses of information on distribution of funds. 
Requires the Inspector General, OK conparable official of the 
Department of Transportation, to suknit to Congress, with a budget 
justificationr an evaluation of the agency's progress to institute 
effective management controls & the accuracy & conpleteness of data 
provided to the Federal Procurement Data System regarding consultant 
service contractual arrangements. 
Amends the International Investment Survey Act of 1976 to require 
benchmark surveys of foreign direct investment in the U.S. covering
1980 h 1987 h every fifth year thereafter. Require8 all atUlUal COm-
pilation of currently available data on U.S. portfolio investuents 
abroad. Directs the Secretary of Coamerce to report on the estimated 
coat of conpiling data on legislation enacted by major U.S. trading 
partners & other foreign nations which regulated foreign inward 
investment in such nations. Deletes the requirement that the Presi- 
dent report to Congress on any studies conducted pursuant to the Act 
Amends the Older Americana Act of 1965 to eliminate the National 
Information Resource Clearinghouse for the Aged. 
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Public Law 97-98, Agriculture & Food 
Act of 1981. 12/22/81. 
Public Law 97-113, International 
Security & Dewlopent Cooperation 
Act of 1981. 12/29/81. 
Public Law 97-219, Small Buainesa 
Innovation Research Act of 1981. 
7/22/82 
Public Law 97-292, Miming Children 
Act. 10/12/82. 




Public Law 97-290, Export Trading 
Coapany Act of 1982. 10/8/82. 
Public Law 97-215, A bill to amend 
the manufacturing clauae of the 
copyright law. 
Gowrrunent report in preparation. 
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Title XIV - Department of Agriculture should establish working 
relationships with foreign information and data systems. Revises 
specified notification responsibilities of the National Agricultural 
Library's Feed & Nutrition Information 6 Education Resources Center. 
Title XVt Subtitle I - Department of Agriculture in connection with 
other Federal agencies should develop a farmland protection policy, 
& criteria for identifying the effect of Federal programs on the 
conversion of farmland to non-agricultural uses. Directs the Secre- 
tary to develop agricultural land resource information. 
Title I - Requires the President to report to Congress within 48 
hours of the existence of, or a change in statue of, certain hostil- 
ities or terrorist acts (currently after the outbreak of significant 
hostilities) involving a country in which U.S. personnel are per- 
forming certain defense services. Requires such report to include 
the country's identity, description of such hostilities or terrorist 
acts, & the number of U.S. armed forces 6 civilians who may be 
endangered. 
Amends the Small Business Act to direct the Small Business Adminis- 
tration to: 1) maintain an information program to provide small 
business an opportunity to participate in Federal small business 
innovation research (SBIR) program; 2) coordinate a schedule for 
release of agency SBIR solicitations 6 prepare a mater release 
schedule: 3) monitor SBIR programs with Federal agencies: 6 4) 
6 4) report annually to the Congressional Small Business Cornnittee 
on SBIR program. 
Requires the Attorney General to acquire 6 exchange information to 
assist Federalr State, 6 local officials in the identification of 
certain deceased individuals 6 in the location of missing persons 
(including unemancipated persona). 

Secretary of Labor is to reserve from specified set-aside funds, 
sum8 necessary to operate a Federal/State cooperative statistical 
labor market information program. Directs Secretary to maintain on a 
national, state, local, 6 other appropriate basis: 1) a carprehen-
sive national s y s t e m  of labor market information: & 2) household 
budget data reflecting differences in location. Directs Secretary to 
publish an annual report linking labor force status with earnings & 
income. Directs Secretary, in cooperation with the Secretaries of 
Commerce, Defense, Treasury, Education, 6 the Director of the Office 
of Management 6 Budget, to review 6 integrate national information 
systems, maintain standardized definitions, 6 provide technical 
assistance to the States for an occupational supply/demand informa- 
tion s y s t e m .  
Title I - Directs the Secretary of Comerce to promote export trad- 
ing conpanies by providing information 6 by facilitating contacts 
between producers of exportable goode 6 export trading coapanies. 
Amends the copyright law to extend through July 11 1986, the 
requirement that inported non-dramatic literary works in English be 
manufactured in North America. 
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The Analysis of Information Policy 
ROBERT H. BURGER 
A WELL-KNOWN WRITER ON information policy once stated at a dinner 
speech: “In information policy everything is related to everything else.” 
Such a viewpoint certainly does make a listener aware of the complexity 
that surrounds and is part of information policy, but it does nothing to 
enable the intelligent layperson, or even a policy analyst, to understand 
and evaluate analyses of information policies written by others. On 
what basis are we to judge policy analysis of information issues? Should 
our primary anchor be the Constitution, or economics, or the progress 
of science, or international development? Should privacy and the free 
flow of scientific ideas be sacrificed for national security and secrecy? 
These are questions that the policy analysts and information pro- 
fessionals have been grappling with and continue tograpple with daily. 
The purpose of this article is to give the reader some background for 
assessing and evaluating policy analysis in the field of information; 
describe the various contexts in which such policy is formulated, imple- 
mented, and evaluated; and provide some predictive comments about 
the role of information policy analysis for the future. As an end product, 
it is hoped that the reader can more effectively assess a policy analysis on 
information. 
The focus of this paper is public policy,which means policies made 
by governments on behalf of its citizenry. This focus implies that the 
government making the policy has some power at its disposal in order to 
effect a given policy. But what is public policy? One broad definition 
describes public policy as “a set of interrelated decisions taken by a 
Robert H. Burger is Assistant Slavic Librarian and Associate Professor of Library Admin- 
istration, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign. 
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political actor or group of actors concerning the selection of goals and 
the means of achieving them within a specified situation where these 
decisions should, in principle, be within the power of these actors to 
achieve.”’ This definition emphasizes that public policy is a decision to 
do something and that the decision concerns a specific area of human 
society. These two characteristics of public policy can therefore help to 
explain all the different types of analysis used by policy analysts in 
helping an organization to reach a decision and also explain why 
academics and applied analysts tend to work in specific areas of public 
policy such as health care, economics, civil rights, or information 
policy. 
In order to understand the analysis of information policy four key 
areas will be explored: (1) the policy process itself, (2) types of policy, 
(3)  models or assumptions about policy-making, and(4) values inherent 
in policy analysis. Systems analysis, queuing theory, PERT charts, and 
the like will not be part of this discussion. Instead, policy analysis will 
be viewed from a more abstract vantage point. 
The Policy Process 
Policy theorists have attempted to divide the process of making 
public policy into several stages and once these stages are defined, to 
explore each stage in more detail. The three stages are usually identified 
as policy formation, policy implementation, and policy evaluation and 
feedback. These stages have been given various names and different 
ancillary activities have been added to one or another stage. One of the 
reasons that these stages have emerged is that distinct types of activities 
and actions go on in each stage and these differences have suggested this 
trichotomy. 
Policy Formation 
Policy formation focuses on several areas. First are the policy actors 
themselves. In order for policy-making to take place, people must be 
involved. These policy actors are those who make the policy decisions 
and those who influence the policy-making positively or negatively. 
They may be in different levels of government and have different types 
of constraints on their activity. If they are within the bureaucratic 
hierarchy (as opposed to those who can, for all intents and purposes, 
ignore the bureaucratic constraints), they probably must follow organi- 
zational rules that limit their activity and influence. If the policy actors 
are elected officials, the ever-present concern of reelection may influence 
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their behavior and therefore the scope and strength of their influence on 
certain issues is altered accordingly. 
Policy actors may also be outside of government altogether but 
have a special interest in the adoption of a specific policy by the 
government. These actors from outside government attempt to influ- 
ence the governmental policy actors who have the authority to make 
policy. “Thus, policy making usually involves a diverse set of authorita-
tive, or formal, policy makers, who operate within the government 
arena, plus adiverse set of special interest andother constituency groups 
from outside arenas, who press their demands on these formal leaders.”’ 
Second, policy formation involves policy goals and instructions. In 
order to carry out a policy effectively, or even to make a policy, the actors 
presumably have a goal in mind. This goal may be technical, social, or 
political; it may be implicit or explicit. The difficulty with analyzing 
this stage of policy-making is identifying the goals implied by the 
policy. Some policies do not have explicitly stated goals. This, of course, 
will effect how the policy is implemented. 
A policy without clearly defined goals can be interpreted according 
to those goals perceived, with or without justification, by those imple- 
menting the policy. These perceived goals of implementers and the 
implicit but not clearly stated goals of policymakers may not always 
coincide. In addition to the goals of the policy, specific directions for 
implementing the policy are often given. This is desirable because 
without specific directions about how the policy should be imple- 
mented and the authority to enforce these directions, the policy may not 
be implemented in a way desired by the creators of the policy. Hence, 
clarity in both the definition of policy goals and policy directions is 
essential in order to implement a policy. Without goals and specific 
directions, the implemented policy may not at all resemble the original 
intent of the policymakers. 
Policy Implementation 
Many factors have been identified that affect the implementation of 
policy. Making a policy does not ensure its implementation in a form 
intended by the policymakers. At the implementation stage, many 
changes can occur that often are beyond the control ofthe policymakers 
and that often cannot be foreseen by even the most astute political 
veteran. Groups affecting policy implementation include: (1) policy-
makers, (2) formal implementers, (3) lobbyists or lobby agencies, and 
(4)the press. The power of each of these groups varies dependingon the 
type of policy. 
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Policy implementation usually involves a different set of actors. 
However, policymakers do get involved usually in order to ensure that 
their policy is implemented in a way consonant with their original 
intent. They may intervene in the implementation of their policy in 
different ways dependingon their authority or power, and they may take 
credit (a good policy outcome is a political asset) or disclaim responsi- 
bility (a poor political outcome is a political liability) for the actual 
implementation. 
Formal implementers are responsible for implementing a policy 
made by another set of people at a different level of government-the 
policymakers. Formal implementers include administrators within 
departments, agencies, bureaus, and regulatory agencies. There are also 
agents of these implementers, such as governmental bureaucrats at the 
state or municipal level. 
Lobbyists also are active in this stage of the policy process. Lobby- 
ing takes place in an attempt to make the implementation of a specific 
policy work for the lobbyists’ constituency. Coalitions of like-minded 
groups, or separate agencies themselves, may bank together to influence 
the implementation of a given policy. Finally, the press and representa- 
tives of the mass media also influence this aspect of the policy process. 
The well-placed story, the vitriolic editorial can and does have an effect 
on the implementation of specific policies. 
Besides these specific actors, there are other constraints on the 
implementation of policy: these are organizational structures-e.g., 
internal operating regulations, resource allocation guidelines, and the 
psychological motivations of the implementers themselves. Different 
organizations have different assumptions about their own operations. 
Researchers have identified different institutional models of policy 
implementation: the systems management model that looks at the 
implementation as a “goal-directed activity”; the “bureaucratic process 
model” which views implementation as a routine process of continually 
controlling discretion; the “organizational development model” in 
which implementation is seen as a participatory process on behalf of the 
implementers; and the “conflict and bargaining model” which views 
implementation as a conflict and bargaining p r o ~ e s s . ~  These organiza- 
tional models influence the way in which policies are implemented 
because of the expectations about implementation that are inherent in 
them. Furthermore, internal rules and regulations often dictate how 
policies are implemented. The rules and regulations often win adher- 
ence over the actual intent of the policy implemented. For example, 
during the Cuban missile crisis, President Kennedy was often frustrated 
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because the armed forces’ standing operating procedures would auto- 
matically intitiate actions, such as a specific type of alert, that interfered 
with Kennedy’s own executive actions to defuse the crisis. 
Any organization, in spite of the policy directive ordering imple- 
mentation, has to operate within the constraints of its own resources. If 
a policy requires more resources than the organization possesses, the 
policy will not be implemented to the extent intended by the policy. 
Finally, psychological attributes of the implementer may influence the 
implementation of policy. 
Policy Evaluation and Feedback 
Policy evaluation attempts to answer the question of how well or 
how close the policy comes to achieving its original goals. For the 
purpose of this discussion, however, financial evaluation through au- 
dits is not considered. The evaluators can be identified as policymakers, 
the policy implementers, and formal program evaluators. 
Policymakers usually engage in the least formal type of evaluation 
depending primarily on feedback from the policy implemented. Feed- 
back consists of mail, telephone calls, and other types of communica-
tions from the policymaker’s constituency, which, over time, give the 
policymaker an impression of how well a given policy has been received 
by constituents. The policymakers base their actions, to a major degree, 
on the assumption that satisfied constituents mean reelection; reelec- 
tion means power, a major goal of politicians. 4 
Policy implementers, on the other hand, have a different approach 
to evaluation. Like the policymakers, policy implementers have a per- 
sonal stake in the success of their policy. Their reputation and future 
depend on such success. Therefore, they attempt to maintain and 
increase the support of policymakers for the policy implemented. 
Because of this the type of evaluation coming from implementers is apt 
to be biased in favor of the policy. Policy implementers can influence 
the evaluation of policy in several ways: (1) they can filter information 
about the success of the policy that is intended for the policymaker; 
(2) they can mobilize support from groups affected by the policy and 
urge positive feedback to the policymaker; and (3) they can use resources 
of the program implemented to gain support from affected group^.^ 
The political stakes are high for both makers and implementers in 
the evaluation process. Both groups of actors will naturally attempt to 
put the best face on any policy with which they are involved. Becauseof 
this bias, evaluations of policy emanating from these groups may not be 
the most accurate indication about the success of a specific policy. 
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Another group of evaluators, technical evaluators, can sometimes pro- 
vide the corrective that is needed for biased evaluations. 
Technical evaluators are usually hired by policymakers or policy 
implementers in order to provide an objective evaluation of a specific 
policy. Of course, because of the financial arrangement involved, these 
evaluators are subject to pressure from their benefactors to examine a 
policy outcome in the most favorable light. Of course, these technical 
evaluators also must maintain their reputation as professional evalua- 
tors. They do this by providing an evaluation that is as objective and 
unbiased as possible. In order for a policy to be evaluated objectively, i t  
must meet certain basic tests: 
1. 	Policy goals are stated clearly. 
2. 	These goals are precise enough to be measurable. 
3. 	Implementation activities are directed toward achieving these goals. 
4. 	Objective measures that relate implementation activities to goals 
exist or can be created. 
5. The data necessary to verify these measures are available.6 
The main problem usually encountered is that the first test is not 
met. Often the goals of the policy are stated in language that cannot be 
measured. For example, in one paragraph of the statute that set up 
the National Science Foundation (PL81-507, sec. 3[a][5]), one goal 
was to “foster the interchange of scientific information among scientists 
in the United States and foreign countries.” On reflection, one will 
realize how difficult it would be to assess whether this goal had been 
met. The discussion of goals, however, brings us to the next area of 
discussion-i.e., policy types or areas of policy. 
Policy Types 
Theodore Lowi has described four types of policy identified by 
their functional goals. These types are distributive, redistributive, regu- 
latory, and constituency-based. Lowi’s purpose in describing public 
policy in this way is so that political scientists can “develop criteria for 
policy choice in terms of predicted and desired impacts on the political 
system, just as economists, biologists, and the like attempt to predict 
and guide policies according to their societal impacts. ”’ 
Distributive policies are those that are “characterized by the ease 
with which they can be disaggregated and dispensed unit by small unit, 
each unit more or less in isolation from other units and from any general 
rule. ‘Patronage’ in the fullest meaning of the word can be taken as a 
synonym for ‘distributive’ ’” Regulatory policies attempt to control the 
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action of a group of persons or a corporate body by allowingor prohibit- 
ing behavior. The decision “involves a direct choice as to who will be 
indulged and who deprived.” Examples are allocation of television 
channels and truth in advertising. Redistributive policies confer bene- 
fits, much like distributive policies, but they are different because they 
simultaneously take away benefits from other groups. The fourth type 
of policy-constituency policies, referred to by others, are self-regulatory 
policies-are the most difficult to describe and characterize. As Salis- 
bury explains it they “also impose constraints upon a group, but are 
perceived only to increase, not decrease, the beneficial options to the 
group.”’ Lowi includes reapportionment or setting u p  a new agency as 
examples. These are distinguished from redistributive policies by the 
type of group immediately affected. With constituent policies the politi- 
cal party is the beneficiary. With redistributive policy, nonparty groups 
are immediately affected such as reserve controls of credit, progressive 
income tax, and social security.” 
Characterizing policies in this way helps to understand what the 
policy actors perceive to be the functional goal of a policy. If we know 
the functional goal of a specific policy as perceived by the policy actors, 
we may be able to predict how the policy will be influenced by different 
policy actors, both public and private. Also, given the historical circum- 
stances at the time of the policy-making, the probable success of adopt- 
ing a policy can be assessed. 
For our purposes it is enough to realize that political scientists have 
attempted to classify policies according to functional goals. When 
applying these four classes to information policy, as Linowes and 
Bennett have done in their paper, it is clear that information policy- 
making and implementation may be more difficult to understand than 
are traditional public policies that can be easily classified by Lowi’s 
four-part typology. This difficulty arises because, while many different 
types of policies are subsumed under the rubric of information policy, i t  
is not clear that their common characteristic of information coincides 
with each of the policies’ functional goals. Further, certain information 
policies, such as privacy policy, may belong to another as yet unnamed 
policy type as suggested by Linowes and Bennett. 
In speaking about these four policy types, based on functional 
goals, the functional goal was that perceived by the policy actors. 
Assumptions about the perceptions of policy actors, as well as their 
motivations, determine to a great degree the analysis of a given policy. 
Analysts’ assumptions about the perceptions of policy actors and the 
actors’ behavior can be described as models of policy-making. 
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Models of Policy-Making 
There are many models that attempt to explain the way people in 
organizations make decisions. Political scientists are continuously 
searching for the best model to apply to a given public policy. In this 
article only three such models will be examined-the rational actor 
model, the bureaucratic model, and the garbage can model. The descrip- 
tion of these three representations will help us to understand the wide 
range of such models. 
The rational actor model assumes that policy formulators and 
implementers are rational and are able to act unencumbered by external 
events. The  main guide for action and decision-making is rationality. 
Hence the decision-making process involves the following steps: 
(1) identification of the problem; (2) consideration and description of 
all facets of the problem; (3) offering several solutions for the problem 
based on the constraints delineated in the second step; (4)outlining the 
advantages and disadvantages of each solution; and ( 5 )choosing one of 
the solutions based on the assumption of achieving maximum benefit. 
The  model carries with it some assumptions: there is enough time to 
carry out the process outlined; no interfering variables arise during the 
decision-making process; and once the decision is made for action, the 
desired result will be achieved. 
Although this model of organizational decision-making is often 
used as a straw man by analysts, the assumptions that make up  the 
model can still be seen in many public media accounts of policy choice 
and tragic events. When this model is applied one of two things 
happens. Either failure of the policy is attributed to the failure of the 
rational actors to consider all the alternatives and make the right choice 
(the events leading up  to the bombing of the U.S. Marine barracks in 
Beirut is but one example), or the analyst is bewildered as to why the 
policy implementation did not turn out as was planned. Thecontention 
in this latter case is that the policy implementers followed the dictates of 
rationality but still were foiled. 
The second decision-making model is the so-called bureaucratic 
model. This model assumes that in spite of the intent of those formula- 
ting the policy, once it moves to the implementation stage, certain 
phenomena affect the policy in possibly undesirable ways. The person 
using the bureaucratic model assumes that the bureaucracy is essentially 
a rule-governed system. People within the system make decisions on the 
basis of clearly established rules and modes of conduct. Any policy that 
is to be implemented by a bureaucracy must be transformed in such a 
way that whatever the intent of the policymakers about the implementa- 
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tion of the policy, the bureaucratic rules of the implementingorganiza- 
tion will be more powerful. In this type of implementation, rules, not 
policy goals or rationality, carry the day. 
The third decision-making model is called the garbage can model. 
This is at the other end of the spectrum from the rational actor model. 
This model applies to decisions where the goals may be far from clear 
and the methods and constraints on implementation are assumed to 
affect the final policy outcome. In this model the decision-making 
process is pictured as a garbage can into which policy goals, organiza- 
tional rules and constraints, the “right climate,” and other often unex- 
pected variables are thrown together. The resulting policy outcome is 
often unpredictable and because of the ambiguous nature of the policy 
goals itself, often unrecognizable. 
The reader of a policy analysis should be aware that analysts have 
certain assumptions about how decisions are made in government. 
These assumptions are often not explicit, but they certainly affect the 
conclusions of the policy analysis. One way of testing the credibility or 
legitimacy of a given analysis is to ask what assumptions about organi- 
zational choice the writer makes. If the assumptions are in doubt then 
the entire analysis may come into question. Finally, there is one related 
area of any given policy that may be more difficult to ascertain than the 
writer’s assumptions about decision-making. This is the area of 
assumed values of the analyst. 
Values Inherent in Policy Analysis 
Carlyle Marney has stated: “All institutional loyalties are value 
judgments. Institutionalism becomes a structure native to prejudice 
precisely because the institution exists to mark the edges of a valu- 
able.”” All analysts have some type of institutional affiliation. These 
affiliations and loyalties inhere in the analyst’s judgment about a spe- 
cific policy. For example, the analyst who works for the Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA) can be expected to have a different analysis of 
an EPA policy than would the analyst who is employed by a waste 
disposal firm. These types of institutional loyalties are strong and 
probably the most visible. But there are other types of institutional 
loyalties that are stronger and that are often more difficult to perceive- 
i.e., the institutions of law, economics, politics, science, and religion. 
These types of institutions, as much as those mentioned earlier, have 
more power and influence on the conduct of policy analysis and on the 
conclusions reached as a result of that analysis. 
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For example, the scientist arguing for the absenceof any control on 
scientific communication will certainly and obviously be in conflict 
with a politician who claims that such unimpeded free access will 
damage the security of the United States. The creationist’s claim that his 
beliefs are scientific will have an argument from a scientist who will 
attempt to dispute that claim, or from a district judge who will dispute it 
on legal grounds. These are cases where the conflict between the values 
of these institutions are easily discernible. But in other cases the conflict 
may not be readily perceivable because the reader adheres to the values of 
both institutions. For example, there is much publicity today about the 
technological race between the Americans and the Japanese. A book 
by Ezra Vogel at Harvard, entitled Japan as Number One, makes 
four recommendations for catching up  with and surpassing the 
Japanese in high technology. One of these urges a deemphasis on 
individualism in this country for the good of the larger whole. It 
may be necessary, suggests Vogel, to curb civil liberties in order to 
achieve our goal of being number one.12 
Although this may be oversimplifying Vogel’s argument, we are 
faced here with a conflict in value institutions in which most of us are 
caught. On the one hand is the institution of economic security and 
supremacy and on the other is the American ideal of liberty guaranteed 
in the Bill of Rights. This type of value-laden analysis is more difficult 
to deal with because we have allegiance to both institutions of value. It is 
in this area of public-policy analysis, the resolution of ambiguity in 
decision-making and policy choice, that more work remains to be done. 
Information Policy 
How are the attributes of policy analysis applicable to information 
policy? Can these same categories be applied to information policy, and 
if so, why isn’t more progress made in the analysis of information policy 
itself? One answer lies in an area to which most of the writers in this 
volume have drawn attention-the impact of technology on the trans- 
mission, reception, and use of information. Technology has rendered 
former policies governing information obsolete. These former policies 
were based on assumptions about information transfer and use in a 
predominantly print culture. Our culture is now no longer predomi- 
nantly print. Whether we are in a transition stage from a print culture to 
an electronic culture, as many would maintain, is a matter of debate. But 
at the very least, the influence of electronic communication devices and 
computers has altered the base upon which previous policies were 
formulated. It is also this rapid introduction of new technology that is 
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responsible for the piecemeal character of information policy. For 
example, a policy is made in response to a new technology. Soon after 
implementation of the policy a new technological application is 
invented that requires modification of the existing policy or promulga- 
tion of another policy to cover this new aspect. Furthermore, with 
change occurring so rapidly, it is difficult to predict the characteristics 
of new changes that will require new policy. As a result, planning for 
information policy in order to have a coherent and sensible program is 
thwarted because of our inability to be prescient. 
What is needed now is an intensive amount of work in information- 
policy analysis from a political science perspective given the categories 
of the analysis described earlier. We must move beyond the merely 
descriptive studies of information policy, as valuable as these are, to 
analytical and prescriptive studies of information policies. In spite of 
the burgeoning literature about information policy, we are still in a 
quandary about what information policy really is. What kind of policy 
is information policy? Is it a redistributive policy, a regulatory policy, or 
some new breed not yet described? Can we really speak of information 
policy at all or is i t  simply an umbrella term for problematic policies 
spawned by the advent of the new electronic communication devices and 
computers? 
These are all urgent and difficult questions, but perhaps the most 
difficult ones will revolve around competing value systems. In formu- 
lating and implementing information policies, we as a society are going 
to have to make some difficult choices or the choices will be made for us 
by the momentum of the existing structures and values of policy forma- 
tion and implementation. The process does not promise to be a cooly 
rational and calm one but is likely to be divisive and inflammatory. The 
outcome and the choices we make may eventually determine whether 
individual liberty and the freedoms guaranteed by the Bill of Rights will 
persist or, for the sake of an economically supreme and politically stable 
society, some of these rights will be curtailed. It is not too strident or 
alarmist to state that the present and future information-policy activity 
is central to our survival as a democracy. Hence, it is of the utmost 
importance that the greatest number of citizens be able to understand 
and critique information policies. 
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